CIA LIBRARY

New Series · Volume I · Number 1

back v. 1, no. 2

Studies

on the

Soviet Union

FILE COPY
PLEASE RETURN TO:
G-F-39

1961

CIA LIBRARY

Institute for the Study of the USSR

The views expressed in this journal
are those of their authors.
They are not bound by any single political philosophy
nor are they to be construed as representing
the point of view of the INSTITUTE

Material contained herein may be reproduced.
provided reference is made to this publication

Verantwortlich für den Inhalt:
S. STANKIEVIČ

Herausgeber: Institut zur Erforschung der UdSSR, e.V., München 22, Mannhardtstr. 6, Tel. 22 06 81-84.
Verlag: HORST ERDMANN VERLAG für Internationalen Kulturaustausch, Herrenalb/Schw.
Printed in Germany by Erich Pabel, Druck- und Verlagshaus, Rastatt/Baden

Foreword

On July 8, 1960, the Institute for the Study of the USSR completed ten years of research and publication activity. During these ten years it has acquired a substantial library of original source materials, has gathered around it a large number of full-time and contributing researchers and has published a wide variety of monographs, conference reports, reviews and other information and reference materials in various languages. The monthly Institute *Bulletin*, now in its eighth year, has been its principal English-language periodical, and will continue publication.

While aiming at a scholarly approach, the monthly *Bulletin* has dealt mainly with current developments in the Soviet Union. In response to a demand for a Review also dealing with problems of present importance but at greater length and in more general terms, the Institute is introducing the present *Studies on the Soviet Union, New Series*, which it is hoped will be no less useful. While bearing the name of a review published twice yearly since 1957, the *New Series* will be considerably broader in scope in addition to appearing more often. It will also to some extent replace and make available to a larger audience the research previously published in a number of Institute periodicals of narrower scope, now discontinued.

Studies on the Soviet Union, New Series, will contain background articles on such basic problems of life in the Soviet Union as ideology, foreign policy, industry and agriculture, art, literature and religion. It will also include analyses of important current trends. Considerable attention will be devoted to studies of developments in the various Union Republics and among the various peoples. Space will be given to bibliographies, book reviews and notes on Institute activities of general interest. Many of the articles will reflect the results of research by the Institute staff, most of whom have had direct experience of life in the Soviet Union as well as years of work in the Institute library, where they have at their disposal one of the largest separate collections of Soviet materials in Europe. Contributions from outside scholars will also be included. The Institute will particularly welcome new contributors, who are invited to address articles or inquiries to the Editor.

Comments and criticisms of *Studies on the Soviet Union, New Series*, will be greatly appreciated, and it is hoped that readers will bring it to the attention of individuals, libraries and other possible subscribers.

The Institute for the Study of the USSR is a body of émigré scholars from the Soviet Union whose aim is to furnish reliable information regarding conditions and trends in the Soviet Union today. The offices of the Institute, which was founded in 1950, are in Munich, Germany. Its studies embrace the general field of the social sciences, including various aspects of economics, law, government and Party, history, education, religion, literature, and social organization. The views expressed in the *Studies on the Soviet Union* or other Institute publications are those of their authors. Contributors are not bound by any single political philosophy nor are their views to be construed as representing those of the Institute.

*

All comments and inquiries are most welcome and should be addressed to:

Institute for the Study of the USSR
Editor, Studies on the Soviet Union
Mannhardtstrasse 6
Munich, Germany

Table of Contents

Political and Ideological Problems

GEORG STADTMÜLLER
The Initial Attraction of Communism 5

L. M. UYAZEBEK
The Political Status of the Tatar Autonomous Republic . . . 12

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
The Soviet Intellectuals: Observations from Two Journeys . . 25

Economic Problems

IVAN S. KOROPECKKJ
Soviet Industrial Location in Practice 38

VSEVOLOD HOLUBNYCHY
Recent Soviet Theories of Value 47

A. ARKHIMOVICH
The 1960 Soviet Harvest 73

Literature and Science

G. OLGIN
Soviet Views on the Metaphysics of Relativity 83

PANAS FEDENKO
Soviet Views on the 1960 World Historical Congress 115

I. N. BUSHMAN
The Tolstoy Jubilee in the USSR 125

BOOK REVIEWS

The Application of Mathematics in Economic Research 136

Outlines of the History of the Communist Party of Armenia . . . 141

ERRATA

Page 13 line 6: "or with" should read "or to".

Page 13 line 7: "with those" should read "to those".

Page 14 line 4 should read: "the same methods which, it charges, were applied".

Page 20 line 15: "folowing" should read "following".

Page 22 line 32: "remarks" should read "speeches".

Page 38 line 8: "inbited" should read "inhabited".

Page 43 line 31: "reflected Soviet leaders' opinion" should read "reflected the Soviet leaders' opinion".

Page 47 footnote 1: "*Sochininiya*" should read "*Sochineniya*".

Page 59 footnote 37 line 2: "*Quaterly*" should read "*Quarterly*".

Page 60 footnote 37 line 8: "soviètieque" should read "soviétique".

Page 62 line 19: "Tugan-Baronovsky" should read "Tugan-Baranovsky".

Page 68 line 4: "score" should read "point".

Page 88 line 10: "paradox." should read "paradox,".

Page 96 line 8 should be deleted and read "which, according to many interpreters of Einstein, can be squeezed this".

Page 98 line 27 should read: "Into Metaphysics".

Page 104 line 20: after "must" insert "not".

Page 117 line 21: "Concress" should read "Congress".

Page 142 line 42: "elenventh" should read "eleventh".

Studies on the Soviet Union

Institute for the Study of the USSR

New Series | Number 1, 1961 | Volume 1

Political and Ideological Problems

The Initial Attraction of Communism

GEORG STADTMÜLLER

The unquestionable attraction exercised by totalitarian systems and ideologies appears at first sight difficult to account for, but it is essential to provide an explanation if we are to find a cure for the political illness of our time.

When one comes to examine this question, comparisons with the Nazi dictatorship leap to mind, and although one should beware of the temptation to overlook the very real differences between the Soviet and the Nazi systems, there are certain psychological characteristics common to both. We are confronted by the fact that both in Germany and in the Soviet Union a large proportion of the population (how large is a matter for dispute) were drawn into an organized mass-movement by means of a seemingly irresistible force. What is the nature of this attraction?

The power of fascination is a phenomenon known to psychologists; the word itself means suspension of the rational faculties under the superior pressure of a strong feeling that is aroused by the impact of some powerful external imagery, an impact so strong that it creates an inner picture in the human soul and in the end the individual concerned is convinced that this inner picture has become reality, or is capable of becoming reality, in the outer world. The effect is, of course, all the greater on someone who possesses no set of firm and coherent beliefs and is consequently in no position to resist the symbols and slogans of a totalitarian ideology. A spiritual vacuum is, in fact, the key psychological factor in explaining the lure of any totalitarian ideology; during the Nazi regime it was noteworthy that those with deep religious convictions formed the part of the population relatively immune to Hitler's ideology, which took skilful advantage of the need for a faith felt by every

human being. If this need is not satisfied by some form of philosophy or religion, the individual clutches at a substitute, or pseudo-faith, based on mass propaganda persuasion. This is the only way in which the attraction of the Soviet system is to be understood. Communism at first provides a satisfying answer at its particular level, and this lends it a powerful momentum; its answers appear all the more convincing because they are couched in what appear to be scientific terms. The Soviet ideology asserts that in the long succession of ideologies, it is the first to be also a science, that with the teachings of Marx and Engels the way to the false paradise of Utopian socialism was blocked and the path to a strictly scientific socialism was opened up in its place. For the first time there appeared an ideology with claims to scientific authority.

A further important source of the attraction of Communism is its monolithic nature: a philosophy which admits of questioning finds it far harder to impose itself, but Communism claims to have irrefutable and final answers to every question relating to the natural sciences or to history and human society. These answers rest upon a materialist basis, including the postulate that there is an evolutionary process governed by inflexible laws. Since, in Soviet eyes, history is governed by such laws, not only can the past be analyzed with the aid of the dialectic, but accurate forecasts can be made about the future course of history. For the first time, so claim Marx and Engels, it is possible to discover how the stages of human history succeed one another in obedience to natural laws, until universal Communism is established as the eschatological goal of the historical process. This claim to provide a logic of history forms an important part of the attractive force of Communism, and the Communists lose no opportunity to stress the inevitability of their triumph over the doomed capitalist system.

It has often been pointed out that Communism has distinctly religious features, and it is a moot point whether one should term it a substitute for a religion or a substitute religion. The first seems closer to the mark, because the Soviet system certainly has its hierarchy, doctrinal authorities, dogmas, Party conclaves, an organization of functionaries which resembles that of the religious orders and even its "sacred texts" for perusal by the faithful. The Party, with its Church-like claims, embodies the essence of the Soviet system and its doctrine of salvation; therefore, the ardent Communist owes his total allegiance to the Party, as such memoirs as those of Wolfgang Leonhard and even more so those of Jan Valtin bear frightening witness. They tell of human beings whose ability to think and act freely according to the dictates of their conscience has become so atrophied that the Party in the end becomes to them a supreme value in itself. At one point Valtin writes:

> The Party comes first. Whole mountains of human lives lie buried beneath this epitaph. When someone has been in the Party, he has belonged to it body and soul. Despite the cynicism which increasingly fills the hearts of those who

dedicated their lives to the cause, we loved our Party. We were proud of its might and proud of our own bondage, because we had sacrificed to it all our youth, all the hopes, all the enthusiasm and selflessness which we once possessed.

Here one can detect a mental state which provides a clue to an understanding of the attraction of Communism: the human urge to embrace a cause wholeheartedly and to lose oneself in its service. Surrender of the self to the "community" or, as in the Soviet Union, to the "collective," appears to give purpose to the life of the individual and arouses the pleasurable sensation of being freed of personal responsibility. The individual is relieved of the heavy obligation of finding the truth through his own efforts, of making decisions in accord with his own conscience, of acting on his own responsibility. He feels himself lifted above all such obligations, which at the same time form the content of his dignity as a human being. This illusory solution of his problem lends a new and higher meaning to life and henceforth he has a new conception of the word "freedom." In Soviet ideology, as in Marx and Engels, "freedom" means insight into necessity. Since history in Communist eyes is seen as a predetermined process, the individual can only swim with the tide, being no more than a minute particle in the powerful stream of history. He can gain a limited degree of freedom only in the sense that he conceives of the process of history as a social and economic determinism and accepts the resulting necessity and its affirmation through action in conformity with the eternal laws of history.

How strong is the attractive force of the Soviet ideology when it comes into collision with other creeds? The writings of ex-Communists confirm that the individual who has been nurtured on dialectical and historical materialism, has imbibed it avidly in his youth and championed it, is less likely to have his faith undermined by disillusioning experiences within his own society than by contact with the outside world. Consequently, nothing is more vital to the self-preservation of the Soviet ideology than that its adherents should be sealed off as hermetically as possible from all such contact. Even among those who have rejected Communism, belief in the destiny of the Soviet Union as the saviour of mankind is slow to die; a revolution rarely devours all its children, and the cast of thought inculcated by an abandoned ideology cannot be completely eradicated. Most ex-Communists seem to be prey to a particular form of doubt: they try to maintain their belief in Marxism, but if its premises are correct, how, they ask themselves, was the rise of Stalinism possible? They are at a loss to explain at what point Communism strayed from the royal road of Marxism-Leninism into its Stalinist degradation, and at what stage false conclusions were drawn from these correct premises.

Here one may ask to what extent those who live under the Communist system actually approve of it, and on what grounds. The minority which joined the Bolsheviks in the early years after the Revolution may well have been sincere and disinterested servants of the new cause, but the fruits of their sacrifices were reaped by the bureaucratic class which succeeded them,

and which protested its Communist convictions in order to preserve its material privileges. It is hard to tell whether this "new class" genuinely believes in the Soviet system; within the Soviet bloc, it tends to enjoy an almost bourgeois way of life as the reward for its docile compliance with the demands of the Party line. This development within the Communist social system is often overlooked in the outside world, where it is mainly the psychological impact of its monolithic structure which attracts attention. But it would appear that within the confines of the Soviet bloc this impact is hardly felt by the present generation, and that Communist propaganda enjoys greater success in the non-Communist world than it does at home. This leads to the conclusion that the effort to put an initially alluring idea into practice results in self-defeat and disillusionment and the facts tend to support this conclusion. The old Marxist battle-cry of man's ability to act as his own deliverer undoubtedly made an important contribution to the success of the Bolshevik underground political activity before the seizure of power. But in the Soviet Union today it has lost much of its revolutionary *élan* and novelty, and no longer grips the imagination.

The psychological advantage which the Communists have always possessed in the field of propaganda is an indisputable fact, but this advantage stems less from Communist strength than from the political weakness and disunity of the outside world. This lack of political unity goes hand in hand with the absence of any generally-accepted philosophy and a pluralistic way of life which tolerates the existence of a multitude of differing and conflicting opinions and outlooks. Western democracy is not prepared to forego this pluralistic form of society, which means that, in the initial stages, at least, it is at a disadvantage in any ideological combat with Communism, although in the course of any prolonged and free exchange of views between East and West, the latter could prove its superiority. This superiority can, however, only manifest itself through the medium of genuinely uninhibited discussions between private individuals, not through so-called East-West talks at government level. Communist ideology appears psychologically more effective for the simple reason that it admits of no freedom of discussion; the Kremlin is conscious of this weakness and therefore forbids any normal intercourse with the non-Communist world. Only delegations of carefully-picked and ideologically well-primed Party functionaries are, as a general rule, allowed to engage in discussions with Western representatives.

Let us turn to an examination of the present world situation and the status in it of the Soviet Union and the entire Soviet empire. We see that this powerful bloc of states which in the forty years of its existence has cost the lives of millions of individuals, has drawn to itself, through the power of fascination of its messianic mission, millions of others, only to disillusion them and misuse them. It has converted these persons from idealists to cynics, from fanatics to doubters, from fighters to slaves and from murderers to the murdered, but has placed in positions of unparalleled power in its higher offices a small group of

persons who have outlived all this intact. This group rules through terror and propaganda as well as through promises for the future and with the dizzying consciousness of being the representative of the powerful nation which has initiated the conquest of the universe with the firing of its sputnik. We see that this bloc of states, in spite of its record, not only keeps in troubled suspense by its powerful apparatus of force and propaganda both Europe and America, but also holds a remarkable degree of fascination for what are known as the developing countries.

It is this appeal which constitutes the most serious political problem of our time. The former colonial territories of the European powers are faced with specific difficulties: when a people which has existed passively under less modern social conditions for centuries realises, after contact with Western industrialised societies, that another way of life is possible, there develops an impatience of explosive force and a hectic urge to revolutionise conditions overnight. The belief that a modern industrial society can be created without passing through the intermediary stages which in the classic industrial societies of Western Europe have spanned a couple of centuries, is highly dangerous. An abrupt transformation of the traditional social structure in underdeveloped countries may cause serious disruption of social, tribal, moral and religious customs and values. The attempt to graft Western-style democracy on to countries where the social prerequisites are very different must inevitably at first bring about the most acute social convulsion; the pattern of events in South-East Europe in the early 19th century is being repeated, albeit with differences of emphasis, in the newly-developing countries, which as yet possess no stable middle class, no system of universal education, and no adequate supply of administrative personnel. Consequently, the efforts to practice Western democratic methods are often ill-starred, especially if certain elements among the ruling class abuse democractic procedures. In such cases, it is an easy way out to replace the civil government by a military junta, for the purpose of restoring a superficial stability to the political scene. The authoritarian "emergency exit" from a democratic system which has failed to satisfy expectations swiftly enough has become a tempting solution in many of the newly-independent states.

The urge for technical progress has seized hold of the now developing countries, and they have access to the most up-to-date Western knowledge; their students have the opportunity to receive training abroad, and in consequence there is little or no shortage, for example, of engineers in the Asian countries at least. It is, indeed, reported that the supply of engineers in India outstrips the demands of industry at its present level of development. The implication is that it is simpler to produce trained personnel than to build up industrial potential as an organic whole, covering all branches of production. This is a typical feature of a situation in which the economically underdeveloped countries are attempting to catch up in the shortest possible time with the industrial and technical level of the world's foremost economic powers, including

as one of their models the Soviet Union, which exercises such a powerful attraction in this sphere, partly because the ideal goal of attaining American standards of prosperity is recognised as at present unattainable.

The image of economic might which the Soviet Union has managed to impress on the peoples of the less developed countries is, in fact, out of all proportion to actual Soviet industrial potential and capacity to grant economic aid. Despite the great progress made by the Soviet Union, its production has during the last ten years risen to only 40, or at the most 42, per cent of that of the United States, and if one compares the total social product of the Communist bloc with that of the United States, Canada and Western Europe, the ratio is about three to one; in other words, industrial and agricultural output in the West is roughly three times greater. Yet although there are no outward signs of Soviet cultural or economic influence in the world outside the Communist orbit, there seems to have grown up a concept in the popular mind of the Soviet Union as a land of almost legendary might. There are three reasons for the rise of this inflated evaluation. One is the ban on criticism and opposition within Communist society, which enables the Party rulers to pursue their political objectives with single-minded intensity. Secondly, there is the fact that the Soviet economic system is run on state-controlled lines and not on the basis of a free market, as in the West, in which commercial profit and calculation take pride of place. This means that the Soviet leaders can, for example, switch thousands of engineers overnight to work on some top-priority prestige project, such as sputnik production, regardless of expense and quantity of manpower involved, and without rendering account to anyone.

The third cause for the discrepancy between the actual capabilities and the reputation of the Soviet Union in the developing countries is the ceaseless, intensive and extremely subtle Soviet propaganda barrage to which such countries are subjected. This propaganda rarely reveals its Communist origin, preferring to mask itself behind such stock epithets as "progressive," "peace-loving," "democracy," etc. In all the major cities of South-East Asia and Japan one comes across "Progressive Books" and "International Progressive Books" advertised by certain book-dealers. These Soviet publications are sold at very low prices and consist of the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin; in India they are on sale in a dozen different languages.

The ignorance of Russian history in general, and of Soviet social and economic conditions in particular, provides fertile ground for Soviet propaganda impact in the underdeveloped countries. Only in Japan do extensive opportunities exist for the study of the Russian language, but even here there is little in the general field of Slavonic studies; in India and Africa no such facilities as yet exist. Yet when one bears in mind that even in the West there is considerable ignorance of many highly important aspects of Russian history, one can hardly blame the Indians, or any of the other Asian peoples, for a similar fault.

But perhaps the most serious consequence of this ignorance is the fact that Soviet propaganda claims about the tempo of industrialisation in the USSR are taken completely at face value. These claims cannot be put into their proper perspective, because the basic facts about the considerable industrial progress made by Tsarist Russia are so little known. Even Lenin himself drew attention in his work *The Development of Capitalism in Russia*, written between 1895 and 1897, to the great strides forward being made by Russian industry at that time. Between 1890 and 1900, the number of industrial workers rose from 1.5 to 3 million, and in 1913 the Russian steel industry had attained an output of five million tons, which was higher than that of Austria-Hungary, even though it was below that of Germany or France. It is no accident that this particular economic study written by Lenin is not included in the selection of his works made available in mass editions for foreign consumption, because it proves that long before the advent of the Communist regime, industrialisation was proceeding at a great pace in Russia. This fact refutes Soviet propaganda assertions that Russia did not begin to emerge as a modern industrial power until Soviet methods of planned and centralised economic management were introduced.

It is also not generally realised that the original Marxist revolutionary political programme lost all hope of acceptance in Western Europe as long ago as the 1890's, when the "revisionists" won the day. And it is forgotten that social and political development in the West over the past half-century has rendered Marxist teachings about capitalism out-of-date, and that by clinging rigidly to these teachings, and refusing to acknowledge these changes, Soviet ideology reveals the degree of its ossification.

The lack of familiarity with the true facts about the Soviet world provides an explanation for the success of the Communist propaganda impact on audiences in the developing countries, and in particular, on the intellectuals, who have not had the experience of the many ardent Western admirers of the Soviet Union who first fell victim to the fascination of its ideology and then suffered bitter disillusionment when they discovered the underlying reality.

(This article has been sligthly condensed from the author's original text in the Institute's *Sowjetstudien*, September 1960, under the title "Über die anfängliche Faszinationskraft des Bolshevismus.")

The Political Status of the Tatar Autonomous Republic

L. M. UYAZEBEK

In view of the facts that the constituent republics of the Soviet Union are all organized on the same basic principles and that their written constitutions are all essentially alike, it is generally assumed that there are no important differences in their political status. It is true that study of the written constitutions of the 15 Union republics and 19 autonomous republics reveals only such minor distinctions as differences in the basis of representation in their republic Soviets resulting from differences in number of inhabitants or the presence or absence of a ministry for some branch of economic affairs. However, in spite of the uniformity of their written constitutions, the Union republics in practice differ considerably in political and legal status from the autonomous republics and the autonomous republics also differ considerably from each other, particularly as regards the degree and type of Party control over their activities.

While the governmental systems of the Union republics are fairly well known, there has been much less study of those of autonomous republics. It is hoped that the following description of the political and legal status, in theory and practice, of the Tatar Autonomous Republic will be of interest both for itself and as a more or less typical autonomous republic. In the complex federative system of the Soviet Union, the Tatar Autonomous Republic, it should be kept in mind, is a constituent republic of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR), which itself is one of the constituent republics, or what is called a Union republic, of the Soviet Union.

To begin with, there are a number of political and legal peculiarities which distinguish the Tatar Autonomous Republic from the other national political units of the Soviet Union. One of the most striking is the fact that only a small proportion of the Tatar population of the Union live within the Tatar Republic. At the time of its formation in 1920, the boundaries were drawn in such a way as to encompass only 1,459,600, or little more than a third, of the approximately 4,200,000 Tatars then living in the Soviet Union.[1] It is a remarkable fact that the two adjacent districts of Belebeev, with a population of 671,000, of whom 62 per cent were Tatars and 4.5 closely related Bashkirs, and Birsk, with a population of 626,000, of whom 55 per cent were Tatars and 4.5 per cent Bashkirs were not included.[2] The territory inhabited by these more than 500,000 Tatars

---

[1] Fatykh Saifi, *Trudy Doma Tatarskoi Kultury* (Publications of the House of Tatar Culture), Kazan, 1930, Vol. I, p. 197.

[2] Salakh Atnagulov, *Bashkiria*, Moscow 1925, pp. 78, 79.

and Bashkirs was made into a belt dividing the Tatar and Bashkir republics until 1922, when the two districts were absorbed, but by the Bashkir, not the Tatar, republic. The artificial nature of the present boundaries of the Tatar republic is also attested by the fact that they do not correspond to the historic area of the ancient Bolgar state, whose territory is now divided between the Tatar, Chuvash, Marii and Udmurt republics and the western part of Bashkiria, or with that of the old Khanate of Kazan or even with those of two autonomous states planned in 1917 and 1918, one by the nationalists and the other by the Soviet leaders.

In spite of the fact that the Tatar Autonomous Republic has been artificially constructed in such a manner as to exclude a large proportion of the Tatar population of the USSR, even in its present form it appears to cause some concern to the authorities in Moscow, based on a fear that the republic may become a uniting force for the entire Tatar people, with their traditional ties to the other Moslem peoples of the East. To avoid such a threat, the Soviet regime has adopted a national population policy in regard to the Tatars aimed at keeping them a minority element within their own republic. During the past forty years the Tatars have been held to a level of about 45 to 50 per cent of the population. When the republic was founded in 1920 they composed 50 per cent;[3] in 1924 they made up 51 per cent;[4] in 1926, 45 per cent;[5] in 1939, 50.4 per cent;[6] in 1956, 49 per cent;[7] and in 1959, 47.2 per cent.[8] This restriction has been achieved by the systematic transfer of Tatars from the republic to other krais, oblasts and republics, with the result that despite the considerable growth of the total Tatar population of the USSR, the number of those living in the republic has fallen both relatively and absolutely. In 1959 the number of Tatars there was 115,000 less than in 1920, and in 1959, of the 4,986,000 Tatars in the Soviet Union, only 1,345,000 (27 per cent of the total) were living in the Tatar Republic.[9]

In this regard the Tatar Republic is unique among the Soviet republics: in none of the others does the indigenous population represent so small a proportion of the total. In the RSFSR, for example, 85.8 per cent of the population are Russians; in the Ukraine 86.3 per cent are Ukrainians; in Belorussia 82.5 per cent are Belorussians; and in Uzbekistan 83.8 per cent are Uzbeks.[10] Despite

---

[3] *Sovetskoe stroitelstvo v Tatrespublike za god 1920—1921* (Soviet Construction in the Tatar Republic During 1920—1921), Kazan, pp. 121, 122.
[4] *Desyatiletie Sovetskogo Tatarstana* (Tenth Anniversary of Soviet Tatarstan), Kazan, 1930, p. 19.
[5] Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union*, Geneva, 1946, p. 63.
[6] *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia) Moscow, 1947, Vol. "USSR", p. 61.
[7] *Ibid.*, Moscow, 1956, Vol. XLI, p. 644.
[8] *Pravda*, May 5, 1959, *Vestnik statistiki* (Statistical Bulletin) No. 4, 1960, Moscow, p. 71.
[9] *Pravda*, May 10, 1959; *Vestnik statistiki*, Moscow, No. 4, 1960, p. 71.
[10] *Vestnik statistiki*, No. 4, 1960, p. 71.

the Soviet claim that they have reversed what they call the Tsarist policy of dismembering the national minority areas, the Soviet policy in the case of the Tatars has been not to unite but to divide and the Party has continued to apply the same methods which it charges were applied beginning with the Russian conquest of the Khanate of Kazan in the mid-16th century.

Partially in consequence of their minority status within their own republic, the Tatars lack full opportunity to play a leading part in the economic, administrative and cultural life of the republic and of the Union. According to official Soviet statistics, only 34 per cent of the workers and employees in agriculture and industry in the republic are Tatars, and those engaged in industry alone make up only 31.2 per cent.[11] Of those engaged in low-paid agricultural and cottage-industry occupations, 46.6 per cent are Tatars.[12] There is also discrimination against the Tatars in fields connected with national culture, the basic element of real national autonomy. In the teaching profession, only 36 per cent are Tatars.[13] In elective organs of state government, if the national republics of the Soviet Union may be said to have such governments, the Tatars form some 50 per cent of the members of the Supreme Soviet and of raion and village Soviets. But in the Council of Ministers, the ministries and the directorates — where the actual administrative control of the republic is located, the proportion is only 35 per cent.

In consequence of the fact that a large portion of the Tatar population of the Soviet Union lives outside the Tatar Republic, the Tatars are greatly underrepresented in the central organs in Moscow: the nearly five million Tatars in the Soviet Union are represented on the basis of the one and a half million living in the Tatar republic. According to Article 34 of the Soviet Constitution, which stipulates one deputy to every 300,000 persons, the Tatars should have 16 deputies in the Council of the Union, the chamber of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, based on population. In fact there were in the Council of the Union only four Tatar deputies in 1950 and 1954 and only five in 1958. In the other chamber of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Council of Nationalities, the entire Tatar population is represented only by delegates allocated to the republic. Of the 11 allocated, only about half have generally been of Tatar origin: in 1950 and 1954, the republic was represented by five Tatars and six Russians, although only 40 per cent of the population is Russian. It was not until 1958 that the ratio was changed to 9 Tatars and 2 Russians. The RSFSR, which contains 2,600,000 Tatars in addition to those in the Tatar Republic, does not send a single Tatar delegate to the Council of Nationalities.

---

[11] *Narodnoye khozyaistvo Tatarskoi ASSR, statisticheski sbornik* (The National Economy of the Tatar ASSR: A Statistical Compilation), Kazan, 1957, p. 162.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] *Ibid.*

An even greater discrepancy between the theory and practice of Soviet nationality policy can be seen in the Tatar representation in the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR; under Article 25 of the RSFSR constitution, which stipulates one deputy for every 150,000 of the population, the four million Tatars living in the republic should have 27 deputies but in 1959 had only 16 — 11 from the Tatar Republic, one from Astrakhan Oblast, and four from Bashkiria.

So much for Tatar representation in the higher legislative and executive organs of government in the USSR and the RSFSR. What is the political status of the Tatars under the Soviet system?

Although the Tatars are one of the largest peoples of the Soviet Union and are at a relatively high cultural level, with a large group of intellectuals and a well-developed economy, the Tatar republic is not a Union republic but only an autonomous republic. The Tatar population of the Soviet Union is exceeded only by those of the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Belorussians, and the Uzbeks, making it fifth in size among all the peoples and second in size among non-Slav peoples.[14] It is larger than that of any of the ten national minorities having republics of full Union status. Even in its reduced size, the present Tatar Autonomous Republic has a larger population than the Lithuanian, Latvian, Kirghiz, Tadzhik, Armenian, Turkmen, or Estonian Union republics,[15] and a larger territory than the Lithuanian, Moldavian, Latvian, Armenian, or Estonian.[16] Nor can it be argued that the reason for its inferior position is cultural or economic backwardness. Even before the Revolution there was, according to Soviet data, one school for every 600 or 700 of the Tatar population,[17] and 300 book titles in a total of 1,671,000 copies were published in the Tatar language in 1913.[18] In 1956 there were 2,142 Tatar "scientific workers," that is, trained specialists, or 42.5 per 100,000 of the population, a number far exceeding those of most of the other Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union except for the Azerbaidzhani.[19] In the higher educational establishments and the specialized secondary schools of the USSR, 57,000 Tatars were enrolled, or 1,140 per 100,000, approximately the same proportion as for the other Turkic republics.[20]

---

[14] Izvestia, February 4, 1960.

[15] *Pravda*, May 10, 1959.

[16] *Statistichesky sbornik* (A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957, pp. 283 and 296.

[17] S. S. Sovetkin, ed., *Natsionalnye shkoly RSFSR za 40 let* (The National Schools of the RSFSR During 40 Years), Moscow, 1958, pp. 167, 168.

[18] *Dostizheniya sovetskoi vlasti za 40 let v tsifrakh, statistichesky sbornik* (Accomplishments of the Soviet Regime During 40 Years: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1957, p. 294.

[19] *Kulturnoe stroitelstvo SSSR, Statistichesky sbornik* (The Cultural Construction of the USSR: A Statistical Compilation), Moscow, 1956, p. 254.

[20] *Dostizheniya sovetskoi vlasti za 40 let v tsifrakh, Statisticheski sbornik* (Accomplishments of the Soviet Regime During 40 Years: A Statistical Compilation), *op. cit.*, pp. 283, 296.

As to the economic argument, the broad area between the middle stretches of the Volga River and the southern range of the Ural Mountains occupied by the Tatars is highly developed in agriculture and industry. Even in the limited area of the present Tatar republic, there were, according to a Soviet source of 1957, 10 per cent of the world oil reserves.[21] In 1960 more than 40,000,000 tons of oil were produced. Large coal reserves have also been reported in recent years. The Tatar Republic also has important machine-building and consumer industries. The value of gross industrial output totals about 15,000 million roubles.[22]

The official Soviet explanation for the Tatar Republic's lack of Union status is that it does not border on the Soviet frontiers, this being an indispensable prerequisite for Union republic status with its theoretical right to secede from the Soviet Union.[23] One might, however, ask, on the basis of this explanation, why the Crimean Tatar republic (dissolved during the Second World War) was not entitled to Union status. The answer in this case is apparently that the population was too small, but on this argument Karelo-Finland should not have been a Union republic, which it was from 1940 until 1956, since in 1939 it had only 469,000 inhabitants, of whom only 252,000 were Karelians.

The truth is that the decision as to whether or not a Soviet republic shall have Union or autonomous status depends solely on the political and propaganda objectives of the Soviet rulers. The unfavourable position of the Tatars in the Soviet Union is explicable first by historical factors, namely, by pre-Revolutionary Russo-Tatar relations, memories of which have helped to shape the policy of the present Soviet rulers, and, second, by distrust of the Tatars, who both before and after the Revolution made constant attempts to gain independence for themselves and for the other Turkic peoples. Fear of the effect of Tatar influence on the security of Russia's eastern borderlands was for centuries the cause of political discrimination against the Tatars by the Tsarist government, reflected in a refusal to allow Tatars to enter the teaching profession in Central Asia or in Kazakhstan, a ban on ownership of real estate, etc. The mainspring of the Soviet policy of dismembering and weakening the Tatar nation is fear that it might again try to set itself at the head of a Turkic anti-Soviet movement, as it did in the early years of the Soviet regime.

The present political situation in the Tatar Republic is the result of the crushing of the Tatar national Communist movement in the late 1920's and early 1930's, following ten years of struggle for autonomy. This clash between

---

[21] *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopedia* (The Large Soviet Encyclopedia), Vol. "USSR," Moscow, 1957, p. 40.

[22] *Pravda*, May 5, 1957; *Sovetskoi Tatarii 40 let, Sbornik statei* (40 Years of Soviet Tataria: A Symposium), Kazan, 1960, p. 33; for a more detailed study of the Tatar economy, see *The East Turkic Review*, No. 2, Munich, 1959, pp. 37—56.

[23] *Sovetskoe gosudarstvennoe pravo* (Soviet State Law), Moscow, 1948, p. 253.

the Tatar intelligentsia and the central Soviet authorities arose soon after the creation of the republic in 1920. The Tatars argued that autonomy implied the right to decide internal affairs independently, a claim for which they could find support in numerous Soviet declarations. For instance, the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," of November 2 (15), 1917, listed the following basic principles of Soviet nationality policy: 1. The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia; 2. The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to secession and the formation of an independent state; 3. The abolition of each and all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions; 4. Free development for national minorities and ethnic groups inhabiting the territory of Russia.[24] The Third Congress of Soviets of the RSFSR, on January 18 (31), 1918, announced in a "Declaration of the Rights of the Toiling and Exploited People" that it left to the workers and peasants of each nation the decision as to whether and on what basis it wished to participate in a federal government or in other Soviet federal institutions.[25] Stalin, in a speech at a conference held to prepare for a constituent assembly of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic on May 10, 1918, stated that autonomy included "the education system, judiciary, administration, the political measures, forms and means necessary for the execution of decrees in conformity with national conditions — all in the native language accessible to the population."[26]

The first public statement of the Tatar Communists' views on autonomy was made in 1920, in a widely-circulated pamphlet, *The Tatar State*, which declared that the republic, like the Bashkir, Kirghiz, Turkestani, Azerbaidzhani and Ukrainian republics, was an autonomous part of the RSFSR, and that the Tatar republic functioned in the spheres of internal government, education, justice, and social security, under laws made by itself.[27]

Contrary, however, to their declared policy regarding the national minorities, the Soviet leaders subsequently demonstrated that they had no intention of allowing the autonomous republics to exercise the right to decide important internal matters in any sphere; the power of decision was retained by the central Party authorities in Moscow, and consequently strained relations developed between those who were demanding genuine autonomy in most of the republics, and the Communist leaders in Moscow. The Tatar national Communists came under particularly close watch, since they had adopted an attitude openly hostile to the Kremlin's policy, and regarded Kazan, not Moscow, as

---

[24] *Pervaya sovetskaya konstitutsiya, Sbornik dokumentov* (The First Soviet Constitution: A Collection of Documents), Moscow, 1938, p. 281.

[25] *Sezdy Sovetov RSFSR v postanovleniyakh i rezolyutsiyakh* (Congresses of the Soviets of the RSFSR in Decisions and Resolutions), Moscow, 1939, p. 42.

[26] E. Genkina, *Obrazovanie SSSR* (The Formation of the USSR), Moscow-Leningrad, 1949, p. 52.

[27] Fatykh Saifi-Kazanli and Galimzyan Sharaf, *Tatar ile* (The Tatar State), Tatgosizdat, Kazan, 1920, p. 62.

the centre from which the liberation movement of the Moslem peoples of the East should be directed. They called the Tatar republic "the foundation of liberation of the East" and "the vanguard of the revolutionary East." Practical steps were taken to put this claim into effect with publication of the first official Tatar government annual report, which stated:

> The Eastern autonomous republics receive support from the All-Tatar Central Executive Committee in the form of essential cadres, both political and technical. The Executive Committee has taken and is taking measures to supply literature, text-books, instruction manuals and also teaching personel and cultural workers to Moslems in all areas outside the Tatar Republic.[28]

The idea of directing a Moslem liberation movement from Kazan was developed by Mirza Sultan-Galiev into a scheme to create a Colonial International under Tatar direction and independent of Moscow.[29]

The Tatar Communists rejected the Marxist theory of class antagonism, denied the existence of a class struggle in Tatar society and advocated a dictatorship not of the industrial proletariat but of urban and agricultural workers. They also maintained that the class struggle and the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat should be relegated to the background, since to stir up a class struggle among the Tatars at such a point in their history would be criminal, in that it would impede their cultural development and weaken their united stand against Russian chauvinism. The Tatar Communists were particularly opposed to any stimulation of class enmity among the peasantry, on the ground that there were very few landowners and kulaks among the Tatars.[30] This view that the Marxist concept of the class struggle was inapplicable to Tatar society led the Tatar Communists to reject agricultural collectivisation, and with it the whole Soviet Communist Party line on agriculture.

At the same time, the Tatar Party and non-Party intellectuals put up a spirited defence of the independent national development of the Tatar language and culture, as is indicated by their desperate attempts to prevent the compulsory abolition of the Arabic script in favour of the Latin alphabet, proposed by Moscow. The Soviet press commented at the time on this resistance as follows:

> During the initial stage of Latinisation, Tataria was the centre of all the forces which opposed the new alphabet. It was here that the counter-revolutionary Sultan-Galiev movement — the nationalist-chauvinist wing of the Tatar intelligentsia

---

[28] *Sovetskoe stroitelstvo v Tatrespublike za god 1920—1921* (Soviet Construction in the Tatar Republic During 1920—1921), Kazan, 1921, p. 27.

[29] A. Bennigsen and Chantal Quelquejay, "Der Sultangalievismus", *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte*, Osteuropa-Institut an der Freien Universität, Berlin, 1959, Vol. VII, pp. 341—396.

[30] *Desyatiletiye Tatarstana (1920—1930)* (The Tenth Anniversary of Tatarstan, 1920—1930), Kazan, 1930, pp. 49, 50.

— carried out its activities, in an attempt to form a nationally-exclusive Tatar culture and to subjugate to it a number of other Turko-Tatar peoples in the Soviet Union.[31]

Moscow was seriously disturbed by this opposition to its authority, since the Soviet leaders were determined not to allow Kazan to develop into a political rival of Moscow as it had been once before, prior to its capture by Ivan the Terrible in the mid-sixteenth century, and feared that the ideas being disseminated from Kazan could lead to the secession from the USSR of its southern and eastern Moslem border territories. Therefore, as soon as the Soviets had consolidated their power in the country as a whole, they launched a campaign against the Tatar nationalists. The geographical position of Tataria, hemmed in on all sides by Russian provinces and cut off from the bulk of the Tatar population which was scattered over five or six of these provinces, facilitated the Kremlin's task. The autonomy of the Tatar Republic was abolished on the ground that its privileges were, as the Soviet Party press declared, being used as "a legal platform for a campaign against the class and nationality policy of the Party and as a legal tribune for the propagation of bourgeois-nationalist ideas."[32] In consequence of the policy of the central Soviet government, Tataria was not allowed to become an equal member state of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which was formally created in 1922, and at the very time that a constitution was being prepared for the latter, Moscow struck at the Tatar national-Communist movement by arresting its leader, Sultan-Galiev, on a charge of nationalist activity. Stalin deliberately arranged for discussion of the Sultan-Galiev case to proceed concurrently with the debate on the draft Soviet Constitution which was held in the Party Central Committee during June 1923, his purpose being to make the fall of Sultan-Galiev serve as a warning to the Ukrainian and Georgian nationalists who were also opposed to the projected constitution with its great restrictions on the rights of the individual Soviet republics in favour of the central Government.

Sultan-Galiev's arrest was followed by a purge of the Tatar intelligentsia, but this did not succeed in preventing the latter from continuing to uphold their views, and they proceeded to draw up their own constitution for the Tatar republic, in defiance of Moscow. The draft of this constitution was laid before the Tatar Central Executive Committee in 1925, and the Tatar People's Commissar of Justice, Bogautdinov, urged its acceptance on the ground that:

---

[31] *Revolyutsia i natsionalosti* (The Revolution and the Nationalities), No. 9, Moscow, 1931, pp. 83, 84; see also author's article in *The East Turkic Review*, No. 3, Munich, 1960, pp. 23—33, and No. 4, 1961, pp. 50—68; on the position of Islam in the Tatar Republic, see A. Hakimogly, in the same periodical, No. 3, 1960, pp. 34—47.

[32] Decree of the Bureau of the Tatar Oblast Commitee of the Communist Party on "Sultan-Galievism," *Kyzyl Tatarstan*, Kazan, October 1929.

> The existing decree on the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar republic leaves room for infringement upon our rights. Sometimes the central People's Commissariats arrogate to themselves functions which should be carried out by the People's Commissariats in our republic.[33]

The draft Tatar Constitution was approved by the executive committee, and was passed to a special commission for further editing, but since it did not meet with the approval of the central Party authorities, it never saw the light of day.

With the beginning of forced industrialisation and collectivisation at the end of the 1920's, Moscow renewed its encroachment on what remained of the autonomous rights of the Tatar republic, in order to ensure elimination of resistance to the requirements of its economic policy. All actual or potential opponents of this policy were liquidated, and in 1929 Sultan-Galiev, who had been released from imprisonment in 1923, was again arrested, put on trial in Moscow in the folowing year, and sentenced to ten years' deprivation of freedom. This trial served as pretext for a fresh and drastic purge of the Tatar intelligentsia; in 1930 alone, 2,056 members of the Tatar Communist Party (13.4 per cent of the members and candidate members) were expelled, 2,273 were reprimanded and 329 prominent Party officials were removed from their posts.[34] Both the Tatar government and the Party leadership were completely reshuffled. Despite this radical shake-up, the Tatar republic was placed directly under the supervision of the central Party authorities.[35] By the mid-thirties, management of the Tatar government and economic apparatus and direction of propaganda had been completely brought under the control of the authorities in Moscow. The autonomous rights of the republic had become so vestigial that it was in practice no more than an administrative sub-division of the USSR, with administrative organs whose functions were essentially identical to those in any of the other territories.

With the adoption in December 1936 of the present Soviet Constitution, the national minority areas of the Soviet Union were regrouped; however, although several autonomous republics, such as Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, were made into Union republics, the Tatar republic was not. In 1937 a constitution drawn up in Moscow and ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR on July 2, 1940, was forced on the republic. This constitution was a close replica of those which had been prepared for the Soviet Union and for the RSFSR. The rights embodied in the new constitution amounted to nothing more than propaganda

---

[33] *2-ya sessiya TsIK'a Tatarskoi ASSR, 25. 6. 1925 g. Stenograficheski otchet* (The Second Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Tatar ASSR, June 25, 1925. Stenographic Report), Kazan, 1925, p. 115.

[34] *Kyzyl Tatarstan*, April 20, 1930.

[35] *Ibid.*, January 29, 1930.

window-dressing, and its effect was to contract still further the functions of the top administrative bodies in the Tatar republic to such an extent that they were not even empowered to transfer a village in the republic from one raion to another within the borders of the republic, or to name public buildings after prominent personages, without approval from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR. Consent had to be obtained from Moscow even to convene sessions of the Tatar Supreme Soviet. It is therefore not surprising that the latter enjoyed in the eyes of the national intelligentsia far less confidence than its predecessor, the Tatar Central Executive Committee, which had from beginning to end had a certain degree of independence in regard to matters of local importance.

Even though it does not enjoy much power in practice, the official government of the Tatar republic is a typical example of an autonomous republic of the USSR and is accordingly deserving of brief description. The constitution contains the usual provisions of Soviet constitutions to the effect that the republic is a socialist workers' and peasants' state and that all political power rests in the soviets or councils of toilers of city and countryside. There are three kinds of property — state, cooperative-kolkhoz and personal. "He who does not work, does not eat," and reward for labour is based on the principle "From each according to his ability, to each according to his labour."

The rights of the Tatar republic are defined in Article 13 as being limited only by those listed in Article 14 of the Constitution of the USSR as in the competence of the Supreme Soviet of the Union or in Article 19 of the Constitution of the RSFSR as in the competence of the Supreme Soviet of that republic. However, Article 18 contains an extensive list of questions specifically within the competence of the Tatar republic's supreme organ of power and organs of state administration.

The supreme organ of power and sole central legislative body in the Tatar republic, as defined in the Tatar Constitution, is the Supreme Soviet, to which deputies are elected by universal, equal and direct suffrage for four years, on the basis of one deputy to every 15,000 inhabitants. The constitution provides for parliamentary immunity. Meetings are held in Kazan twice a year. Its nominal powers, already severely restricted by the general limits on the power of the Tatar republic, are further restricted by the constitutional delegation of a number of powers to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and to the Council of Ministers. Accordingly, its functions are practically limited to election of the Presidium, appointment of the Council of Ministers, nomination of the Supreme Court, approval of the budget, and amendment of the constitution. It appoints standing commissions and, if it finds it necessary, may create investigating and auditing commissions.

Under the constitution, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet calls sessions of the Supreme Soviet, debates laws, conducts referendums, abrogates resolu-

tions and decrees of the Supreme Soviet contrary to law, abrogates decisions and orders of raion and city soviets contrary to law, replaces cabinet ministers on recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers subject to confirmation by the next session of the Supreme Soviet (and in practice, though it is not provided for in the Constitution, takes the same action regarding members of the Supreme Court), publishes laws passed by the Supreme Soviet (according to the constitution, in Tatar and Russian, but in practice in Russian only), and creates and awards orders of distinction of the Tatar republic.

The highest executive and administrative organ of the republic is the Council of Ministers. Its constitutional powers include co-ordination and direction of the work of the ministries and other economic and cultural institutions subordinated to it; co-ordination and direction of the work of ministries delegated by Union and Union republic ministries; adoption of measures for realizing the economic plan, the republic and local budgets, and maintaining public order; defence of the interest of the state and securing of the rights of the citizens; and direction and inspection of the work of the executive committees of raion and city soviets. The Council of Ministers now includes those of the interior, health, communal economy, culture, local industry, food industry, education, agriculture, social security, trade, and finance, as well as the chairmen of the state planning commission and the committee of state security and the chiefs of the departments of motor transport and main roads and of the construction materials industry.

In intervals between meetings of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Presidium. The resolutions and orders of the Council of Ministers must be based on the laws of the Union, of the RSFSR, and of the Tatar republic as well as on resolutions and orders of the Councils of Ministers of the USSR and the RSFSR.

A few words should be said regarding the practical application of these constitutional provisions. In the first place, of the some 190 deputies of the Supreme Soviet, about half are usually Tatar by birth and the others Russian. Sessions are conducted in Russian, with provision for translation into Russian of remarks by Tatars speaking only Tatar. Although many of the deputies understand little or no Russian, there is no provision for translation from Russian into Tatar. For practical purposes, sessions are chiefly of propaganda value. The usual questions on the agenda are amendments to the constitution, generally limited to abolition or creation of a ministry, removal or appointment of individual ministers, ratification of changes in the Supreme Court occurring between sessions, and approval of the state budget. And even in regard to these matters the actions are purely formal, having been previously decided by the Tatar oblast Party Committee or even by the authorities in Moscow. The Tatar Supreme Soviet in Kazan has much less to do with preparation of the budget than the civil servants of the Union Ministry of Finance in Moscow.

Any changes made in Kazan are limited to transfers within the totals for income and expenditures and even these must be co-ordinated with the Union authorities. As to parliamentary immunity, it is no more respected than such other guarantees to be found in Soviet constitutions as those of freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and so on.

To turn to the Presidium, its members are usually second-rate individuals with the exception of the one who is also First Secretary of the Tatar Oblast Party committee and who determines the actual proceedings in Presidium sessions. Other higher officials are excluded ex officio by constitutional provision, the Second Secretary of the Oblast Party committee by virtue of the fact that he is chairman of the Supreme Soviet, to which the Presidium is subordinated, and the chairman and other members of the Council of Ministers because they are subordinated to the Presidium. Meetings of the Presidium are held in Russian with no provision for translation, regardless of the inability of members to understand Russian, and decisions are published in Russian. The nominal right of the Presidium to revoke illegal measures of the Council of Ministers is rarely exercised, because of the greater practical authority of the latter body. Moreover, under Article 46 of the RSFSR constitution, the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR can prevent application of resolutions and decrees of the Council of Ministers of an autonomous republic, although in practice this rarely occurs as the two Councils coordinate important matters between themselves beforehand. And, finally, the Tatar Council of Ministers works under close supervision by the Tatar Oblast Party Committee.

The real organ having the power to make decisions on matters of basic importance in the Tatar republic is not the local Supreme Soviet or its Presidium, or its Council of Ministers, as might appear from perusal of the constitution, but the Tatar Oblast Committee of the Communist Party. It is true that the Party is mentioned in the constitution, but only in very general terms. Article 19 covering the "Basic Rights and Duties of Citizens" states:

> . . . the most active and conscientious citizens from the ranks of the working class, toiling peasants and labouring intelligentsia unite voluntarily in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the vanguard of the workers in their struggle for construction of the Communist society and representing the nucleus of all organizations of toilers, both social and governmental.

The Oblast Committee receives its authority by delegation from the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which in turn receives its authority not from the Soviet constitution but from the practical exercise of power backed by force. The Tatar Oblast Committee does not have a large apparatus, but this does not matter, since it is concerned not with day-to-day administration but with the issue of policy instructions to the government apparatus, and in the first place to the Council of Ministers of the republic. Its First Secretary is appointed directly by the Presidium of the Party

Central Committee. It is rarely that a Tatar is appointed to this all-powerful position, and although the First Secretary is formally elected by a Tatar Party congress, only the candidate proposed by Moscow is chosen. During the forty years of its existence, the Tatar republic has had only one native-born First Secretary — Zinat Muratov — and this was no more than a temporary post-war tactical concession by Moscow. Muratov was removed from his post in 1957 and replaced by Stalin's former Minister of State Security, Semyen Ignatyev.

The number of Party members and candidate-members in the Tatar republic totalled 110,000 in 1960.[36] These cadres are answerable only to the Party and take their instructions from the government apparatus only to the extent that these instructions are fully in line with Party policy.

In conclusion it should be mentioned that in addition to its political and administrative subordination to the Soviet Communist Party apparatus, the Tatar republic has little or no control over economic matters, including the use of its natural resources. The republic's highly-developed industry is in the hands not of the Tatars but of the central government, which exercises its control through the Tatar Council of National Economy, which is subordinated directly to Moscow. The bulk of the industrial production of 15,000 million roubles annually for which this council is responsible is exported to other parts of the Soviet Union, and abroad.[37] The revenue thus obtained flows into the budget for the whole Soviet Union or for that of the RSFSR, and cannot be utilised for raising the standard of living of the population of the Tatar republic. The Tatar government controls only such small local industries as those producing bricks, agricultural implements, furniture, or musical instruments — virtually cottage industries, the value of whose output amounts to no more than 320 million roubles a year, or 2.2 per cent of the value of the industrial output in the hands of the Council of National Economy.[38] However, even the income derived from these minor industries is not entirely at the disposal of the Tatar republic, since, as a Tatar deputy complained at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in 1957, 55 per cent of the profits from production over and above the state plan have to be handed over to the treasury of the RSFSR.[39]

The status of the Tatar republic, to say nothing of that of the Tatar population of the Soviet Union as a whole, is clearly more nearly that of a colonial possession than that ostensibly assured by its title of autonomous republic.

---

[36] *Partiinaya zhizn*, No. 12, 1960, p. 8.
[37] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, June 25, 1960.
[38] *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, March 4, 1960.
[39] *Zasedanie Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 6 sessiya 4-go sozyva* (Meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The Sixth Session of the Fourth Convocation), Moscow, 1957, p. 242.

The Soviet Intellectuals: Observations from Two Journeys

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

The sheer size of the Soviet system of higher education, second only to that of the United States, gives it a special importance for all those interested in the development of modern industrial society. For specialists in Soviet affairs, the role of higher education in the designs of the Communist rulers for transforming Soviet life is particularly interesting. In recent years Western analysts have devoted special attention to the organization and methods of operation of the educational system; the 1958 changes in the requirements for admission of students have aroused particular interest.

Aside from the role of the higher educational institutions as a system of instruction, however, the position of the Soviet instructional staffs themselves is a matter of extraordinary interest. In the liberal capitalistic state which has generally prevailed in Western Europe and America, the intellectual has been relatively detached from class interest, or, as Mannheim puts it, *freischwebend*.[1] In recent years, the increasing bureaucratization of all aspects of Western society, including intellectual life, has led to reconsideration of this generalization; a considerable number of specialized studies of the intellectual's role have appeared in scholarly literature. Most of these discussions, however, take little account of the contemporary, but sharply different, development of the position of the intellectual in the vast territory which before 1917 formed the Russian Empire, and which today constitutes the Soviet Union. The peculiarly misleading Soviet use of the term "intelligentsia" to designate all who are not manual labourers — i.e., what Americans call "white-collar" workers, has been one source of confusion. Obviously such a large and diverse group has little sociological distinctiveness. Nevertheless, the true intellectual exists in Soviet society, as elsewhere. The artist, the actor, the belletristic writer, the journalist, all correspond to what is usually considered the intellectual elsewhere. The university professor, however, in the USSR as in other countries occupies a particularly important place. However specialized his interests, and whether he enjoys the designation or not, common opinion identifies him as the intellectual *par excellence*.[2] Consequently, any effort to understand this important segment of Soviet society can well begin with a consideration of the outlook of these academic intellectuals.

During two recent visits to the USSR I made a special effort to become acquainted with the Soviet university instructors and members of the Academies

---

[1] Karl Mannheim, *Ideologie und Utopie*, Bonn, 1929, pp. 126 ff.

[2] Melvin Seeman, "The Intellectual and the Language of Minorities," *American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV, July 1958, 27.

of Sciences. To be sure, I had several objectives in mind. I wished to acquire certain special information concerning the history and functioning of the Soviet political system. I hoped to learn more about the nature of Soviet higher education in order to be able to advise American graduate students who are now beginning to study in the USSR. But I was especially interested in observing the reactions of the professors as representatives of the intellectual group in Soviet society.

My first visit to the Soviet Union took place in August and September of 1956 — shortly before the traumatic events in Poland and Hungary. On that trip I visited eight educational institutions: Moscow University; the Institute of Law (Institut Prava) of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; Minsk University; the Academy of Sciences of Belorussia; the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine; Kiev University; Odessa University; and the Institute of Jurisprudence (no longer part of the university) in Kharkov.[3] As my own discipline, political science, does not exist in the USSR, I had intended to devote special attention to the legal institutes, thinking that their work would be most closely related to my interests. I found, however, that in general the scholars working in contemporary history were most intimately concerned with my subjects. Consequently, on my later trip, in June and July 1958, I devoted most attention to the historical institutes, visiting the Institute of History of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Samarkand University, the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow University, and the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine.

As a university professor, I had fairly ready access to the staffs of the institutions mentioned above. In most cases the visits were arranged by the Intourist bureau of the city in which the institution was located, within a day or two after I had made my request. Only in the case of the Central Asian University (Tashkent) was I informed that the historians were too busy to see me. Of course, the Intourist bureau invariably insisted on sending an interpreter, although I rarely used his services, for I was able to carry on a reasonably fluent discussion with the professors in Russian, or occasionally in English or German which several spoke very well. I do not believe, however, that the presence of the Intourist interpreter acted as a special inhibition to freedom of discussion. Much more important was the fact that except for one high official at Moscow University, the Soviet academicians invariably met me in groups rather than alone. On the occasions when I appeared unannounced and unaccompanied at an educational institution, the Soviet scholar whom I first met called in several colleagues before he would talk to me. Consequently, each person I visited was always aware that his conversation was being observed

---

[3] I also visited Leningrad, but did not visit any academic institutions there.

by a colleague; under these circumstances overt deviation from official ideology was impossible.

As I was unable to meet any Soviet scholars alone, I am unable to make a direct appraisal of their real attitudes, and this fact must be borne in mind in considering my appraisal of their reactions. However, I was able to meet by chance a fairly large number of other intellectuals — students, secondary school teachers, writers, editorial workers — in the course of my travels, especially in 1956. In long private discussions, these intellectuals were much franker in expressing their opinions. Some, indeed, openly declared their opposition to the Communist regime, while others went far beyond permissible limits in criticizing specific features of the Soviet system. Consequently, I feel justified in inferring that considerable dissatisfaction with official policy exists among the university professors too, and I have tried to "read between the lines" in interpreting their remarks in the formal meetings with me.

Soviet Professors as Scholars

Most recent visitors to the Soviet Union have been impressed by the level of scientific and scholarly ability in the Soviet universities. The remarkable Soviet scientific advances demonstrate that in the natural sciences at least the level of attainment is indeed high. On the purely technical plane, my observations of Soviet legal and historical scholarship are in accord with these generalizations.

Much of the basis for my appraisal of Soviet scholarship derives, to be sure, not from discussions with academic figures, but from a close study of a large number of candidate dissertations. To obtain the degree of candidate of sciences, qualifying the recipient for university teaching, the student must submit and defend a thesis several hundred pages long, which nominally at least constitutes an original contribution to knowledge in his field. Copies of all dissertations accepted in Soviet institutions are deposited in the Lenin State Library, Moscow; I was permitted to examine almost all the dissertations which I requested there. During my 1956 visit I devoted my attention almost exclusively to dissertations dealing with recent organization of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, examining twenty altogether.[4] On my 1958 visit, I extended my observation to a broader group of dissertations dealing with numerous aspects of the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet state — about forty-five in all.

While — as in Germany or the USA — the quality of these studies varied greatly, the better ones showed considerable skill in the critical analysis of sources. To be sure, the framework was always Marxism-Leninism, and as a

[4] See my "Clues to the Soviet Political Archives," *Russian Review*, XVI, April 1957, 47—52.

rule the first or second chapter is devoted to summarizing the views of Marx, Engels, and Lenin (and Stalin, except in the most recent dissertations) on the topic treated. On the other hand, most dissertations use a great deal of documentary material from the archives of the State and the Party, including frequently highly detailed sources from local collections. Some dissertations also utilize local newspaper collections and the unpublished correspondence of Party leaders. Aside from providing much revealing information concerning recent Soviet history, these studies indicate that Soviet historians (and juridical and philosophical students studying historical problems) have a keen sense of the importance of original sources and are eager to exploit them when permitted to do so.

Another evidence of the technical competence of Soviet scholarship, within the bounds imposed by ideological control, is the close attention which specialized scholars devote to foreign literature in their field. Lecturers in Ukrainian history in the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine were acquainted with my writings on the Ukraine and eager to discuss them. While critical of my "failure to use Soviet sources," the instructors were very interested in the material on Ukrainian politics and administration contained in the unpublished German documents collected for the Nuremberg trials, and even asked whether they would be allowed to use them if they should visit the United Staates themselves. The Soviet historians in Kiev were also surprisingly well acquainted with the writings and activities of Ukrainian emigre leaders.

In a somewhat different field, the scholars of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR also exhibited a surprising familiarity with foreign scholarship. We discussed at length numerous aspects of American historical study of World War II, including for example the monumental works of William L. Langer[5] and Samuel E. Morison.[6] Soviet historians were especially interested in cross-examining me concerning "schools" of interpretation of World War II and its background. Thinking that they were primarily interested in attacking Langer and others of the "official" school as anti-Marxist or anti-Soviet, I alluded to the works of Frederick Schuman and similar American writers who have made interpretations more sympathetic to the Soviet position. In fact, however, the Moscow scholars were mainly interested in another group, the "revisionists," whom they evidently thought were "suppressed." They suggested that Harry Elmer Barnes, for example, resorted to private printing of his criticism of Langer and others because he was denied access to regular publication. One historian also asked me whether I did not believe that Charles Beard's revisionist views could be traced to his early materialist interpretation of history. I was rather amused that the scholar should be implying an identity

---

[5] William L. Langer and S. E. Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, 1937—1940, New York, 1952.

[6] *History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II*, Boston, 1947.

between Beard, regarded in America as an extremely conservative force in his later years, and Marxism. I pointed out that Beard had embraced what was sometimes known as the "devil theory of history," ascribing events which he regretted, such as United States entry into World War II, to the machinations of F. D. Roosevelt and other individuals. Moreover, I said, aside from this theoretical opposition of Beard's later views and Marxism, he and his sympathizers were essentially isolationists, opposed to American entry into the war, and consequently to its alliance to the USSR.

This discussion, in spite of the technical familiarity with American scholarly literature which the Soviet historians displayed, indicates that their grasp of the fundamental interpretative tendencies of Western thought is far from complete. Aside from the circumscribing influence of Communist theory, the whole tendency of Soviet advanced training militates against a broad understanding of currents of world thought. As the Rector of Samarkand University very bluntly told me: "Our purpose is to provide specialists." While emphasis on specialized competence as contrasted to the broad knowledge inculcated in the traditional "liberal education" is noticeable in Western countries, particularly the United States, it is nowhere carried to the extremes of philistine expediency found in the USSR.

Nevertheless, Soviet scholars in traditionally humanistic fields are somewhat broader in their outlook than other Soviet intellectuals. Soviet professors indicated a deep interest in the nature of academic life in the United States, not only in its material sides (salaries, payment for publication, living standards, pensions, etc.), but also in the intangible conditions of intellectual work. Moreover, several were very eager to discuss broad trends of thought abroad, even if they did not really understand them. In 1956, rather vaingloriously, I had had visiting cards inscribed with my name and university position and in addition the designation "Doctor of Philosophy." When I talked with members of the Belorussian Academy of Sciences, one scholar remarked that he was very pleased to see that I was a philosopher, as that was his specialty. Rather embarrassed, I explained that the "doctor of philosophy" merely designated the standard advanced degree in American universities, indicating no special competence in philosophy. By this time, however, the interest of several of the assembled scholars was aroused, and they asked me which philosophical school I followed in my historical interpretations. I replied that, like most other Western scholars, I avoided a rigorous theoretical framework for the interpretation of concrete historical circumstances. I pointed out that we endeavoured to utilize insights derived from numerous sources, thus taking what the Soviet ideologist would probably call an "eclectic" approach. When they insisted that I must have my own philosophical preferences, I replied that I indeed did, and as a Catholic preferred the Thomistic philosophy. "Ah," the Soviet academics replied, "who are the contemporary exponents of this philosophy?" I mentioned of course Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson, but added that in

the application of specific Thomistic principles to contemporary society I had been much influenced by Father von Nell-Breuning, whose lectures I had attended years ago at the University of Frankfurt. Then I added that, while in general we Western scholars avoided strictly moral judgements, my interpretation of some events was bound to clash with the Marxist. As an example I cited a work I knew they would know, G. Linkov's account of the activity of the partisans in Belorussia during 1947,[7] in which he implies that the Red partisans were right in killing innocent people whose activities objectively aided the German occupation forces. I pointed out that while this principle of the acceptability of all means was consonant with Leninism, such a means as the deliberate killing of the innocent, wholly incompatible with my philosophy, was necessarily condemned in my interpretation.[8] My Soviet interrogators did not contradict me.

Political Conformity

Enough has been said to indicate the pervasive influence of the official Leninist ideology upon Soviet scholars. Equally noticeable, and a good deal more irritating to the outside observer, is conformity to the immediate purposes of Soviet politics. Lack of space prevents citing the numerous instances of this nature in the Soviet dissertations which I examined. Generally speaking it would be superfluous to do so, since all students of Soviet affairs are familiar with parallel instances in published Soviet works. It should be noted, however, that only a small portion of the dissertations relating to recent Soviet history were completed prior to the death of Joseph Stalin. While this was doubtless due partly to the fact that most students could begin their studies only after the end of World War II, and were therefore not ready to defend dissertations before 1953, it also results from the difficulty and danger of writing *any* account of Party affairs while Stalin was still alive. Even in the short period since his death, however, the line followed on many topics has shifted more than once; one can almost determine the year of completion of a dissertation by the "internal evidence" of its interpretation of sensitive aspects of Party history. Indeed, one of the most remarkable instances is that of a dissertation which bears the date 1954 on the title page, but which contains pages referring to the Twentieth Congress!

The constant fluctuations of the Party line affect of course the work of mature scholars as well as candidates. One of the most interesting examples of this arose in my discussion with the historians at the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. As noted above, our principal subject of discussion was the

---

[7] G. Linkov, *Voyna v tylu vraga* (The War in the Enemy's Rear), Minsk, 1948, pp. 92, 111.

[8] I did not cite any specific interpretations of my own to the Soviet group, but the reader may wish to compare p. 280 of my *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939—1945*, New York, 1955.

history of World War II. I remarked that it was very difficult for us in America to teach the history of the war on the Eastern front, because there was no work in English which dealt with the subject in even a moderately comprehensive fashion. Moreover, I said, it was difficult for students even to analyze particular social and political aspects of the war, since there was no detailed account of military events which they could use as a reference. We were forced to refer students to Kurt von Tippelskirch's *Geschichte des zweiten Weltkriegs*[9] and to Augustin Guillaume's *La Guerre Germano-Soviétique*,[10] although neither book is fully satisfactory.

Having made what I considered a tactful approach to the matter, I asked the Soviet academicians whether they were in fact preparing any general military history of the war. Their reply was negative. I then inquired whether the Soviet scholars were undertaking exhaustive, but fairly broad treatments of specific aspects of the war. To explain what I meant, I adduced the massive two-volume history of the partisan operations in Belorussia by Lavrenty Tsanava.[11] In 1954 Tsanava was condemned to death as a member of the "Beria gang." On my trip to Minsk in 1956 I had tried in vain to buy a copy of this useful, but very rare, work; I was told that it was "out of print." In the Lenin Library there is no alphabetical listing for "Tsanava, Lavrenty." Strangely enough, however, the work is listed under the subject heading "USSR, History, Belorussia, 1941—1945." When I inquired about the book at the Academy in 1958, I pointed out that I hoped I was causing no embarrassment, for I knew that Tsanava had been condemned. Perhaps, I said, the book contained errors, but in scope and approach was a good example of the type of work which I hoped was being written by the academicians. I did indeed cause embarrassment; most of those present denied ever having heard of Tsanava's work. Finally, one — the specialist on American history — did admit knowing it, but hastened to change the subject.

The above example suggests that there are still whole areas of recent Soviet history which are too dangerous for Soviet historians to study. That World War II on the Eastern front is one such area is hardly surprising in view of the fact that controversy over blame for reverses and the credit for victories formed one of the principal aspects of the rivalry of Marshal Zhukov and Nikita Khrushchev, ending of course in the latter's complete victory just nine months before my second Soviet visit.

The conversation at the Moscow Academy of Sciences also indicates the restrictions under which Soviet historians labour in utilizing earlier works, even those by Soviet writers. Certainly the beginning student in the USSR is

---

[9] Kurt von Tippelskirch, *Geschichte des zweiten Weltkriegs*, Bonn, 1951.

[10] Augustin Guillaume, *La Guerre Germano-Soviétique*, Paris, 1949.

[11] Lavrenty Tsanava, *Vasenarodnaya partisanskaya voyna y Belorussii protiv faschistskich sachvattschikov* (The Nation-wide Partisan Warfare in Belorussia Against the Fascist Aggressors), Two Volumes, Minsk, 1949 and 1951.

deprived of many important books. Very few Western accounts of Soviet political or social developments are included in the catalogue of the Lenin Library open to the general reader. On the other hand, many are undoubtedly available to advanced scholars. As noted above, specialists in Ukrainian history in Kiev were familiar with my studies, though none are listed in the Lenin Library "open" catalogue. There is, of course, a *restricted* catalogue of this Library, which I was able to see only briefly in the course of a conducted tour of the Library. While standing near one of the cabinets, I casually opened a drawer under the heading "B," and noted that Raymond Bauer's *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*[12] was listed. When I later checked the *open* catalogue, I found no listing for Bauer.

In discussing their work with me, the Soviet scholars frequently appeared to be taking a defensive, or even apologetic, attitude although no one voiced resentment against the controls under which they work. For example, the director of an institute proudly exhibited the catalogue of his library. When we came to a group of viciously anti-American items of the Korean War period, he embarrassedly remarked: "Oh, all that is past now," and hastily moved on.

There was, however, a marked difference in this respect between 1956 and 1958. In 1956 many scholars — especially in Kiev — pressed me to explain at length the nature of the organization and operation of the American university. They were especially eager to present questions related to the freedom of teaching. Who determines the schedule of lectures for the year, the State Department of Education (they knew that I taught in a state university)? Who determines the textbooks used in your courses? Must you submit an outline of each lecture to your departmental chairman before you present the lecture? I am inclined to think that the questioners were well aware that I would reply that interference by higher authorities with the individual professor's choice in any of these matters was contrary to our concept of academic freedom. Undoubtedly the Soviet scholars also knew that they were wholly unfree in just these matters, though they insisted that they might do as they pleased, even to the point of "criticizing the government." I believe that they wanted my answers, however, just to confirm in their own minds the contrast between the American and the Soviet systems.

To be sure, there was sharp criticism of the United States and other Western countries even in 1956. At the same meeting at Kiev University, one young faculty member argued sharply that Chancellor Adenauer's then recent suppression of the Communist Party was undemocratic. I replied that I had some question in my mind as to the tactical wisdom of the move, but that the Chancellor had been under severe provocation from the East German regime,

---

[12] Raymond Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology*, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1952.

which suppressed all non-Communist-dominated parties. The Soviet scholar hotly denied that there was political suppression in East Germany, alleging the existence of numerous parties, which, he said he had observed himself while in Germany on military duty. As the argument grew rather unpleasant, the dean of the Law Faculty politely but abruptly intervened to change the subject.

In 1958, however, such sharp, though less heated, attacks on the Western countries were the rule, rather than the exception among the Soviet scholars whom I met. In addition to generalized attacks upon American foreign policy, and criticisms of the "undemocratic" features of American education, scholars in both Kiev and Moscow commented bitterly on the "illegal" American retention of the Smolensk Party archives, which had been captured by the Wehrmacht in 1941, and then seized by the U. S. Army in Germany in 1945.

One peculiar aspect of political control over Soviet scholars which seemed to become evident in the course of my discussions with them is worth special note. The members of the Academies of Sciences in the union republics, at least, seemed notably freer in their comments than did the professors of the universities. At Kiev University I tried in vain to induce the staff to enter into a discussion of the training of Party officials at the University. I was sure that some such training did take place, and even interrogated the professors concerning specific officials. They all, however, denied that they knew anything about the training of Party officials.

The following day at the Academy of Sciences I raised the same question, and after some initial hesitation was given a considerable amount of detailed, though for the most part superficial, information concerning high Party officials such as the editor Aleksandr Chekanyuk, who had studied at the Academy. Since the Academy works in close physical conjunction with the University, it is evident that the University professors must also have been in a position to give me similar information had they felt free to do so. At the time I thought that in the intervening hours a higher level decision had been reached to discuss the matter of Party training with me. Thus, I thought that the Academy personnel had simply been authorized to discuss the matter while the University staff, taken by surprise the previous day, had been afraid to reply to my questions. As will appear below, however, the situation was chronologically reversed in Uzbekistan, yet I obtained the franker answers from the Academy personnel. It seems, therefore, that the Academy member has a real advantage over the university instructor in his ability to discuss freely with foreigners.

National Variations

While the last paragraphs of the preceding section touched upon differences between academicians in the centre (Moscow) and the national republics, the general question of controls over intellectual activity can be treated uniformly,

for the monolithic totalitarian rule prevails throughout the USSR. However, as my itinerary indicates, a considerable part of my time in the Soviet Union, and a large majority of my academic visits were made in the non-Russian republics. For years I have been deeply concerned with the national composition and differences in the USSR. Consequently, I regarded my visits to academic institutions in the union republics as a special opportunity for investigating the national as well as the "all-Soviet" aspects of the position of the Soviet intellectual.

My special field of interest has been the Ukraine, and in a way my most interesting conversations were those in the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences concerning my book, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939—1945,* published the year before my first visit to Kiev. As I indicated above, the Soviet specialists n Ukrainian history were surprisingly well acquainted with the emigre Ukrainian leaders and their writings, and eager to hear more about them. Of course, they were critical of the nationalist leaders. When, for example, I mentioned that I had talked to Colonel Andryj Melnyk, one sarcastically inquired: "Don't you think Melnyk now wishes that he had remained an engineer in Lvov instead of entering politics?" At the same time, I suspected that the academician knew that the harsh Soviet criticism of the Ukrainian nationalist movement was not entirely justified. As the subject was a delicate one, I resorted to the services of my Intourist interpreter, fearing that I might otherwise express myself incorrectly. I admitted that the Ukrainian nationalists had made serious blunders during World War II, as I had pointed out in my book, but added that they were under serious provocation from the Gestapo — and the NKVD. When the interpreter repeated the phrase "NKVD" she lowered her voice slightly; there was no further comment from my auditors.

During 1958 my formal discussions relating to the nationality question were not so direct, but in a way perhaps even more revealing. The discussions revolved principally around the subject of the distinctiveness of academic "cadres" in the separate republics. From time to time I had noticed that there appeared to have been little interchange of scholars among the republics during recent years, although such exchanges had been frequent immediately after the Revolution. The subject obviously had an especially important bearing upon conditions in Central Asia, where the local population is quite distinct in appearance and background from the Russians, yet where the relatively backward cultural state made outside assistance necessary in the development of academic activity. During my visit to the Institute of History of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in Tashkent I inquired whether it was true that after the Revolution other Moslem groups more "advanced" culturally and in their acceptance of Bolshevism, particularly the Kazan or Volga Tatar, had helped in the formation of the Central Asian University, the Academy of Sciences, and other Uzbek educational institutions.

One of the professors of the Academy, who had himself been trained in Tashkent in the 1920's, assured me that the Volga Tatars had indeed played

a major role in developing Uzbek higher education; for a time they had even constituted a majority of the historical faculty of the Central Asian University. In reply to my questions, he said that there were never any Azerbaidzhanis in the faculty, but that a large body of Crimean Tatar intelligentsia was employed in Tashkent and the surrounding rural areas, especially as teachers, during World War II. Some Crimean Tatars, he said, still remained in that area. In general, however, the present staff of the Uzbek higher educational institutions was recruited from the graduates of these institutions.

When I questioned the Rector of the Uzbek State University in Samarkand on the same subject, he also assured me that the majority of his professors (including all whom I met personally) were trained at Samarkand, and most of the remainder in other Central Asian institutions. On the other hand, his reply concerning the Volga Tatars flatly contradicted that of the Academy of Sciences professors. The Rector said that he had never known a Volga Tatar at the Central Asian University when he studied there in the 1920's, and denied that they, or other scholars of Moslem origin, had played any part in establishing that university. Instead, he said, following Lenin's directive, scholars came from Moscow and Leningrad universities to assist in its formation. Here again the university spokesman seemed less frank than the Academy spokesman, for other evidence appears to leave little room for doubt that the Volga Tatars were indeed important.

On the larger question of the predominance of local graduates in the national republic higher educational systems, however, their answers coincided, and they agreed with information I obtained elsewhere. The professors of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR declined to discuss this matter with me, saying it was a question handled by the universities. Members of the Ukrainian Academy, on the other hand, were quite willing to talk about it. They assured me that ninety per cent of the academic personnel in Kiev were graduates of Kiev University, with many of the others from other Ukrainian institutions. In reply to my questions as to whether this did not lead to "inbreeding" of personnel, and an undue influence of the older professors upon their students who joined the staff, the Kiev academicians replied that this was not the case. They argued that the necessity for the candidate's passing an examination by many professors militated against his becoming the protege of a single professor. Moreover, they pointed out that a large majority of the candidates of science did not in fact join the university faculty, but went into economic or state service. Finally, they contended, under "Soviet conditions" such personal influence could not prevail.

Whatever the effect upon personal relations in the universities, it does seem to be true that the academic staffs in the national republics form fairly distinct groups. In the long run, this factor may play an important part in developing a sense of national distinctiveness among intellectuals. At the same time, it should be recognized that a number of other factors tend to preserve

uniformity. There are frequent All-Union conferences of professors in each academic discipline. More important, the curriculum and the text books, as noted above, are rigidly standardized by the centre. Soviet scholars are reluctant to discuss this point, but in Minsk I was able to secure a copy of the standard curriculum set in Moscow for all law schools throughout the USSR.

Then there is the matter of the national affiliation of the scholars themselves. A large majority of those whom I met in Tashkent and Samarkand were obviously Uzbek, or at least Central Asian. In the Ukraine and Belorussia national origin is harder to judge, since there are no clear physical distinctions between Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians. A few, especially in Kiev, wore the national blouse, but this many have been an affectation. Judging from the names, however, I would think that a majority of the scholars I met in Kiev and Kharkov, though not necessarily in Odessa or Minsk, were natives. Possibly a deliberate attempt was made to select native Ukrainians to meet me. However, in spite of the Soviet insistence on the high proportion of women in academic posts, I met very few female professors; hence, I am inclined to conclude that the group whom I met was not specially selected from the nationality standpoint.

Since my oral knowledge of Ukrainian and Belorussian languages is slight, I did not try to converse with the scholars in these languages. Everywhere, however, they appeared to be talking among themselves in Russian rather than in the "local" languages. This customary use of the "All-Union" language in conversation does not necessarily mean that the scholars in the Ukraine are unacquainted with the Ukrainian language, however. In this connection, my investigation of candidate dissertations leads to some interesting statistical conclusions. Of the eighteen dissertations prepared in Ukrainian educational institutions which I examined, one-third were written in Ukrainian, the remainder in Russian. This may seem a small proportion in Ukrainian; but of all the scores of dissertations which I saw listed in the catalogue of the Lenin Library for *other* national republics, only *two* — one from Azerbaidzhan and one from Armenia — were written in the national languages. Moreover, it must be realized that the subjects with which I was concerned — recent Soviet and Communist Party history — are much more likely to attract the highly politicized, "All-Union" type of student than are, for example, literature or pre-Soviet history. I would conclude, therefore, that the Ukrainian language, while definitely less used than Russian even in the Ukraine itself, may well have a greater attractive force for young academic intellectuals than have the other national languages.

Conclusions

My investigation of the Soviet academic intellectual, while careful, was by no means a thoroughly systematic one in the scholarly sense of the term. It was, of course, almost wholly confined to professors of history and jurispru-

dence; rather different conclusions might be derived from discussions with philologists, to say nothing of natural scientists. While I visited the larger Union republics, I did not go to the Trancaucasus, the outlying areas of the RSFSR, or the western territories acquired in 1939 and later. As described above, my discussions were circumscribed by the formal nature of the group gatherings in which they took place. Consequently, I regard the observations I have presented as fragmentary material for further study of the problem of the Soviet intellectual rather than as the basis for firm conclusions.

Nevertheless, it may be helpful even at this stage to offer even tentative conclusions. One such conclusion is that the Soviet scholar, in spite of all restrictions, is technically equipped to conduct important basic research, and is eager to do so. At the same time, his whole frame of reference is warped both by the underlying effect of Leninist ideology, and by the necessity of constant shifts in his own position to conform to the changing Party line. On the whole, I would agree with a remarkably penetrating study completed several years ago, however, that the historians are, at least passively, able to avoid some of the pressure to ideological conformity.[13] The jurists appear to be somewhat less successful in this respect. Unhappily, a comparison of my experience in 1956 and 1958 suggests that in this rather short period there has been no improvement. On the contrary, the attitude of the Soviet scholars in 1958 seemed distinctly cooler, and I sensed their desire to hew more closely to the official political line.

The rather interesting position of the national republic academic staffs suggests that one of the basic conditions for the development of distinctive national scholarly tradition is present. As long as the totalitarian character of the Soviet regime is maintained, however, this can only be a potential, not an active, element in the Soviet intellectual life. In the final analysis, the scholarly intellectual, like all intellectuals in the USSR, is only a member of an almost powerless minority. He may embody the hope for the development of free intellectual life among the peoples of the Soviet Union in the future, but this hope can only be realized if the Communist regime is dissolved by forces far stronger than he.

---

[13] C. E. Black, "History and Politics in the Soviet Union," *Rewriting Russian History*, New York, 1956, p. 30.

Economic Problems

Soviet Industrial Location in Practice

IVAN S. KOROPECKYJ

The basic principles of the Soviet theory of industrial location are as follows: proximity of production sites to sources of raw materials and final consumers, and their even distribution throughout the country; creation of complex and at the same time specialised economic regions; reduction of the difference between cities and countryside; industrialisation of republics and territories inbited by national minorities; strengthening of the national defence capacity, and promotion of an international division of labour within the Soviet bloc[1].

Application of these principles in practice would be at best a slow process, and, taking into account the situation in the Soviet Union at the time of the introduction of the Five-Year Plan, it could not have been otherwise. Moreover, the highest economic authorities were always forced to decide which of these principles had priority, because their simultaneous realisation was impossible due to implicit contradictions. But when, in addition to this, the state constantly sets new goals, based more on political than on economic considerations, and furthermore, there have been the tremendous economic losses and general upheaval as a result of the Second World War, it can be seen that the lot of Soviet economic planners is not an easy one. Many of the principles remain in fact, mere rhetoric.

At different stages in Soviet industrial development, varying principles of locational theory have played dominant roles. The Soviet authorities have always regarded rapid industrial development as a major objective, with the machine-building industry in a privileged position. It was believed from the first that this branch of industry was an indispensable basis for the growth of light industry, transport, electrification and the mechanisation of agriculture. The machine-building industry was developed in three industrial centres of the European part of the Soviet Union. Only one of these, the south-eastern part of the Ukraine, had an adequate metallurgical basis, with its coal from the Donbas and iron ore from Krivoi Rog. In order to increase production in these regions, great stress was laid on the supply of hydro-electric power to factories. Industrial capacity and traditional centres of population had to be treated at this stage as constants and power as variable. Furthermore, the availability of a skilled labour force favoured the choice of the old industrial centres. It was hoped that resulting increases in production would meet the ambitious goals of the First Five-Year Plan.

In order to obtain bigger supplies of such essentials as steel, and non-ferrous metals, and to expand the machine-building and chemical industries, attention

[1] For details on theory see Ivan S. Koropeckyj, "Soviet Theory on Industrial Location," *Studies on the Soviet Union*, No. 5, 1960, pp. 72—82.

was turned to the development of rich natural resources in Soviet Central Asia. This process, according to Dobb,[2] was planned as follows: on the basis of existing mineral resources, hydro-electric power stations would have to be built; with the help of this cheap energy, which has the additional advantage of being easily transferable, the basic metal industries could be built up. Hydro-electric power is of great importance for the production of non-ferrous metals, for which many parts of the Asian region of the Soviet Union provide excellent prospects. The next step was to be the development of a machine-building industry, which would facilitate production of cheap consumer goods. Population growth would proceed simultaneously with industrial growth.

About 1,500 new enterprises were organized,[3] some in underdeveloped regions, but the bulk in the traditional industrial regions. Comparison of theoretical objectives with this picture of the First Five-Year Plan leads to the obvious conclusion that rapid industrial development was of paramount importance. In consequence, all available power was used for increasing production in existing industrial centres. But growth was extremely uneven, and the major part of the natural resources remained untapped; among the national minority areas, only the Ukraine was further developed and this was only thanks to its previous industrial capacity. Defence considerations did not yet outweigh all others. The reasons for the overwhelming importance given to the rapid increase in production may be found in the internal Party situation and Stalin's fight against both the Left and the Right opposition, which advocated somewhat different approaches to industrialisation.

In general, the Second Five-Year Plan postulated a continuation of the policies of its predecessor. About 4,500 new enterprises were built during this period,[4] and greater emphasis than before was placed on the development of a consumer industry, although heavy industry continued to be given unchallenged priority. The complete elimination of "exploiting" and "bourgeois" elements and the total collectivisation of agriculture were claimed to be the outstanding successes of this stage in Soviet economic development.

As far as the location of these new industries is concerned, it may be said that the theoretical principles did not differ from those of the First Five-Year Plan, although their practical application was not always possible. In any case, the number of new industrial plants located in the previously underdeveloped regions increased rapidly in proportion to those in the old centres, although their output still lagged far behind. This increase was not only due to exploitation of the rich mineral resources and the emphasis on heavy industry but also to attempts to develop light and food industries. The successful progress made in this period was partly due to the availability of rich raw materials and to their

[2] Maurice Dobb, *Soviet Economic Development Since 1917*, New York, 1948, p. 391.
[3] R. S. Livshits, *Ocherki po razmeshcheniyu promyshlennosti SSSR* (Industrial Distribution in the USSR), Moscow, 1954, p. 129.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

favourable location for exploitation in the Asian regions of the Soviet Union. The cost of production in these new centres was lower than in the old ones, and it was expected that within a few years the saving achieved would compensate investment expenditure.

In the Second Five-Year Plan, a serious shortage in transport made itself felt. This resulted from the construction of large enterprises without regard to the over-all development so often advocated in theoretical discussions. The balanced development of a region requires some time, and the construction of gigantic plants is a step in the opposite direction. The shortages in transport resulted from long hauls of subsidiary raw materials (in most cases coal or semi-finished products) to the large metallurgical plants. Also, in many cases excessive specialisation required a great deal of transport to distribute the finished products. Therefore, great emphasis was laid upon utilisation of local fuel, including exploitation of local coal resources, sometimes even those of very poor quality. Construction of similar plants in different parts of the country was also promoted in order to reduce long hauls.

The construction of the Ural-Kuznetsk Combine is closely assiociated with the Second Five-Year Plan,[5] and because of its importance as an example of Soviet planning, it is necessary to discuss the project in somewhat greater detail. Plans for the development of iron ores in the Urals and coal deposits in the Kuznetsk Basin had already been drawn up before the Revolution, and during the period of preparation of the First Five-Year Plan they were revived and re-drafted. It was decided that in order to utilise the natural resources of these areas which complement each other in the production of steel, it was necessary to unite them into a single economic unit. The powerful electric power plants already mentioned were constructed as a basis for the development, and were intended to help promote the iron-smelting and machine-building industries. They were to be connected by main railway lines running shuttle services to transport iron ore in one direction and coal in the other. Because of weight factors it is usually most economical to transport coal to steel works located at iron ore deposits, assuming the distance to the consumer is the same, as is the case in the Ukraine.

Arguments were raised against this proposal, especially by Ukrainian economists and industrial managers, and by the All-Union Ministry of Railways.[6]

[5] Franklyn D. Holzmann, "The Soviet Ural-Kuznetsk Combine. A Study in Investment Criteria and Industrialization Policies," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, p. 368.

[6] One of the most outspoken opponents of the construction of the Second Metallurgical Base, and at the same time defender of further economic development of the Donbas, was the distinguished Ukrainian economist Professor Ya. Dimanshtein. In addition to purely economic arguments concerning the irrationality of the undertaking, he also argued that the central authorities, in order to gain sympathy for the plan, had gone so far as to falsify the necessary statistical data. For his courageous stand Professor Dimanshtein paid with his life.

They insisted that the high cost of freight between two centres of production would outweigh the advantages derived from the availability and quality of mineral resources, that is to say, such costs would be too high to offset the difference in costs at the two locations. They also pointed out that, owing to the very small population in the parts of the country concerned, the finished products would have to be transported to the European parts of the Soviet Union, which would add further to the average cost per unit of output. Opponents of the plan proposed instead that available funds be invested in further development of the Donbas with resulting lower average costs. This solution, they claimed, would result in economical allocation of scarce resources. The defenders of the plan argued that creation of the proposed combine would result in real economy. The military advantage of the development was also mentioned, but not greatly stressed, even though armaments production on a large scale had already started in the Soviet Union around 1932. The decisive argument came from Stalin, who held that the Donbas alone was not enough to meet the needs of the Soviet Union. After the battle over the building of the combine was won, the construction of gigantic complexes instead of a series of individual plants was decided upon for the following reasons: (1) certain technological processes had to be combined in the conversion of raw materials into finished products if production was to attain maximum output with minimum costs; (2) division of labour and economy in the use of raw materials would increase due to co-ordination of enterprises; and (3) more rational and complete use of equipment would be achieved.

In order to realise this tremendous undertaking, one-fourth of all the investment funds of the Second Five-Year Plan were devoted to it. In the Third Five-Year Plan further development of the combine was neglected until studies made during the Second World War forced the authorities to resume action. It appeared that the smooth working of the two constituent parts of the combine was hindered by bottlenecks in transport and often all available resources and, of course, all propaganda facilities, were used to lessen transport difficulties. One means of coping with this problem took the form of attempts to make the two centres more self-sufficient. These involved development of a local fuel base for the Ural iron furnaces and utilisation in the Kuzbas of low-grade iron ore for smelting. The exploitation of closer coal resources in Karaganda was encouraged and their delivery to Ural foundries cut coal transport costs by half.

It will be useful at this point to summarise the effectiveness of this famous undertaking. At the time of its construction, capital investment per ton of coal was much higher in Kuznetsk and Karaganda than in the Donbas. But since natural resources in these two Central Asian areas were richer and better than in the Donbas, the difference in value had to be included in production costs. Secondary investment, such as that in transport, still further increased costs, of which the heaviest were those incurred in transport. During the Second Five-Year Plan output by the combine was much higher than was needed in Soviet

Asia and the products were exported to the west of the USSR. Seen from a long-term view, the combine has largely justified its existence, and considering its contribution during the Second World War, when European production centres were occupied, there is no doubt that its construction was justified. In this respect, it is worth-while remembering Stalin's famous dictum that for the Soviet Union profitability is important as a long-term aim.[7] The Ural-Kuznetsk combine is a very characteristic example of this long-term Soviet planning.

In the course of drawing up the Third Five-Year Plan the Soviet leaders became aware of the mistakes and shortcomings in the distribution of industry during the two previous Plans, since, throughout the country, the absence of comprehensive development was evident, and was reflected particularly in the increase in the amount of railway hauling. Transport remained a weak spot in the economy and there was little hope for increased investment in this sector without damage to the rearmament programme which was consuming a growing part of the national income. In order to avoid economic breakdown, the trend established by the preceding Five-Year Plans had to be reversed without a decline in production. Accordingly, the Eighteenth Party Congress, in 1939, placed new emphasis upon location theory.[8] To the familiar objectives — evenness of industrial distribution, closeness to raw materials and consumers, and self-sufficiency of economic regions — were added such new ones as the fight against the mania for building giant factories, and the elimination of wasteful crosshauls and excessively long hauls. Among the measures to ease the transport situation and at the same time to distribute industry more evenly throughout the country was an order to stop all new construction in the areas of heaviest industrial concentration, such as Moscow, Leningrad and Kharkov. The Party resolution directed the appropriate ministries to build new plants in the east identical to those already existing in the west of the USSR. The resolution did not, however, remain effective for any great length of time.

During the three years of the Third Five-Year Plan preceding the German invasion, 2,900 new enterprises were constructed,[9] and there was some success in making individual economic regions more self-sufficient — a course due to military as well as to purely economic considerations. The machine-building industry was particularly widely dispersed, especially in the areas beyond the Urals; the goal was to make each individual economic region able to function independently in the event of enemy attack.

Such measures soon had to be carried out under war-time conditions, when almost the entire European part of the Soviet Union, with its most highly developed industries, was quickly lost to the enemy, and in order to be able to

---

[7] Peter Wiles, "Growth Versus Choice," *The Economic Journal*, London, June 1956, p. 254—255.

[8] Holland Hunter, *Soviet Transportation Policy*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1957, p. 28.

[9] R. S. Livshits, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

continue the war, the Soviet leadership were forced to concentrate industrial output in the Central Asian areas. This was done by installing dismantled industries moved from the west and by investing all available funds in the construction of new facilities. The increase in output in the eastern regions of the Soviet Union was tremendous, although it took some time to assemble the evacuated plants and to provide the necessary labour force. The growth of output was not only due to the increase in the size of the mining industry; the whole structure of the local economy was changed. The machine-building, chemical and non-ferrous metals industries and many other finished product industries were put to work. Because of the war effort there was, of course, less emphasis on the development of consumer industries. An especially heavy increase in output took place in the Ural and Volga regions, which, thanks to their relative proximity to the front, became main suppliers to the Red Army. In Kazakhstan as well as in other national minority regions, new industries were introduced which often required the importation of skilled labour from Russia proper, with the result that the new industrial centres represented growing Russian enclaves amidst the local population.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan, the first after the war, was devoted mainly to the reconstruction of devastated war areas. By 1948, the task of reconstruction was, according to Party pronouncements, complete. During the period,[10] 7,000 large new enterprises were constructed, not counting a great number of small and medium-sized ones, and, in contrast to the trend in the pre-war Five-Year Plans, the areas beyond the Urals which had been opened up or expanded during the war, served as the basis for economic reconstruction and further development. The traditional industrial centres in the west were for a time deficit areas in the internal economy. The reconstruction and further development of these regions, including the Ukraine, proceeded under urgent pressure from the local Party organisations for more capital investment, and their success was due not only to the fact that it was cheaper to reconstruct plants damaged during the war than to build new ones, but also because production could thus be resumed much sooner. Neglect of the principle of military safety probably reflected Soviet leaders' opinion that the satellite states represented an adequate buffer zone, and that in any future war the distance factor would in any case be of no great importance.

This period of reconstruction gave the planning authorities a good opportunity to correct errors in industrial distribution made in the previous Five-Year Plans. First of all, the plants which fitted into the general economic structure of a region were reconstructed, and in new construction, emphasis continued to be placed on comprehensive development by the erection of a large specialised enterprise, if all the necessary means of production were available for the particular type of output, and then building up round it subsidiary and consumer goods industries. In planning industrial distribution the following

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 305.

factors were to be taken into account: (1) the ratio between mining and manufacturing industries; (2) the ratio between capital construction and the production of building materials; and (3) the balance between demand and consumption in the region concerned. Of course, the traditional requirements that industry be so planned as to eliminate irrational transport, that similar plants be constructed and that local fuels be utilised, were emphasised as before.

Industry had become much more widely dispersed than before the war; the eastern part of the Soviet Union was now the source of almost half the total production, which greatly benefited the national republics in Soviet Asia. Kazakhstan became one of the important centres of heavy industry and in Uzbekistan several textile factories, processing local cotton, were constructed and in addition a textile machine-building industry was created. The development of electric power in Kirghizia and of an oil industry in the Turkmen Republic provided some hope for the cultural and social progress of the peoples of these areas, on the basis of a stronger economy.

That the planning of industrial distribution is still very far from satisfactory is evident from the example of the machine-building plants in Minsk, Belorussia.[11] Belorussia was before the war, and still is, an underdeveloped country as compared with other European regions of the Soviet Union. The country is not especially rich in minerals although there are rich peat deposits available, capable of serving as the basis for a synthetic fuel industry. Efforts were made to begin such an industry before the war, but were not resumed afterwards. Although there was no solid foundation for a machine-building industry, one was set up during the Second Five-Year Plan and production greatly increased in the post-war period.

Belorussian plants produce from imported steel a large variety of cars, tractors, lorries, locomotives, motorcycles, bicycles, and road and construction machinery. It may be suspected that this development has taken place in accordance with the doctrine that industry be built up near consumer centres, but there is an unfavourable balance of import and export in Belorussia's machinery industry. This is due to the very specialised nature of its production: the lorries and tractors manufactured can be used only on very large building sites, such as those in the Urals or in Kazakhstan while, on the other hand, Belorussian agriculture badly needs light tractors, and local industry could use many more light lorries than are actually manufactured.

The influence of this kind of planning on transport is doubtless substantial. Vsevolod Holubnychy attributes mistakes in the planning of industrial distribution, resulting in economic waste, to the tremendous size of the Soviet Union and to excessive centralisation. Another writer[12] thinks that the construction of a

[11] See V. Holubnychy, "Location of Industries in the Belorussian SSR," *Belorussian Review*, No. 4, Munich, 1957, p. 122.

[12] A. Poplujko, "Problems of Soviet Industrial Location," *Bulletin*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, January, 1956, p. 43.

heavy industry, based on imported steel, was assigned to Belorussia in accordance with its role as an economic advance post in the west from which economic penetration farther westward would proceed. No other explanation appears logical, since the delivery of finished products from Minsk factories to the eastern part of the Soviet Union is economically irrational. The same applies to Georgia's metallurgical and machine-building industry, although there are some coal deposits, and low grade iron ore can be brought in from Azerbaidzhan.

According to Khrushchev,[13] the Fifth Five-Year Plan was a great success, like all its predecessors, and, as a result of the internal political "thaw" and the slackening of the cold war, greater emphasis was laid on the development of a consumer goods industry, especially in the western areas of the Soviet Union where density of population would provide markets on the spot. Location of heavy industry is, on the other hand, governed mainly by the lower cost of production in the eastern parts of the country, where the cost of coal mining, for example, is about 33 per cent lower than in the Donbas, owing to the possibility of open-cast mining.

As far as the future is concerned, the present official emphasis is on tapping the immense natural resources of Siberia and Central Asia, establishing a new metallurgical centre in this region, bringing more virgin lands under cultivation and resettling population, especially young people, from the Ukraine and Belorussia.[14] These policies constitute one of the main features in the current Seven-Year Plan, and are probably permanent.

Statistical indications of the results of the application of Soviet locational theories in practice are still almost non-existent. As far as I know, there is only one recent study of this sort. This is an article by Holubnychy,[15] the gist of which is contained in the following table:

Population and Gross and Per Capita Industrial Output in the RSFSR and other Soviet Republics, in 1913 and 1955

	1913	1955
RSFSR:		
Population, as Percentage of USSR Total	63.1	58.1
Gross Industrial Output as Percentage of USSR Total	70.2	77.0
Per Capita Industrial Output (RSFSR = 100)	——	——
OTHER SOVIET REPUBLICS: *		
Population, as Percentage of USSR Total	36.9	41.9
Gross Industrial Output as Percentage of USSR Total	29.8	23.0
Per Capita Industrial Output (RSFSR = 100)	72.7	41.4

* Excluding the three Baltic republics, and allowing for territorial changes in the other Soviet republics.

[13] Report of the CPSU Central Committee on the Twentieth Party Congress, Moscow, 1957, pp. 48—61.

[14] See G. Wheeler, "Recent Developments in Soviet Central Asia," *The Geographical Journal*, London, June 1957, pp. 137—147.

[15] V. Holubnychy, "Exploitation of the Non-Russian Republics of the USSR," *Vpered*, Munich, April 1957, pp. 6—8.

This table sheds some light on the actual state of realisation of the Soviet theoretical principle of equalising levels of industrial development in the areas inhabited by the non-Russian minorities, bordering on the RSFSR. The table is based on official Soviet statistics for gross volume of industrial output and shows that, although the ratio of the population of the non-Russian republics to that of the USSR as a whole increased between 1913 and 1955, the ratio of industrial production did not grow so rapidly. Holubnychy concluded that, in spite of the absolute growth of industrialisation in the non-Russian republics, a fact which is beyond dispute, in relative terms the non-Russian republics of the USSR today are even more underdeveloped industrially in comparison with Russia proper than they were before the Revolution. This finding has, of course, an important political significance, since it reveals that the decisions of the Tenth Party Congress in 1921[16] calling for an end to economic discrimination against non-Russian areas have not been fulfilled and, according to Marxist logic, on which those decisions were based, the economic causes of non-Russian nationalism have not been removed in the USSR.

The failure to equalise the level of industrial development in the non-Russian republics with that of Russia proper may mean, however, that such equalisation would have been impractical and contrary to fundamental principles of rational distribution of industry. This conclusion seems to be supported by the findings of John S. Hoyt, in his as yet unpublished dissertation on the subject.[17]

In summing up, one may say that during the First Five-Year Plan all effort was concentrated on increasing output, which was achieved through further development of the old industrial centres. In the Second Five-Year Plan the construction of the Ural-Kuznetsk combine was in the foreground of attention; the Third Five-Year Plan and the war period were entirely dictated by the needs of national defence, while the Fourth Five-Year Plan was devoted to reconstruction. In the Fifth Five-Year Plan and the current Plan the industrial development of Siberia has priority.

Without statistical comparisons it is difficult to evaluate the results of the practical application by the Soviet authorities of their theory of industrial location, but the recurrent complaints in the press about shortcomings in this sphere and the repeated Party resolutions on the matter indicate that results have only been moderately successful.

---

[16] *KPSS v rezolyutsiakh* (Resolutions of the CPSU), Moscow, 1953, pp. 559 et seq.; Ivan S. Koropeckyj, *op. cit.*
Holubnychy, "Soviet Theory on Industrial Location," *Studies on the Soviet Union, No. 5,* Munich, 1960, pp. 81 et seq.

[17] Cf., *Dissertation Abstracts,* University Microfilm Inc., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1959, Vol. XX, No. 5, p. 1614.

Recent Soviet Theories of Value

VSEVOLOD HOLUBNYCHY

The Stifling Impact of Stalin's Dictatorship

The discussion began when Stalin announced that not only political power but also the economy and society in the Soviet Union had become socialist. At first he seems to have been aware, as every other informed person was, that he was saying something utterly incompatible with the letter and spirit of Marxism-Leninism. So, at the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930, he said that the USSR was only entering the stage of socialism, and immediately qualified his declaration by saying that this did not imply abolition of the NEP because money, commerce, and commodity relations were not yet going to be liquidated.[1] But at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, having silenced all opposition, he felt free to revise Marxism-Leninism wihout qualification, and completely forgetting his continuation-of-the-NEP formula, he declared that full-fledged socialism had been built in the USSR, while money, commerce, and commodity production were here to stay because they did not contradict socialism, in which centralized planning dominated everything.[2]

Soviet economists knew very well at the time how Marx, Engels, and Lenin envisaged their socialism, but no one would dare to question Stalin's authority if he wished to avoid the sad fate of Ryazanov, Rubin, Kushin, Groman, Bazarov, and other Marxists silenced at that time by the GPU. Moreover, Stalin's emphasis on centralized planning as the dominating force in money-commodity relations looked like an innocent and plausible item of revisionism, especially since he also promised that money-commodity relations were only temporary. Everyone understood him correctly and sycophants started to sing his praises. In 1930 he was placed on the same footing as Marx, Engels and Lenin. A legion of minor writers began to popularize his economic theories, while those with authority started to elaborate on them. K. Ostrovityanov, who had successfully mutilated his outstanding "Bukharinite" past, unequivocally declared that Soviet economics "should know no objective economic laws whatsoever" because it had just "jumped into the Realm of Freedom" in which there was only one economic category left: "the plan of the dictatorship of the proletariat."[3] For the former "semi-Trotskyite" A. Leontiev this was nothing new; he had only to reprint his 1925 *Notes on Transitional Economics* in which he had predicted

---

[1] J. V. Stalin, *Sochininiya* (Works), Vol. XII, Moscow, 1949, pp. 306–307.
[2] *Ibid.*, Vol. XIII, p. 342
[3] *Vestnik Kommunisticheskoi Akademii*, No. 4, 1933, pp. 10 ff.

that centralized plans would take the place of economic laws in Soviet economy. While for S. Strumilin all this was nothing but a triumph of his ideas about planning; he proclaimed that from now on there remained only one law: "the will to rush towards Communism."[4]

Were it not for Stalin's arbitrariness and terror, Soviet economic thought would probably have developed normally along the promising paths opened up in the twenties by such thoughtful economists as I. Rubin and E. Slutsky, instead of straying off for more than a decade in the jungle of voluntarism.

The painful consequences of the lack of economic theory and methods, however, began to be felt soon enough. It is enough to mention such facts as the complete financial collapse of the entire Donbas mining industry in 1939, when even wages were not paid for months. Yet the change was very slow, for it was only in September 1940 that an editorial in *Planovoe khozyaistvo* called for the first time for "more attention to economics and economic theory."

It was around this time, in 1940 or 1941, that in an unpublished statement Stalin urged economic theorists to work out a text-book of Soviet economics; it is said that at this time "Stalin, as the first Marxist, put forward a thesis about the necessity of commodity production under socialism as well as the operation of the law of value in an altered form."[5] This was the consummation of Stalin's economic revisionism.

The war delayed the work on the new theory, but finally, in the last issue of *Pod znamenem marksizma*, in 1943, an editorial was published that reverberated throughout the world.[6] The paper did not refer to Stalin but nonetheless authoritatively declared that "commodity production" and a "transformed law of value" were operative in the USSR. This editorial was probably written by L. Leontiev. Anyhow, it was put in imperative terms, which, however, displayed nothing but intellectual calisthenics. R. Meek agrees that the logic of the argument was dubious and the use of Marxian economic terms arbitrary and inconsistent.[7] Yet to some neophytes the paper was a revelation: an attempt was even made to prove that Engels in 1844 had known what Marx would say in his *Critique of the Gotha Programme* in 1875, and that both had presaged exactly what was said in the Soviet paper.[8]

Soviet economists, however, were not at all enthusiastic about the editorial of 1943: they ignored it almost unanimously until, in 1948, Leontiev in a signed article reminded them of its main theses.[9] Instead, in the meantime, they were

---

[4] *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 8—9, 1934, pp. 200 ff.

[5] *Zycie Gospodarcze*, Warsaw, No. 12, 1959, p. 12.

[6] An English translation of this editorial apeared under the title "Teaching of Economics in the Soviet Union," in the *American Economic Review*, Menasha, Wis., USA, September 1944, pp. 501—530.

[7] R. L. Meek, *Studies in the Labour Theory of Value*, London, 1956, pp. 272—273.

[8] *Les Cahiers de l'économie soviétique*, Paris, January-March 1947, pp. 3—4.

[9] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 1, 1948, pp. 3 ff.

interested in somewhat more meaningful and immediate issues: E. Varga's debacle over the thesis of "planned capitalism" in the West, S. Strumilin's discussion of the "time factor" in capital investments, A. Notkin's theory of a "technological factor" in economic growth, E. Sollertinskaya's courageous statement on the existence of differential rent on collective farms, etc. It was not until 1951 that a group of senior economists was finally directed to write the first draft of a text-book on Soviet economics. The completed draft was sent for comments to Stalin, and these comments were published in the autumn of 1952.[10] Of particular import was Stalin's declaration to the effect that the law of value, although having "no regulating function in socialist production ... nevertheless influences production" and as such "cannot be ignored" in price-fixing as hitherto.[11] As the two major causes of the existence of the law of value under socialism Stalin stressed (1) the difference between state and collective farm property which necessitated a commodity exchange between industry and agriculture based on money, and (2) the existence of a retail market for consumer goods in which consumers had free choice in spending their incomes. He thus confined the operation of the law of value to only those economic relations which were not yet wholly controlled by the state; in particular, he remarked, the law did not operate within the capital goods industry where products were not really bought and sold but were simply transferred from one enterprise to another by order of the planners. However, apparently still conscience-stricken because of his revision of the views of Marx and Lenin on socialism, Stalin invented a non-existent leftist critic of his doctrine, named him "Comrade Yaroshenko," quoted his views on the institutions of a moneyless and marketless economy, very similar to Marx's, ridiculed them as obviously Utopian under the present conditions, but promised that they would come true in the future, under the "second stage" of Communist society.

Needless to say, Stalin's pronouncements were hailed by all as the ultimate in wisdom. Yet the work on the economics text-book proceeded rather slowly, so much so that it even outlived Stalin. The book appeared in the autumn of 1954, incorporating everything bequeathed to it by that greatest of all economists[12]. It was full of abstruse and unpalatable ideas in the tradition of Stalin's historical materialism as outlined in the notorious Chapter IV of his *History of the CPSU, Short Course*, but as far as economics was concerned it was insipid and inane.

Yet it cannot be gainsaid that Stalin at least reminded the majority of the Soviet economists of their professional duties by having swerved their thoughts from blissful voluntarism to something called "objective economic laws." Thenceforth Soviet economic discussions began to acquire more meaning and signi-

---

[10] J. Stalin, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, Moscow, 1952.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 23 ff.
[12] *Politicheskaya ekonomiya: Uchebnik* (Political Economy: A Handbook), Moscow, 1954.

ficance, their scope began to broaden, and their character became lively and spontaneous. Of great political import was the 1954 debate over the comparative rates of growth of heavy and light industries; then, in 1954-55, there developed a revealing discussion of the nature of the turnover tax; and in 1955 the question of capital depreciation and obsolescence was raised, the debate over which continued through 1958.

The next notable change occurred in 1956, when at the Twentieth Party Congress Mikoyan openly called for a revision of Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism.* This brought a breath of fresh air. Economic discussion acquired new freedom and vigour. A long series of great debates on the law of value and price policy, on the efficiency of capital investments, and on agricultural costs and prices started in 1956 and lasted through 1959. In 1957-60, ground and mining rents came under discussion, and in 1959-60 the question of the location of industries, the laws of monopoly capitalism, and finally, the basic law of socialism.[13] In the post-1956 discussions, for the first time in some thirty years, Soviet economists tackled problems of real theoretical importance and profound political implications.

It should not be construed, of course, that these debates provided the opportunity for an entirely free expression of thought. The most important of them were thoroughly organized in the form of conferences under the auspices of the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR; others were stimulated by the editors of journals, who solicited contributions on a pre-arranged topic; but, above all, the debates were, of course, carefully watched by the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, and, as a result, most expressions were confined to a more or less strict Party orthodoxy.

These Soviet debates have already deservedly become a current issue with leading Western students of the Soviet economy.[14] Since, in general, their

---

[13] For these discussions the reader must consult not only *Voprosy ekonomiki* and *Planovoe khozyaistvo,* but also such journals as *Nauchny doklady vysshei shkoly; Ekonomocheskie nauki; Vestnik statistiki, Ekonomika selskogo khozyaistva; Finansy SSSR; Gorny zhurnal; Ekonomicheskaya gazeta;* as well as the journals of the universities of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Tbilisi, and the republic economic journals such as *Ekonomika Radianskoi Ukrayny,* etc.

[14] R. Schlesinger, "Strumilin and Others on the Theory for a New Price Structure," *Soviet Studies,* Oxford, July 1957, pp. 92—98; M. Dobb, "A Comment on the Discussion About Price-Policy," *Soviet Studies,* Oxford, October 1957, pp. 131—41; A. Nove, "Recent Developments in Economic Ideas," *Survey,* Washington, D. C., November-December 1957, pp. 19—26; A. Nove, "The Problems of 'Success Indicators'," *Ekonomica,* London, February 1958, pp. 1—13; W. Leontief, "The Decline and Rise of Soviet Economic Science," *Foreign Affairs,* New York, January 1960, pp. 261—72; M. Dobb, "The Revival of Theoretical Discussion Among Soviet Economists," Science & Society, Washington, D. C., Fall 1960, pp. 289—311; B. Ward, "Kantorovich on Economic Calculation," *The Journal of Political Economy,* Chicago, December 1960, pp. 545—56; A. Zauberman, "The Soviet Debate on the Law of Value and Price Formation," in G. Grossmann (ed.): *Value and Plan,* Berkeley, 1960, pp. 17—46. (Includes comment by A. Bergson).

subject matter is already known, an attempt will be made here only to summarize their most salient points, which are for the most part in the theory of value and price, and then to try to discover their meaning by what Hegel called the method of immanent critique, i.e., by comparing them with themselves, on their own terms. The discussions which follow are in particular based on the papers read at the December 1956 conference on political economy held at the Institute of Economics of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and published during 1957 in *Voprosy ekonomiki;* the papers read at the May 1957 conference on the law of value and pricing held at the same institute and published in a symposium;[15] the papers of the January 1958 conference on the same subject held at the Moscow State University and also published in book form;[16] articles by S. Strumilin (who was not present at these conferences) in various journals;[17] and other articles and books on the subject of the theory of value which appeared in the course of 1960.[18]

The quintessence of all recent Soviet economic debates has been a search for some objective, material, scientific method of decision-making. Most participants have in one way or another admitted and recognized that, until now, major Soviet economic decisions have been for the most part subjective and arbitrary, and have led to direct and indirect losses. It has been suggested that the reasons why Soviet economists have only now turned to this problem are: (1) that the concern with scarcity deepens as an economy gets richer,[19] (2) that, in pursuit of the aim to overtake the West at the earliest possible date, Soviet economists have become acutely conscious of the need for maximum efficiency,[20] and (3) that they have succumbed to the Western criticism of their methods.[21] All these explanations are plausible, though as to (1) and (3) it must be added that it is only now that they have been freed from the stifling pressure of

---

[15] Y. A. Kronrod (ed.), *Zakon stoimosti i ego ispolzovanie v narodnom khozyaistve SSSR* (The Law of Value and Its Application in the National Economy of the USSR), Moscow, 1959.

[16] N. A. Tsagolov (ed.), *Zakon stoimosti i ego rol pri sotsializme* (The Law of Value and Its Role Under Socialism), Moscow, 1959.

[17] See in particular *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 8, 1956; No. 12, 1956; No. 7, 1959; No. 8, 1959; No. 5, 1960; *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 2, 1957.

[18] See in particular Y. Kronrod (ed.), *Problemy politicheskoi ekonomii sotsializma: Sbornik statei* (Problems of the Political Economy of Socialism: A Symposium), Moscow, 1959 and 1960; Sh. Ya. Turetsky, *Ocherki planovogo tsenoobrazovaniya v SSR* (An Outline of Planned Price Regulation in the USSR), Moscow, 1959; V. Venzher, *Voprosy ispolzovaniya zakona stoimosti v kolkhoznom proizvodstve* (Problems of the Application of the Law of Value in Kolkhoz Output), Moscow, 1960; M. F. Makarova, *O tovarnom proizvodstve i zakone stoimosti pri sotsializme* (On Commodity Production and the Law of Value Under Socialism), Moscow, 1958.

[19] Zauberman, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

[20] Nove, in *Survey*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

[21] Leontief, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

Stalin's authority,[22] and as to (2) it must be pointed out that, in addition, they have realized that, during the past decade, Soviet economic growth has been steadily slowing down.[23]

The Debate on the Law of Value

As of 1960, Soviet debates have centered around three basic problems: (1) how to explain and exonerate in the face of classical Marxism-Leninism the fact that commodity production, an exchange economy based on money, and the law of value exist at all in the Soviet socialist economy; (2) how this law of value relates, or should relate, to the centralized price-setting practiced in the Soviet economy; and (3) how the law of value relates, or should relate, to capital allocation under centralized planning.

Almost all participants in the discussions continued to accept Stalin's revision of Marx's and Lenin's views on socialism, and many — K. Ostrovityanov, F. Koshelev and others — admitted this fact explicitly. Thus, the starting point in the debates was that the "law of value" is compatible with socialist economics. But this was an unfortunate start; as a result, the debates avoided the need to define what the law of value really was. They proceeded as if such a definition were clear and unanimously accepted; in reality, however, it was not, and this produced much unnecessary confusion and dismay. Academican L. Kantorovich hit the point exactly when, at the General Assembly of the USSR Academy of Sciences, in March 1959, he declared: "On the 42nd anniversary of the existence of the socialist state, it is not yet clear to our economic science what the law of value means in a socialist society and how it has to be applied."[24] (The same charge was aptly raised in a recent Polish discussion by Professor J. Drewnowski.)[25]

The explanation of the reasons for the persistence of the law of value and money-commodity relations in the Soviet economy separated the debaters into two large groups. The majority, headed by K. Ostrovityanov, stood fast on Stalin's (and, theoretically, also Marx's) position, maintaining that it is not the division of labour as such, but rather the particular, private or group property rights in regard to the products of such division that necessitate the existence of money-commodity exchange and, consequently, the operation of the law of value. The minority, led by Y. Kronrod, insisted that division of labour alone makes an exchange economy necessary. Although much of this discussion is too recondite

---

[22] Cf. Dobb in *Science & Society, op. cit.*, pp. 289 ff.

[23] Cf. V. Holubnychy, "Le ralentissement des rhythmes d'accroissement de l'économie soviétique," *Problèmes soviétiques*, Institute for the Study of the USSR, Munich, No. 2, 1959 pp. 52—85.

[24] *Vestnik Akademii Nauk SSSR*, No. 4, 1959, p. 60.

[25] *Ekonomista*, Warsaw, No. 5, 1960, p. 1006.

and sophistic, its possible practical implications seem to be important. Ostrovityanov's argument, it seems, can better explain the persistence of a limited free market in the USSR in the form of the collective farm market, the black market, etc., as well as the typically monopolistic relations between the state and collective agriculture; also the freedom of wage-earners to spend their income on the acquisition of personal property for consumption purposes can be adduced in support of Ostrovityanov. Of course, a Western economist would also have added scarcity as an important factor in this analysis of the development of value, but this could not have been part of Ostrovityanov's argument; what he was talking about, in Western terms, was the principle of economic sovereignty as the fundamental cause of all exchange. However, immanent in Ostrovityanov's position is the possibility of eventual abolition of all differentiation of property and, hence, the abolition of exchange and the law of value by their subjugation to an exclusive sovereignty of state property. In this implication Ostrovityanov is an orthodox Marxist. On the other hand, Kronrod's insistence on deriving exchange from the division of labour (in Western terms this can be interpreted as product differentiation) implies that an exchange economy may continue as long as the division of labour persists, and that may last forever. Kronrod's position is not orthodox, for Marx said clearly that, "while it is true that private exchange implies the division of labour, it is false to maintain that division of labour implies private exchange."[26]

However, despite the fact that Ostrovityanov's orthodoxy carried off the honours, Kronrod scored at least one important victory: it was as a result of his and his adherents' criticisms that Stalin's contention about producer goods being "non-commodities" was almost unanimously rejected. From now on all output in the USSR is considered as consisting of commodities, and hence the law of value is supposed to be universally applicable throughout the economy.

As soon as the law's existence in the USSR was so recognized, debaters moved their attention to the problem of its effect upon the formation of prices and the effectiveness of capital investments. The discussion of this problem was spearheaded by a series of thought-provoking articles by Academician S. Strumilin, who declared that the existing practice of the utilization of the law of value in the USSR was ajar with Marxian principles.

Strumilin maintained that Marx's insistence that, under socialism, economy in labour input should be the supreme rule governing the planned allocation of resources, is identical with and implies the existence of the law of value in a socialist economy. Accordingly, Strumilin proposed that both Soviet prices and the criteria of resource allocation lead to the reduction of current labour input, i.e., stimulate a rise in labour productivity. This end is achieved, in Strumilin's

---

[26] Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Chicago (Kerr ed.), 1911, p. 68.

opinion, when prices are made proportional to new value added in current production, i.e., when commodities are exchanged according to the "living" labour currently spent in their production. Since there is no practical method of measuring the labour contents of commodities directly, Strumilin concocts an ingenious figment: since the USSR Constitution establishes that wages in the USSR are paid "according to one's labour," the wage fund is a basic measure of value from which to start. Since both national income and wage fund are known (fixed by the plan?), the difference between them, which is the rate of accumulation, or surplus labour, is thus completely determined. Consequently, the basic elements of the price are also determined; the price must be made directly proportional to wages and include an average, uniform rate of charge for the accumulation fund. In Marx's terms, says Strumilin, this means that M : V = constant. *M* stands for "surplus value," *V* is "variable capital" which reduces to wages. The whole ratio, M : V, within a new value added, constitutes the rate of surplus value as well as the distribution of national income into accumulation (M) and consumption (V) funds. By using this notation without qualification, Strumilin forgets that, in Marx, V is sometimes also the necessary part of the "living" labour day, which comprises not only wages, but also the depreciation of capital and the cost of raw materials; in such a case it represents the consumption of gross national product, rather than of national income, and destroys the whole structure that Strumilin has built up on it. The achievement of such an equilibrium in the rate of surplus value must be the ultimate goal of resource allocation. Since M, the rate of accumulation, or surplus value, is to be constant, resources must be allocated so as to equalize and reduce V in all lines of production. This is the same as to say that the goal is the equalization of labour productivity by means of the substitution of capital for labour. In this way Strumilin thinks, Marx's testament of the need to economize on labour input and thus liberate the workers from the necessity to work would be realized in practice.

Having been, indeed, until 1957, the consummation of abstract economic theorizing in the Soviet Union, Strumilin's model attracted a large following among Soviet economists and wide attention abroad. Such luminaries as Y. Kronrod, A. Probst and M. Mstilavsky came out openly in support of his proposals, while K. Ostrovityanov, M. Bor, A. Boyarsky, A. Bachurin and others supported at least his main thesis, that prices must be made proportional to labour values. However, Strumilin acquired the widest acknowledgement by his practical proposal to equalize the rate of turnover tax throughout the economy. This implied raising prices of producer goods to the level of those of consumer goods, a proposal which met with a cool reception on the part of the Party authorities and of such economists as Ostrovityanov, Bachurin and Bor.

A model of price reform directly opposite to that of Strumilin was vigorously proposed by I. Malyshev. He began with a pointed remark that Strumilin's model, if accepted, would produce serious variations in profitability, and

this would lead to waste in the utilization of capital funds and would hamper Soviet economic growth. Since it is economic growth that is the priority task of the USSR at the present time, a maximum economy in the use of capital funds must be the goal of price and allocation policies. This can be achieved only by means of the "prices of production" described by Marx in Vol. III of *Capital*. These prices consist of full prime costs and a uniform, average charge on all advanced capital, constant as well as variable. This means that not M : V, but M : (C+V) = constant, where C stands for "constant" capital, which in this case amounts to gross investment in fixed assets; this is the formula for the rate of profit, rather than of surplus value. The rationale of resources allocation, therefore, must be the achievement of such an equilibrium, which means that the goal is the equalization of the rate of profit per unit of capital in all lines of production.

Malyshev also attracted a wide following among Soviet economists: Z. Atlas, L. Vaag, V. Sobol, M. Kolganov and others spoke unequivocally in support of his proposals, while some, including D. Kondrashev, A. Pashkov, V. Belkin, though not quite sharing his suggestion on the equalization of profit, agreed with his emphasis on full prime costs. In the West, Malyshev met with more favourable comments than Strumilin. However, later in the debate, some orthodox Stalinist levelled charges that Malyshev's model would restore the capitalist principle in price and allocation policy because resources would have to follow the lead of higher profits rather than flow into unprofitable employments which might be of interest to the state.

Lately Malyshev has produced a book to answer some of his critics.[27] In it he does not add anything new to his original proposals, but instead brings Marx into the debate and boldly attacks the Stalinists' continued revisionism of Marx's views on socialist economics. Malyshev singles out Ostrovityanov for criticism and maintains that, according to a correct interpretation of Marx, there should be no money-commodity relations or law of value under socialism. Yet from this Malyshev jumps to a dubious conclusion: he says that, since the Soviet economy *is* socialist, there is no place in it for a law of value and *all* commodities are something that he calls "non-commodities"; moreover, since prices are fixed by the state, they can as such be the measures of socially necessary labour, provided they are computed in accordance with his suggestion, *i.e.*, as the "prices of production."

At some distance from the centre of the main quarrel between what can be called the schools of Strumilin and Malyshev, there also appeared a small but sturdy group of mathematical economists who propose what is in effect an extremist, or marginalistic solution of the price and allocation problems. As of now, the group consists of A. Konyus, V. Nemchinov, and L. Kantorovich, but

---

[27] I. S. Malyshew, *Obshchestvenny uchet truda i tsena pri sotsializme* (Social Valuation of Labour and Prices Under Socialism), Moscow, 1960.

it seems to be gathering momentum. Although, of course, any classification of individuals in schools of thought is a highly conventional undertaking, the author of the present article still feels that A. Zauberman did not do justice to A. Konyus by having him so easily, in a mere footnote, included among the followers of Strumilin.[28] Konyus is an old friend of Strumilin and this was the main reason why he contributed a paper to the octogenarian's commemorative volume. A careful reading of that paper[29] would convince anyone that Strumilin and Konyus have only one thing in common, *viz.*, they both think that the origin of value is in labour and that, for the happiness of man, it is labour that must be ultimately economized. Otherwise, in that paper, as well as in his other writings which he cites in it, Konyus has developed a highly original, mathematically marginalist model of the labour theory of value which handles with subtlety and penetration, and nicely takes into account, all opportunity costs, scarcity rents, interest charges, and other miscellaneous costs; and, what is perhaps most important for a Soviet paper, Konyus supports his conclusions with meticulously collected, pertinent references to Marx and Engels proving that this method is compatible with Marxism. The quintessence of Konyus' model lies in his belief that, at the point of optimum equilibrium, labour-time values can be accurately expressed in (made proportional to) money of constant marginal utility, reflecting all scarcity relations cited in the given plan. In such a case, the whole calculus can obviously be reduced to the definition of a measure of marginal productivity of the marginal unit of labour. Otherwise, his model differs little from the conventional models of Western economists who reduce everything to a marginal unit of money. Nemchinov recently came out with an essentially similar proposal,[30] although he drew his inspiration from the minimax equations of the pre-Revolutionary Russian marginalist, V. Dmitriev.

Kantorovich has produced a model essentially similar to that of Konyus, though perfected to a shrewder practical applicability.[31] His method is somewhat akin to that of the linear programming and input/output analysis of R. Dorfman and others, as well as W. Leontief and W. Baumol. However, his theory of value is different, for he reduces everything to the ontogenic (developmental) marginal unit of labour. It is, by the way, not correct to say that Kantorovich departs from Marx's theory;[32] with a similar argument one can adduce that he improves on Marx by perfecting the method of labour value calculus

---

[28] Zauberman, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[29] *Voprosy ekonomiki, planirovaniya i statistiki: Sbornik statei k vosmidesyatiletiyu Akademika S. G. Strumilina* (Questions of Economics, Planning and Statistics: A Symposium on the Occasion of the Eightieth Birthday of Academician S. G. Strumilin), Moscow, 1957, pp. 405—419.

[30] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 12, 1960, pp. 85—103.

[31] L. V. Kantorovich, *Economichesky raschet nailuchshego ispolzvaniya resursov* (An Economic Estimation of the Best Use of Resources), Moscow, 1959.

[32] R. W. Campbell, Review of Kantorovich's book, *The American Economic Review*, Chicago, September 1960, p. 730.

without essentially changing the letter and the spirit of his economic philosophy.

Finally, among the debaters there was also a group of economists (S. Turetsky, L. Mayzenberg, V. Krasovsky, A. Belov, Y. Liberman, etc.) which strongly defended the existing practices of price formation, i.e., the equalization of the individual plants' prime costs of production around a weighted, intra-industry, average prime cost index, plus a small mark-up for "profit." This group was not very theoretical-minded, but it found some theoretical support among the proponents of the idea of making prime costs proportional to labour values, such as A. Bachurin, D. Kondrashev, A. Boyarsky and P. Mstislavsky.

These last two groups of economists found even stronger support in the remarks of the spokesmen for the official line — K. Ostrovityanov and L. Gatovsky. The latter, however, were only implicitly critical of all other schools of thought, and made no attempt to obstruct the relative freedom of discussion. Yet, the authority with which they spoke left little, if any, doubt that the Soviet Communist Party would think twice before even considering the adoption of any of the proposed models in practice. The Party holds that improvements rather than any radical changes are needed in the existing economic set-up.

The most salient point in the Ostrovityanov-Gatovsky approach is what may be called an anti-equilibrium, completely dynamic attitude towards value. They insist that the law of value, which they, like others, leave undefined, must not be allowed to become an independent, elemental force or the sole allocator of resources; instead, it must be "conquered," "subjugated" and "utilized." What this ostensibly means is that no single formula of price-setting and resource allocation should bind the decisions of the central planners because, after all, every formula describes some equilibrium, and every equilibrium is only a static, or at best a metastatic, model of reality. Such an attitude towards equilibrium is more than just a matter of locution. To "utilize" the law of value, in the terms of the Ostrovityanov-Gatovsky school, means to start from an equilibrium and move away from it, rather than seek to attain such an equilibrium. In practice this means to raise or lower prices, costs, wages, profits, and sundry other relative incentives deliberately so as to cause resources to flow from their present position to the one established as an objective in the state plan. Whereas all the formulas proposed in the debates prescribe the equalization of one or another productivity or efficiency index, the Ostrovityanov-Gatovsky proposal — which is always practiced in the USSR — is diametrically opposite: they insist on destroying equalities in order to deliberately create incentives for the flow of resources in the direction of the plan's objective, which may or may not constitute another equilibrium. Thus, Ostrovityanov-Gatovsky's is the position of the omnipotent sovereign monopoly of the state, which does not wish to be bound by any objective, external laws or formulas, but which, nevertheless, is aware of their existence and import and is ready to partially submit to them in order to utilize their effects for its purposes. Here is a typical statement by

J. Vinyukov, one of Ostrovityanov's followers: "The Soviet State needs planning of prices not for the purpose of some 'ideal' expression or measure of value for the value's sake, but rather for the sake of active utilization of the law of value in the interests of the development of the socialist economy. And in case these interests require that price deviate from value, so must it be."[33]

Doctrinal Limitations and Opportunities

It is not easy to appreciate fully the significance and trends of these debates without sufficient knowledge of Marxian economic theory. The statements to the effect that Marxism (it would be more accurate to say Stalinism) hampers the development of Soviet economic thought and prevents Soviet economists from understanding and embracing Western economic ideas and Western critiques of Soviet economics, though to a large extent true, nonetheless belong to those few hackneyed clichés which have become petrified through conventional repetition, yet have produced little, if any, positive effect on the study of the Soviet economy. While most writers thus blame Marxism and some even strangely deny its significance entirely,[34] only a few voices are heard calling for serious study of the role of Marxism in Soviet affairs, and even these come largely not from the economists but from political scientists and historians.[35] Paradoxically, in spite of all the ado about Marxism, not a single satisfactory empirical study of its relation to Soviet economics is as yet in existence. As a result, we have an appalling situation: while Soviet economists are truly hampered by Marxism in their appreciation and acceptance of Western views, but have no other way out, Western economists, in turn, do not realize or foresee the opportunities still open to Soviet economists within the framework of a Marxism freed from Stalin's stifling authority.

Recent debates and events in the field of publication in the USSR seem to call for a careful re-examination and differentiation regarding the persons and views in the West against which Soviet dogmatism is really directed. Recent translation and publication in the USSR of several American, British, and German books on the methodology of input/output analysis, linear programming, location theory, and mathematical statistics indicate that Soviet Marxists

---

[33] *Ekonomika Radyanskoi Ukrayny*, No. 2, 1960, p. 85.

[34] A. Gerschenkron's article in *Soviet Economic Growth*, ed. by A. Bergson, Evanston, Ill., 1953, p. 26.

[35] Cf. D. von Mohrenschild, "Russian Area Studies and Research Since World War II," *The Russian Review*, Washington, D.C., April 1953, p. 113; H. Koch, "Experience in Research on the USSR," in *Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the Institute for the Study of the USSR: The Aims and Methods of Research in the USSR*, Munich, 1955, pp. 5—6. The only notable exception among the economists was a paper by H. Raupach, "Über den Ausgangspunkt einer kritischen Wertung der Sowjetwirtschaft," *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, No. 5, 1951, pp. 57—68, though he suggested that more attention be paid to Lenin than to Marx.

are not opposed to practical, methodological Western suggestions applicable to the Soviet economic system. They are, however, invariably opposed to Western psychological theories of value and their outgrowth, welfare economics. Yet, whether accidental or not, the fact is that the foremost students of Soviet economics in the West have come from the welfare and neo-liberal schools of thought, and they have also been regularly in the forefront of the criticism of Soviet economics. As a result, there has developed a strikingly incongruous relationship between the economic ideologies of Soviet economists and Western students of Soviet economics.

In order to understand better the current Soviet theoretical positions, it is proposed to examine briefly the dogmatic causes of the Soviet economists' opposition to Western criticism of their value and price system. In this case Soviet and Western economists are in diametrically opposed positions. Western criticism originates from entirely different moral and political precepts which are utterly incompatible with Soviet aims and institutions. (Yet Western critics seldom if ever display awareness of this fact.) Almost all Western economic doctrines which underlie the criticism of Soviet economics start from the precept that the consumer's sovereign choice is taken as the highest criterium in all value judgements and policy decisions. Moreover, it is believed that the consumer's sovereignty, and economic rationality in general, can best be realized through the mechanism of a free market and competitive enterprise.

Starting from such assumptions, many Western students of the Soviet value and price system have decided, on purely doctrinal grounds, that since Soviet value criteria do not square with the precepts of welfare economics, they are irrational.[36] They certainly were not following Hegel's observation that "to him who looks at the world rationally, the world looks rationally back." To be true, there were also numerous exceptions such as the studies of the Soviet value and price system whose primary purpose was to try to understand and explain it before indulging in criticism of its rationale. In quite a few cases these studies have elucidated the functioning and goals of Soviet economics.[37] However,

---

[36] Cf., H. Boustedt, *Preisbildung und Preispolitik in Sowjetrußland*, Munich, 1931; A. Gourvich, "The Problem of Prices and Valuation in the Soviet System," *The American Economic Review*, Menasha, Wis., March 1936; O. Lange, *The Working Principles of the Soviet Economy*, New York, 1944; N. Jasny, *The Soviet Price System*, Stanford, 1951; A. Weber, *Marktwirtschaft und Sowjetwirtschaft*, Munich, 1951; P. Wiles, "Are Adjusted Roubles Rational?" *Soviet Studies, Oxford*, October 1957.

[37] Cf., W. Adermann, "Die Preisbildung der industriellen Fabrikate in der Sowjetunion," *Osteuropa*, No. 12, 1926/27; H. Ware, "Planned Soviet Prices," *American Quaterly on the Soviet Union*, July 1938; B. R. Subba Rao, "Determination of Prices in the Soviet Union," *Indian Journal of Economics*, April 1941; H. Braeutigam, "Finanzplanung, autoritäre Preisfestsetzung und Kapitalbildung in der Sowjetunion," *Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik*, October 1943; P. A. Baran, "Cost Accounting and Price Determination in the Soviet Union," in National Bureau of Economic Research: *Cost Behavior and Price Policy*, New York, 1943; E. Bartels, "Wirtschaftsrechnungstheorie und sowjetische Wirtschaftsrechnung," *Finanzarchiv*, No. 2, 1945; M. C. Kaser, "Soviet Planning and the Price

these studies have also not produced a theory of Soviet valuation and prices, and N.M. Kaplan's 1953 call, "what is needed is a model of the Soviet economic system,"[38] has remained as yet unanswered. There is thus far only one constructive hint — literally one sentence — which seems to me to have pointed in the right direction for an understanding of the rationale of the Soviet system; this was Mrs. J. Robinson's remark that "the primary function of prices . . . is to make accumulation possible."[39]

If we were to ask ourselves in what respect such Western views on the Soviet economy are incongruous with the Soviet economists' position, we would discover that it is not in the attitude towards particular empirical phenomena (Soviet economists and politicians very often admit themselves that one or another value relationship in their economy is at variance with their objectives), but lies much deeper, in the sphere of pure dogma. Thus, first of all, it is entirely wrong to say that "Marx seems never to have written one word on the subjective theory of value: striking proof of his self-confidence and self-isolation."[40] Of what this quotation is striking proof, is attested by the fact that a reader of *German Ideology* can find in it a long, fundamental critique of Jeremy Bentham's view on economics and of their direct implications for modern welfare doctrines.[41] Soviet economists have undoubtedly read it and in addition they have certainly read numerous pertinent references of Marx to J.B. Say's "vulgarities." Furthermore, the ideas of "vulgar socialism" that are "built . . . on the foundation of Jevon's and Menger's theory of use-value und marginal utility,"[42] and, in the form of a "competitive socialism," expounded in the writing of P. J. Proudhon, E. Dühring, A. Wagner, A. Menger, J. Gray and others, have found similarly extensive and unequivocal refutations in *Misère de la philosophie*,[43] *Anti-Dühring*,[44] *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*,[45]

Mechanism," *Economic Journal*, March 1950; H. H. Ware, "The Function and Formation of Commodity Prices in the USSR," *Bulletins on Soviet Economic Development*, September 1950; J. Griziotti-Kretschmann, "Il valore nell'economia sovietica e la pianificazione dei costi," *Critica economica*, No. 2, 1951; H. E. Ronimois, "The Cost-Profit-Output Relationship in a Soviet Industrial Firm," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, May 1952; E. Poom, "Wirtschaftlichkeit, Effektivität und Rentabilität in der Sowjetwirtschaft," *Zeitschrift für Handelswissenschaftliche Forschung*, Nos. 4 and 5, 1952; J. Valarchè, "Le role du profit en économie soviétieque," *Revue économique et sociale*, April 1953; K. Nonomura, "The Price System in the Soviet Union," *The Annals of the Hitotsubashi Academy*, April 1956; L. Turgeon, "Cost Price Relationhips in Basic Industries During the Soviet Planning Era," *Soviet Studies*, Oxford, October 1957.

[38] *The Journal of Political Economy*, Chicago, April 1953, p. 110.

[39] *Soviet Studies*, Oxford, January 1956, p. 269.

[40] P. J. D. Wiles, "Scarcity, Marxism, and Gosplan," *Oxford Economic Papers*, October 1953, p. 298.

[41] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya* (Works), 2nd ed., Moscow, 1955, Vol. III, pp. 409—414.

[42] Engels' Preface to Vol. III of *Capital*, any edition.

[43] See specifically Chap. I, any edition.

[44] See Part II, Chap. IV.

[45] See "Das Kapitel vom Geld" *et passim*.

Capital,[46] etc. Marx's basic position in relation to the precept of welfare economics was that "it was precisely those economists who took consumption as their starting point that turned out to be reactionary and ignored the revolutionary element in . . . large-scale industry."[47] In his opinion, "the assumption that it is personal consumption and not enrichment that works as the compelling motive" in a competitive system "is impossible."[48] The idea that "the sole defence against the capitalists is competition" was spurned by Marx as sheer nonsense,[49] for "there is no competition without concentration" and therefore "monopoly."[50]

These are purely doctrinal barriers for acceptance by Soviet economists of Western criticism and, though revision of Marxism — provided it is approved by the Party — is nothing new or impossible for them, it should be reckoned with that many Soviet economists sincerely cherish the "social justice" of Marx's doctrine with no less conviction than welfare economists sometimes cherish the "intellectual beauty" of their constructions.

Yet, not less important are, of course, purely practical, pragmatic considerations, among which the decisive two are: (1) as Peter Wiles recognized bluntly, "voluntary decision of the consumer to save . . . is by any reasonable standards always too low in the modern world,"[51] and (2) as G. Cassel explicitly reminded the welfarists, "every tax must come either from consumption or from capital formation; no other possibility exists."[52] It seems as if Soviet economists always, while they ignore Western criticism, implicitly reply to their welfarist critics: "It is easy to criticize how we allocate our capital, for there are innumerable choices and opportunities for its investment; what is difficult, however, is to create that capital, and as long as you are not able to show us a better model of maximization of capital formation, your criticism misses the point and is irrelevant."

Marxism has never had any hedonistic criteria of rationality. For Engels, for instance, "rational" meant "in so far as it is necessary," and "irrational" was everything that was "robbed of all necessity."[53] Antagonism between savings and consumption for Marxists is not something they shun to face squarely. Said Marx: "From the very moment in which civilization begins, production commences to be based . . . on the antagonism between accumulated labour and

---

[46] Cf., Vol. III, Chap. XXXVI, reference to C. Pecqueur.

[47] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya* (Works), *op. cit.*, Vol. III, p. 523.

[48] *Capital*, Vol. II, end of Chap. IV.

[49] K. Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, Moscow, 1958, p. 42.

[50] K. Marx, *Sochineniya*, (Works), *op. cit.*, Vol. III, pp. 348 ff. Furthermore, the modern welfarists' ideal of solving all social problems, as well as those of accumulation, by means of direct taxation, is scornfully rejected in *Ibid.*, Vol. VII, pp. 295 ff.

[51] *Economic Journal*, London, July 1956, p. 250.

[52] G. Cassel, *Sozialismus oder Fortschritt*, Berlin, 1929, p. 166.

[53] F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, the beginning of Chap. I, any edition.

present labour. No antagonism — no progress."[54] And then there is Lenin's overriding dictum: "Distribution is a method, a tool, a means for increasing production,"[55] rather than for immediately satisfying consumer demands.[56]

There are also many subtler points of disagreement between Soviet economists and the welfarists. Presumably, leading Soviet economists are aware that many basic technical assumptions and methodological tools in the model of "competitive socialism," such as, for instance, U-shaped cost curves, constant returns to scale, complete divisibility and substitutability of factors, equal marginal utility of money, imputation of the social and overhead costs, etc., are not ubiquitous in real life and are by far not always helpful in practical computations and decision-making.[57]

In particular, it is risky to explain the alleged Soviet economists' "silence" concerning Western proposals to adopt marginal cost pricing by the mere fact that this method is "alien" to them.[58] Although it is probably true that most Soviet economists are no better acquainted with marginalism than most Western economists are with Marxism, there is at their disposal substantial literature on the subject by the early Russian marginalists, such as V. Dmitriev, V. Bogrov, R. Orzhentsky, N. Shaposhnikov, L. Yurovsky, E. Slutsky and to some extent M. Tugan-Baronovsky and Y. Steklov. For dogmatic Soviet economists the issue of marginalism was closed, of course, some sixty years ago, when Lenin, in the polemics against Bulgakov rejected the law of diminishing returns in agriculture. Since then that law has been a subject of scorn for most Marxists.[59] In fact it can be said that Soviet economists recognize the law of increasing returns, for instead of assuming U-shaped cost curves and adjusting their optima to bottlenecks, they incorporate into their plans directives to decrease costs and invest resources to remove the bottlenecks.[60] Furthermore, leading Soviet economists probably know that in the West, too, in real life marginal cost pricing is not, and cannot be, universally practiced for numerous, quite objective reasons.[61]

---

[54] K. Marx and F. Engels, *Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe (MEGA)*, Frankfurt (Main), 1932, Vol. I/6, p. 143.

[55] V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, 4th ed., Vol. XXXII, p. 425.

[56] For additional Marxist critique of the precepts of welfare economics see M. Dopp, *Political Economy and Capitalism*, London, 1950, pp. 306—315.

[57] Cf., E. J. Mishan, "A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939—1959," *Economic Journal*, London, June 1960.

[58] Bartels, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

[59] Cf., Wang Hsiang-shu, "The Myth of 'Diminishing Returns'," *Peking Review*, No. 35, 1958, pp. 10 ff.

[60] Cf., A Boyarsky, "O matematicheskikh metodakh i trebovaniyakh marksistskoi ekonomicheskoi nauki," *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 1, 1960, p. 95; J. M. Montias, "Rational Prices and Marginal Costs in Soviet-Type Economies," *Soviet Studies*, Oxford, April 1957, p. 369.

[61] Cf., P. Wiles. "Empirical Research and Marginal Analysis," *Economic Journal*, September 1950; E. Schneider, "Les courbes de coûts de production en théorie et en pratique," *Cahiers du Séminaire d'Econométrie*, Paris, No. 5, 1959; C. A. Smith, "Survey of the Empirical Evidence on Economies of Scale," in National Bureau of Economic Research:

It is, and it can be, practiced in partial equilibrium analyses, however, that is wherever and whenever the law of diminishing returns clearly sets in; and Soviet economists ought to be criticized if they fail to use marginal calculus wherever it is applicable.

Yet, whereas Marxism is undoubtedly the thick lead wall which protects Soviet economists from the critical radiation of Western welfare ideas, it would be wrong to construe that, by itself, it is completely vapid and can no longer give birth to interesting and meaningful economic ideas. Such impressions usually arise from a smattering and rudimentary knowledge of Marx's writings. Presuming that Soviet economists will continue to live behind this thick lead wall for some time to come, it may be worth-while to pay more attention to *what they still can*, or cannot, unearth from Marxism in the absence of something akin to Stalin's authority.

It must be made known that until now Soviet economists have belied Marx on at least two major counts: (1) in definition of the law of value and (2) in application of that law to their economy. In the same way Marx is often misinterpreted abroad, and this happens either for the same reason as within the USSR or because Western writers on Marxism uncritically follow its Soviet interpretations.

The reason why Marx is misinterpreted is rather simple: barring prejudiced twisting of his positions, it is merely insufficient reading and research. It is a fact that can be adduced merely by looking at sources cited in the footnotes of most writers. Most interpreters of Marx both in the Soviet Union and abroad have read at best only the three volumes of *Capital*. Yet these comprise, according to the number of pages, not more than some 45 per cent of all the mature economic papers of Marx! Disregarding various subjective reasons for not having read Marx fully or carefully, the objective reason for such an incomplete knowledge of Marxian economics is that Marx is not available complete in any single language. Having studied all major bibliographies of the published works of Marx and Engels,[62] the author of the present article has arrived at the conclusion, based on an approximate count of pages, that of all the economic papers of Marx there have appeared, up to 1956, in German — 98%, in Russian — 69%, in French — 56% and in English — 50%. In all other languages, less than one half of Marxian economics is available.

Business Concentration and Price Policy, New York, 1955; U. S. Senate, 85th Congress, 1st Session *Administered Prices*, Washington, D. C., 1958; E. Heinen, "Konzentration und Kosten," in *Die Konzentration in der Wirtschaft*, Vol. III, Berlin, 1960; R. F. Lanzillotti, "Pricing Objectives in Large Companies," *The American Economic Review*, Menasha, Wis., December 1958.

[62] L. A. Levin, *Bibliografiya proizvedenii K. Marksa i F. Engelsa* (Bibliography of the Works of K. Marx and F. Engels), Moscow, 1948; M. Rubel, *Bibliographie des oeuvres de Karl Marx*, Paris, 1956 and 1960.

Such a void in the translation and publication of Marx's economic writings is probably the main cause why, in very broad terms, there have appeared two different schools of interpreters of Marxian economics in general and of his theory of value in particular; one which interprets Marx's doctrine solely on the basis of *Capital*, and the other which takes into account more or less all of his writings. The latter school is very small compared to the former, yet the difference between them is very large.

In *Capital* Marx formulates his theory of value in semi-Ricardian terms, in order, probably, to make it more agreeable to the sophisticated readers of his time who, for the most part, had been educated in the fashionable Ricardian tradition. The fatal element of Ricardianism in *Capital* appears in Chapter 1, Volume I, where Marx obliquely defines his measure of value, "socially necessary labour," in purely Ricardian terms, as some absolute, cardinal number of hours of labour put (in the past) into the production of a commodity under some average technical conditions, without explicit reference to demand. Furthermore, at several decisive places in *Capital*, and particularly in Vol. III, Marx is not explicit on whether he measures value by both "dead" and "living" labour taken together (that is, by full costs), or by "living" labour alone (that is, by wages). If, in addition, one disregards for some reason or other the fact that in *Capital* Marx, unlike Ricardo, stresses "commodity" rather than mere "product of labour"; the competitive conjectural market as the determining force, rather than mere labour-time ratios between isolated individual products; price in terms of money, rather than "relative value" of two products; and — what is most important — the transformation of value into money and capital, rather than into mere "wealth" of things, one easily lands, as is the case with Ricardo, in the school of those who should be properly called "Ricardian Marxists." To a greater or lesser degree, S. Strumilin, L. Leontiev, Y. Kronrod, B. Minc, G. Wolf, Joan Robinson, P. Sweezy, S. Tsuru, L. von Bortkiewicz, Tugan-Baranowsky, N. Moszkowska and E. Roll, among others, belong to this school.[63]

If, in addition, one recalls the fact that in *Capital* Marx says little, if anything, definite on the economics and the law of value under socialism, but instead forcefully brings home the notion that "surplus value" is an abhorrent robbery of the worker that must cease together with capitalism, and hence, that under socialism, the full product of labour should belong to the working class, one may deduce, as some of the Ricardian Marxists have done, that exchange on the basis of the law of value should be properly realised under socialism. At this junction the Ricardian Marxists directly meet and join hands with the Ricardian Socialists of Marx's time — P. J. Proudhon, C. Rodbertus, F. Lassalle, A. Wagner, and others.

---

[63] *Value and Plan, op. cit.*, pp. 184—85; *Capital*, Vol. III, Chap. X.

On the other hand, all those who have studied and accepted Marx beyond his *Capital*, including, among others, F. Engels, C. A. Schramm, F. Mehring, P. Fischer, T. Grigorovici, I. Rubin, A. Konyus, L. Kantorovich, R. Rosdolsky, V. Motylev, Sh. Dvolatsky, A. Bajt, R. Banfi, and, in part, also B. Hilferding and O. Bauer, maintain correctly that (1) Marx's "socially necessary labour," means not the amount of labour actually put into the product in the past, but rather the amount of commodities currently demanded in the market; (2) that there is not, and cannot be, any labour law of value unrelated to the institutions of a free, competitive market, privately-owned, freely enterprising firms, and the law of demand and supply; in fact, Marx's equilibrium of labour values is attainable *only* if and when demand and supply are in equilibrium; (3) that the measure of value in Marx necessarily consists of both "dead" and "living" labour, and explicitly means nothing else but a full cost measure; (4) that Marx's "market prices" include not only labour values, but also scarcity and ground rents, quasi-rents, and even direct interest charges; they are, by definition, different from values, but these are values that underlie them and determine their changes in the long run; and, finally, (5) under socialism, there is no place for the labour law of value to operate by itself, for value withers away together with all other capitalist institutions with the oncoming of general abundance resulting from ever-higher development of the forces production.[64]

In other words, the authentic Marxian law of value is not this Ricardian equation,

$$Q_a : Q_b = \frac{Q_a}{L} : \frac{Q_b}{L}$$

but rather,

$$\frac{M}{Q_a} : \frac{M}{Q_b} = \left(\frac{Q_a^s}{L_s} \cdot M_d \right) : \left(\frac{Q_b^s}{L_s} \cdot M_d \right)$$

where *a* and *b* are some commodities, of which quantities *Q* are brought to the market. *M* stands for money, while *s* and *d* denote respectively the sides of suppliers and demanders, and *L* stands for the labour necessary to produce *Q*.

---

[64] On these conclusions see in particular *Misère de la philosophie* and especially Engels' preface to its first German edition; also *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie*, especially Marx's critique of Ricardo's theory of value; also *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, the sections on Adam Smith; also Marx's *Wage Labour and Capital and Wages, Price and Profit*; and especially Engels' *On Marx's Capital* and *Housing Question*. On the economics of socialism, see in particular *The Communist Manifesto*, *The German Ideology* and especially Engels' *Grundsätze des Kommunismus*, *Zwei Reden über den Kommunismus*, and Part III of *Anti-Dühring*; also Marx's *Critique of the Gotha Programme*.

Some Possible Future Conclusions

In view of the still undeveloped state of studies of Marxian economics, it is quite possible that, in the course of time, Soviet debaters may turn more and more to the primary Marxian sources for their arguments and their food for thought. The newest books by Malyshev and Kantorovich and the papers by Konyus may be the first straws in this wind. It is beyond doubt that, as long as Soviet economists stand fast on the revision of Marx's views concerning the law of value under socialism, the schools of Malyshev and Konyus will be able to adduce more support for their positions in Marx than the school of Strumilin.

Strumilin's model does not square with orthodox Marxism at all. First of all, Strumilin does not and cannot prove that, when Marx speaks about the necessity to economize "labour" under socialism, he means only "living," that is current labour, and not also "dead," past labour, or capital. Had Strumilin read the *Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie* complete, rather than only the three pages of excerpts translated from it in Nos. 11—12 of *Bolshevik* for 1939, which he quotes, he would have found that, although in the cited excerpt Marx is not very specific, in many other places Marx's position is unequivocally opposite to that of his.[65] By relating national income to wages, rather than gross national product to the "socially necessary" (demanded) labour time as Marx does throughout, Strumilin repeats the error of many others whom Marx and Engels untiringly criticized. This is, according to Marx, the chief error of Adam Smith's theory of value, the way of thinking in a "vicious circle," making value the measuring rod of value;[66] this is also the "foolish Utopia" of Rodbertus, who "called in the state" to make "value happily constituted" in the form of fiat wages from which he derived the rest of his cardinal labour-time calculus;[67] this is also the error of Proudhon, Anton Menger, Weitling and numerous other Utopians.

Yet, Strumilin's error is not only formal; it is much subtler. He makes it a rule of his model that capital be invested wherever labour productivity is the lowest, but he fails to sustain it with any economic argument. References in this case to the ideal of freeing labour time for more leisure are, as the Soviet saying goes, "up to the lamp." With Marx, the motive for the substitution of machine for labour is entirely an economic one: the substitution takes place only if "relative surplus value" per unit of "living" labour increases as a

---

[65] See p. 249 of *Grundrisse* where Marx states explicitly that, in his models, V, the "necessary" part of the labour day, includes not only wages, but also costs of depreciation and raw materials.

[66] Karl Marx, *Theorien über den Mehrwert*, Part I, Chap. III, sects. 1 and 10, any edition.

[67] Engels' preface to the first German edition of *Misère de la philosophie*, any edition.

result.[68] With Strumilin, as with almost all other modern Ricardian Marxists, such substitution is impossible by definition because they start from the assumption of a constant rate of surplus value and thus repeat Ricardo's "major error" in that they "assume no increase in exchange-value as a result of the growth of capital."[69]

To be true, not explicitly in *Capital* (and this is the source of the Ricardians' error), but in many other places Marx explicitly states that the rate of surplus value should never be assumed as constant in his model[70] because otherwise the results would not square with the law of value and the rule of the equalization of the rate of profit, but, on the contrary, would produce "damned false calculations."[71] According to Marx, surplus value, at any given (static) time, is only *measured* by M : V, but its rate and magnitude over time vary because they are a function of C : V as well as of the length and intensity of the labour day.[72] Strumilin, like most other Ricardians, identifies *C* with depreciation and excludes it automatically from his model. However, when Marx sometimes excluded *C*, he meant and said that *V*, the "necessary" part of the labour day, took care of depreciation;[73] whereas in his dynamic reproduction model (the basic form of which is given in the *Grundrisse* rather than in *Capital*), in which he included *C*, the latter was the measure of net investment, or accumulation, and as such could not be excluded from equations. Every increment in *C* over time, he said, changes the magnitude and the structure of new value currently created in two ways: by adding to it an enlarged amount of depreciation costs (transferred "dead" labour) and by relatively enlarging the rate of surplus value as a result of increased labour productivity, that is, by creating new, additional, "free" capital, available for reinvestment.[74] This is why there is economic incentive, rather than the slogan of "labour liberation," in Marx's model of substitution of capital for labour.

On the other hand, Malyshev's insistence on the "prices of production" and the rule of equalization of the rate of profit is a consequentially Marxian

---

[68] *Grundrisse*, pp. 592—93 this is the place referred to by Strumilin on the basis of excerpts in *Bolshevik*, but in the original it has a much subtler and entirely different meaning. Cf., also pp 230—31, 240 ff.

[69] *Ibid.*, p. 257.

[70] *Ibid.*, pp. 283, 286, 288, 291 ff.

[71] *Ibid.*, p. 280. This is by the way, how Marx spoke of the notorious „Transformation Problem" invented by L. von Bortkiewicz and continuously repeated by all the Ricardian Marxists. A more careful study of Marx reveals that such a "problem" does not exist. Cf., Rosdolsky, "Joan Robinsons Marx-Kritik," in *Arbeit und Wirtschaft*, Vienna, Nos. 6—7, 1959; also R. Rosdolsky, "Das Kapital im allgemeinen und die 'vielen Kapitalien," in *Kyklos*, Fasc. II, 1953; also W. Klimt, *Mathematische Untersuchungen im Anschluß an L. von Bortkiewicz über Reproduktion und Profitrate*, Berlin, 1936.

[72] *Grundrisse*, pp. 291—93.

[73] *Ibid.*, p. 249.

[74] *Ibid.*, pp 230, 240—58.

model though it also does not go beyond *Capital*. Its acceptance by the majority of Soviet economists is hindered only by political prejudice. However, the final victory in the debates may in the last account go to the Konyus-Kantorowich-Nemchinov school. In his last paper,[75] Nemchinov won a score by pointing out that Malyshev's prices of production cover only the absolute costs and do not take into account scarcity rents and the time factor. Prime costs and "prices of production" can certainly be used as the first basic variables in the value calculus, but, as in Marx's theory of "market prices," they must be modified to reflect fully "social necessity," that is, demand and scarcity. In the final account, if this is doctrinally necessary, the whole calculus can be reduced (or made proportional) to a unit of labour time as a common denominator. It seems that, generally speaking, Western observers of Soviet economic thought should not exclude the possibility that some day, after better study, Soviet economists will arrive at the conclusion that Western mathematical methods, separated from the subjective utility theory and the presumption of consumer sovereignty, are compatible with and useful to the labour theory of value.[76] And this would not be the same thing as the unsuccessful eclectic attempts of some late nineteenth century economists to combine the labour and utility theories of value, for in this case not the theory of value but merely Western mathematical methods and tools of analysis would be taken over by the labour value theorists.

However, it seems most probable that in practice, none of the above-mentioned models will ever be strictly adhered to by the Soviet government in its price policies. And the reason is pretty evident: it would not like to limit its freedom of behaviour by any formulas or laws. It must, perhaps, be stressed that however sceptical one may feel on dogmatic grounds about the well-known neo-liberal arguments of L. von Mises, F. A. von Hayek, W. Röpke, etc., one must grant them a score on one point: no socialist economy — be it Stalinist or O. Lange's market socialist — can be as "objective" and "deterministic" as the past system which knew no state intervention. Under classical *laissez-faire* capitalism all that the objective decision-making in economics involved was merely an adaptation and adjustment to the law of value, or the law of supply and demand, or however one may wish to call the equilibrium value relationship prevailing at any time in the competitive market. Under socialism such external laws are

---

[75] *Voprosy ekonomiki*, No. 12, 1960.

[76] Cf., the opinion of B. Ward, *op cit.*, p. 550, who also remarks: "But this labour theory of value does not work when the optimal point does move off the original facet under a change in plan proportions" (p. 551). The implication is undoubtedly correct, although it would have been more accurate to say that it is the "law of value" that does not work (by itself) under such circumstances, rather than the "*theory* of value." The theory of the origin of value in labour may remain intact even without the "law of value," and this is why Marx insisted that labour saving be the supreme rule under socialism. The reduction of all calculations to the common denominator of labour may, then, serve merely the purpose of a comparative analysis of marginal labour productivities over time and space.

no longer all-powerful. A law to guide price and allocation decisions under socialism can only be expressed in some formulas, adopted and recognized by the government planners in practice only if some political body (the Party, the Supreme Soviet, or at least some governing council of the Gosplan) has proclaimed them to be obligatory. And this is actually what is being done in practice, as e. g., with the latest formulas for the efficiency of capital investments, published in *Planovoe khozyaistvo*, No. 3, 1960. The whole conundrum of this method of procedure consists, however, in the fact that it is difficult to call such "laws" entirely objective: they are formulated by the body politic with the sole purpose of attaining some subjective political goals; e. g., investments are considered efficient only if they produce the maximum growth of a selected sector of the economy with the purpose of catching up with and surpassing the United States, or the like. Therefore, it is obvious that there can be as many formulas ("laws") as there are political goals and choices of action. This is why one must really doubt that a socialist economy can ever be guided in practice by anything akin to what used to be called "objective economic laws." It seems that the extremists — and I mean both Marx and the modern neo-liberals — have perceived this fact better than those few who still expect that some day the Soviet economy will become "rational" in V. Pareto's or A. Lerner's sense of the word.

Implicitly at least, most Western students of Soviet economics do not believe, however, that Western criteria of "rationality" are compatible with a Soviet-type economy and this is why, in their critiques, they demand that Soviet economists restore the free market economy in order to "rationalize" (better, objectivize) their decisions. Yet, only few seem to realize that a free market economy cannot function without free enterprise and a free quest for profit and that this is impossible without individual or group private property in capital. Had they realized this salient fact, they would not have been astonished and disappointed that Soviet economists do not heed their advice. The demand or hope that the Soviet economy will some day revert to a competitive market system seems to me vain. Such a system is simply unconstitutional for the USSR, and as long as the Communist Party is in power it most probably will preserve the existing system intact.[77]

The decentralization of management and of decision-making in the USSR does not yet imply a trend towards the restoration of a free market economy; actually it represents only the delegation, not the division, of centralized authority to the lower echelons of one and the same pyramid of power. All really decisive rights to decision-making remain, and will remain, in the centre. And no one really demands the restoration of free enterprise in the USSR. All that the

---

[77] Among other articles dealing with the nationalization of property, Art. 11 of the USSR Constitution, in particular, states that the "economic life of the USSR is *determined* and *directed* by the state national-economic plan."

managers of state enterprises want is a greater incentive, a larger bonus, and more discretion to maneuver with resources *in order to fulfill* one and the same state plan.

Since the Soviet economic plan is always nothing but a means towards the Communist Party's political aims, one has to stretch one's imagination to a very high level of abstraction in order to see in Soviet economy as a whole some general optimum equilibrium in the distribution of its resources. Of course, with reference to extremist "demand" and "supply" *within the plan itself* (that is, as prescribed by and derived from the Communist Party's priority goals), an optimum equilibrium combination of minimum costs and maximum output can undoubtedly be calculated either by Kantorovich's method or by any other linear programming, provided suitable digital computers are at hand. However, in practice, this equilibrium would seldom be stable enough for numerous objective reasons, and particularly because, related to the economy as a whole, it would still be only a partial equilibrium that more often than not would run into a disequilibrium with other, even though secondary, priorities, as well as with all sorts of continuous changes which usually affect the plan itself, such as changes in the Party's directives, in productivity, technology, inventions, climatic conditions, etc. Hence, in real practice, there can be only temporary partial and local optimum equilibria in the Soviet-type economy,[78] or, to that effect, in *any* type of economy. Yet, the chief reason why a general, stable, optimum equilibrium in resource allocation in the Soviet-type economy seems to be theoretically less plausible than in any type of free market economy lies in the fact that economic sovereignty in the USSR is concentrated at the very top of a convex institutional structure. Under such conditions, virtually every decision disturbs equilibrium.

However, under certain highly abstract assumptions, it is still possible to construct a general model of the Soviet-type economy with a built-in stable equilibrium. But this equilibrium must be sought in production, rather than in consumption. It seems quite realistic to assume that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is interested in developing to the maximum the resources available to it for distribution. If so, the whole sector of the Soviet economy which is under the control of the centralized production plan — and this amounts to almost the whole economy — can best be described in terms of a model of "combined monopoly-monopsony," or "pure monopoly," or, as I prefer to call it, a "total state monopoly." The model of "pure monopoly" has been defined by Cournot and Edgeworth, but most writers consider it a practical impossibility, for they imagine it as existing in a free-entry, competitive eco-

---

[78] Cf., S. Varga, "Führen die Profitmaximierungsbestrebungen zu einem Ausgleich der Profitraten?" *Schmollers Jahrbuch*, No. 5, 1956; See also R. R. Oertel, *Das System der Sowjetwirtschaft: Institutionelle Faktoren, Marginalprinzip und Gleichgewicht in der Sowjetwirtschaft*, Berlin, 1957.

nomy[79]. Yet Chamberlin recently remarked to the point that "there would be pure monopoly only when a single authority controlled every economic good, as conceivably would be the case under state socialism.[80] The theoretical possibility of a "total monopoly" is also agreed upon by some modern Marxist writers.[81]

The salient feature of the Soviet-type total state monopoly is its ability to control not only the supply and prices of commodities but also, to a significant extent, the demand for them. This happens because the monopoly is here almost the only employer of all factors of production (*i. e.*, it is a total monopsonist) and hence the only payer of all national income. Since income is thus under control, demand is known, and therefore, otherwise than in the "pure monopoly" under competitive conditions, a stable equilibrium is uniquely determinate. An interesting element in the possible definition of such an equilibrium was recently developed by a Polish economist, M. Kolupa, who proved that, under conditions of insufficient supply, if the gap between demand and supply remains constant, the bias in the estimation of demand elasticity is nil; therefore, although demand is constantly inelastic, prices nevertheless correspond to consumers' marginal utilities.[82] The total state monopoly pursues, then, the policy of maximizing its net surplus by equating its tight supply and exorbitant prices with demand and the wage fund, and this amounts to equating marginal costs with marginal revenues. The resulting net surplus accrues to the state monopoly's treasury in the form of a "turnover tax," which is nothing else but a pure monopolistic profit. The fact that the monopoly controls both wages and prices permits it to hold real purchasing power and consumption at a minimum. Consumption is cost, rather than welfare, from the point of view of the Soviet state monopoly, and this is why it is in its interest to hold it down. Consumption is, then, always at a minimum, though this minimum is, of course, relative. Whether or not it increases over time and in space depends on the policy on distribution of the monopoly's profit. And this policy, in its turn, depends on social and political factors as well as on the interests of those in whose possession, or under whose control, the total state monopoly actually is.[83]

When Ostrovityanov speaks about the "subjugation" of the "law of value" to the will and power of the state plan and about its "utilization" to squeeze out maximum economy, or when Strumilin and Bachurin discuss the "turnover tax" as a normal and permanent feature of the Soviet economic system, or

---

[79] Cf., J. F. Due, *Intermediate Economic Analysis*, Chicago, 1951, p. 257 *et passim.*

[80] E. H. Chamberlain, *Towards a More General Theory of Value*, New York, 1957, p. 55.

[81] J. Bénard, *La conception marxiste du capitale*, Paris, 1952.

[82] *Przeglad Statystyczny*, Warsaw, No. 4, 1960, pp. 467—71.

[83] For additional discussion see V. Holubnychy, "Zum Verständnis der Vorgänge in China," *Gewerkschaftliche Monatshefte*, Bundesvorstand des Deutschen Gewerkschaftsbundes, Cologne, March 1960, pp. 138—49.

when Khrushchev attempts to hypnotize the world with tales about the abolition of taxes in the USSR and at the same time pursues a policy of unification of all taxes in a unified "turnover tax," we are witnessing declarations of the ideologists of the total state monopoly which entirely conform with the above model. And this may be the trend which underlies all recent Soviet economic discussions. After all, it was Lenin who said that "socialism is nothing else but a state-capitalist monopoly, turned over to the use of the people and, to that extent, one that has ceased to be a capitalist monopoly."[84] Whether or not the present Soviet state monopoly is for the use of the people, is, of course, the crux of the matter and a big question.

---

[84] V. I. Lenin, *Izbrannye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Moscow, 1946, Vol. II, p. 100.

The 1960 Soviet Harvest

A. ARKHIMOVICH

The Soviet press was hoping for a good harvest in 1960. The 1959 results had been disappointing — there had been drought in the virgin lands of Siberia and Kazakhstan, in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic regions. Only the gross cotton crop had exceeded the 1958 figures. Gross yields of grain, sugar beets, sunflower, and fibre flax were much lower. According to official estimates the gross grain yield in 1959 had amounted to 125,000,000 metric tons.[1] This figure represents the total grain threshed; it does not take into consideration the losses incurred during drying, storage in the open, and transport. We can accordingly reduce it by 10 per cent to 20 per cent. The total grain yield was thus only 100,000,000 to 112,000,000 metric tons. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of grain perished under the snow. In the Kazakh SSR alone more than 1,600,000 hectares of grain were lost in this manner.[2] The Soviet press was particularly vociferous on this score.[3]

In January and at the beginning of February 1960, the winter crops were under snow in most regions. The exceptions were the southern and eastern regions of the Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus. The snow did not thaw until the second half of February. New snow fell at the beginning of March throughout the country.[4] The temperature dropped sharply in the southern Ukraine and Northern Caucasus.[5] In general, conditions were favourable in the winter of 1959 for the winter crops. The 1960 spring weather was unfavourable. In the southern Ukraine the dry autumn of 1959 and the inadequate snowfalls had led to a shortage of moisture in the soil. The spring was unfortunately cold and dry. The rapid alternation of frosts and thaws harmed the winter crops in the Northern Caucasus. Then came dust storms which caused considerable damage. Spring crops had to be resown over an area of more than 8,000,000 hectares.[6] In West Siberia and North Kazakhstan there were severe frosts in mid-March and the fields were snow covered.[7] The spring sowing was finished by March 20 in parts of Uzbekistan; by April 1 in the Crimea; and by April 13 in the southern oblasts of the Ukraine.[8] By April 20, some 15,500,000 hectares had been sown throughout the USSR; by May 1, 43,107,000; and by May 31,

1 *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, January 21, 1960.
2 *Ibid.*, January 22, 1960.
3 *Pravda*, June 11, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, August 16 and October 1, 1960.
4 *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, January 22; February 3, 9, 10, 19, 26; March 1—3, 17, 30; April 14, 1960.
5 *Ibid.*, January 22; March 20; April 7 and 14, 1960.
6 *Pravda*, April 24; July 13 and 22, 1960.
7 *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, March 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 29—31; April 1, 5—8, 10 and 15, 1960; *Pravda*, April 24, 1960.
8 *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, March 20; April 5 and 13, 1960.

133,800,000.[9] A total of 142,000,000 hectares were sown. Including winter crops, the overall sown area amounted to 202,900,000 hectares.[10] The late arrival of the spring meant that many early and late crops had to be sown together.[11]

Conditions were generally unfavourable for sowing in the virgin lands. There were heavy rains and high winds.[12] The organisation of the spring sowing also left much to be desired. Fertilisers which had been stored in the open perished during the frost and rains.[13] The maintenance and repair of agricultural machinery was a major problem.[14] In Pavlograd Oblast, Kazakhstan, the Vostochny Sovkhoz had a scrap dump of combines and reapers which were being used for spare parts.[15] The Kursk and Tashkent plants failed to meet delivery dates in 1960 for spare parts.[16] A further problem was the cleaning and storage of seed supplies. They are often kept in damp stores or else simply left lying about the fields. In Novosibirsk Oblast only about one fifth of the seed stock was suitable for sowing;[17] in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast much of the corn seed could not be used;[18] in Kustanai Oblast the dry high-quality seeds had been mixed with the damp seeds on the Maikolsky Sovkhoz. The sovkhoz directors were forced to obtain seeds from other farms.[19]

The early spring crops began to appear at the beginning of March in the Central Asian republics. Then a period of cold weather set in.[20] In the European part of the USSR the situation was very much the same. The crops did not appear in the southern Ukraine, Moldavia, and the Kuban until towards the middle of April. In these regions there was a shortage of moisture.[21] This was also the case in other regions of the Ukraine and Lower Volga. Elsewhere there was heavy rain in May and June. The hot July weather in the central regions of the European USSR helped speed up the harvest. In Siberia and North Kazakhstan the weather was somewhat cooler.[22] In the northern regions of the European USSR the winter crops ripened a week earlier than the average date. By July 13, the spring barley was in full bloom throughout the Ukraine and the southern Central Black-Earth Zone. By July 22, it was blooming below the line south of Minsk, Smolensk, Ulyanovsk, Kuibyshev, and Orenburg. At the

---

[9] *Pravda*, April 24; May 5, 13, 24 and 31, 1960.
[10] *Ibid.*, July 13, 1960.
[11] *Ibid.*
[12] *Ibid.*, June 3 and 14, 1960.
[13] *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, March 11, 1960.
[14] *Ibid.*, February 9, 1960.
[15] *Ibid.*, February 26, 1960.
[16] *Ibid.*, March 1, 1960.
[17] *Ibid.*, March 3, 1960.
[18] *Ibid.*, January 20, 1960.
[19] *Ibid.*, February 17, 1960.
[20] *Ibid.*, March 4 and 10, 1960.
[21] *Ibid.*, April 1, 5, 8, 12 and 13, 1960.
[22] *Ibid.*, April 17, 19, 22, 26; July 19, 20 and 22, 1960.

beginning of August, oats and barley were in full blossom even in Vologda Oblast.[23] The grain began to ripen in the Sverdlovsk, Tyumen, Surgut, Omsk, Tomsk, Novosibirsk, Barnaul, Bodaibo, and Chita regions around July 22. The spring wheat was ripe in the southern Yakutsk Oblast by July 26, but not until August 17 in many regions of the Urals, Siberia, and North Kazakhstan. In virgin lands the grain ripened some 7—10 days later than the 1959 dates.[24]

Repair and maintenance of machinery was again badly organised in 1960. *Pravda* was complaining on June 23 that

> in many oblasts of the RSFSR, Belorussia, and also Armenia, Latvia and Estonia, preparation of harvesting machinery is proceeding very slowly. Particularly alarming is the progress of maintenance work on combines in the Kazakh SSR, where on June 20 less than one quarter of the total combines were ready. In Oktyabrsky Raion, Kustanai Oblast, by the beginning of July only 15 per cent of the combines had been overhauled. In Altai Krai the overhauling of half the combines was not finished by July 20. The general trouble is the shortage of spare parts needed for the repair of combines and reapers.

As in 1959, the grain elevators and grain-reception points were not ready in time.[25] The necessary preliminary steps had been taken on this occasion. In May, *Pravda* had held a meeting of specialists from the state-delivery and agricultural organs. The conference had revealed numerous faults. However, the resolution that these shortcomings be corrected did not produce the necessary results. *Pravda* reported that the annual plan for the construction of grain elevators throughout the USSR had been fulfilled by only 4.9 per cent on June 15. To meet the shortage of grain-reception points in Bashkiria it was suggested that asphalt surfaces be laid and the grain temporarily stored on them in the open. By July 16, nothing had been done.[26] A lead article in the newspaper *Selskaya zhizn* of August 6 reported: "In Aktyubinsk Oblast where the reaping has already begun, the plan for the building of storage points and laying of asphalt protective surfaces was fulfilled by only one third. The situation is no better in Kustanai and Karaganda oblasts."

Harvesting began first in the southern regions of the country. June 23—24 saw the beginning of harvesting in the Crimea, southern Ukraine, Moldavia, the Northern Caucasus, Northern Ossetia, Azerbaidzhan, and the Central Asian republics.[27] A month later, on July 22, harvesting began in the central regions of the country — the Kursk, Voronezh, Orel, Belgorod, and Tambov oblasts and in some oblasts of Kazakhstan.[28] Harvesting began later in the northern and

---

[23] *Pravda*, June 3 and 12; July 22, 1960; *Radyanska Ukraina*, Kiev, June 24, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, July 13, 15 and 24; August 2, 1960.
[24] *Selskaya zhizn*, July 19, 20, 24 and 26; August 2, 12 and 17, 1960.
[25] *Pravda*, May 20, 1960.
[26] *Selskaya zhizn*, July 16 and 19; August 2, 1960.
[27] *Radyanska Ukraina*, June 24, 1960; *Pravda*, June 23 and 26, 1960.
[28] *Pravda*, July 22, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, July 23, 1960.

eastern regions — August 3 in Bashkiria and Amur Oblast in the Far East, August 12—13 in Siberia and North Kazakhstan.[29] In the second half of July the central press began to report the progress of the grain harvest at approximately ten-day intervals. The table below shows the progress between July 20 and October 20:

The Progress of the 1960 Grain Harvest in the USSR

	Area Reaped (Hectares)	Per Cent of Total Area Sown	Area Threshed (Per Cent of Area Reaped)
July 20	16,300,000	15	57
August 1	32,700,000	30	77
August 15	50,500,000	47	86
August 31	71,500,000	66	82
September 15	91,800,000	85	83
October 1	102,300,000	95	88
October 15	105,500,000	98	97
October 20	105,700,000	98	98

SOURCES: *Selskaya zhizn*, July 20, 23 and 28; August 3, 13, 18, 24 and 28; September 3, 8, 14, 18 and 23; October 23 and 28, 1960.

The last report on the grain harvest was dated October 23. It stated that by October 20, some 105,700,000 hectares, or 98.1 per cent of the total area sown with grain, had been cleared. At the end of October a report slipped into the press that "the harvesting of the grain is almost complete throughout the country."[30] Presumably, a total of 2,000,000 hectares was not harvested. The unharvested areas were located mainly in Siberia and the northern regions of Kazakhstan. In Siberia rain and cold weather had hindered the harvesting. It did not begin until two weeks after the 1959 date. By September 23, only the following progress had been made:

The Progress of the Harvest in Siberia
(As of September 23, 1960)

	Area Harvested (Hectares)	Per Cent of Total Area Sown
Irkutsk Oblast	481,000	56
Krasnoyarsk Krai	1,781,000	70
Novosibirsk Oblast	2,000,000	75
Altai Krai	4,650,000	81
Omsk Oblast	2,372,000	86

About 3,400,000 hectares had still to be harvested by September 23. The weather did not improve later on. On September 24, frosts were reported from Omsk and Novosibirsk oblasts and Altai Krai.[31] In North Kazakhstan the late sowing and cold summer were responsible for the late start with the harvesting

[29] *Selskaya zhizn*, August 3, 12, 13 and 20, 1960.
[30] *Ibid.*, October 23 and 28, 1960.
[31] *Ibid.*, September 23—25, 27 and 28, 1960.

— ten days after the 1959 date. By October 10, the harvesting presented the following picture in the North Kazakhstan oblasts:

The Progress of the Harvest in North Kazakhstan
(As of October 10, 1960)

	Area Reaped (Hectares)	Per Cent of Total Area Sown	Area Threshed (Per Cent of Area Reaped)
Akmolinsk	3,708,200	95.5	87.9
Karaganda	1,007,000	89.4	89.4
Kokchetav	2,575,400	95.0	80.0
Kustanai	4,344,600	99.7	96.9
Pavlodar	2,553,000	95.2	96.4
North Kazakh	1,479,200	98.2	93.2

According to *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* of October 23, "more than half a million hectares of wheat still have to be cleared and sheaves threshed over a (further) half a million," as of October 10. Reaping and threshing were taking too long in Akmolinsk and Karaganda oblasts. In Kokchetav Oblast one fifth of the grain reaped was not threshed. September 24 marked the beginning of the cold weather in the northern oblasts of Kazakhstan. In the second half of October when there were severe frosts, the grain had not yet been reaped in Akmolinsk, Kokchetav, and Karaganda oblasts in North Kazakhstan and in Novosibirsk Oblast.[32] Heavy rains had flattened the crop in the Volga region, Altai Krai, Kokchetav Oblast, and Krasnoyarsk Krai.[33] In Karaganda, Kokchetav, and Kustanai oblasts the stalks were cut just below the ears so as to speed up the harvesting. As a result, many ears were not touched at all. Losses of grain per hectare on the sovkhozes of Akmolinsk Oblast amounted to 200—300 kilogrammes.[34] The weather was somewhat better in the southern regions. In October it was reported that 21,000,000 hectares of grain had been harvested throughout Kazakhstan.[35]

Delays between reaping and threshing meant that sheaves stood far too long on the fields. *Selskaya zhizn* estimated that on farms in Kustanai Oblast about one fifth of the grain was lost when the sheaves, which had been standing for weeks on the fields, were collected.[36] At times the snow had to be cleared before they could be gathered in. On some Kustanai farms as much as one third of the grain was lost between reaping and collection of the sheaves.[37] By September 9, only 14 per cent of the grain had been threshed in Kokchetav Oblast, 24 per cent in Akmolinsk Oblast, and 26 per cent in the North Kazakh Oblast. By September 21, sheaves were still standing over an area of 1,553,000 hectares in

---

[32] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, September 21, 27 and 30; October 14 and 19, 1960.
[33] *Ibid.*, July 22; August 30; September, 29; October 1, 1960.
[34] *Ibid.*, September 29, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, September 6 and 30; October 9, 14 and 15, 1960.
[35] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, October 18, 1960.
[36] *Selskaya zhizn*, September 11, 1960.
[37] *Izvestia*, October 16, 1960.

Kokchetav Oblast. By October 1, the figure was over 2,000,000 hectares. By October 8, there were as many as 2,500,000 hectares still to be cleared of sheaves in the north eastern oblasts of Kazakhstan. By October 19, an area of 260,000 hectares still had to be cleared in Novosibirsk Oblast. In Krasnoyarsk Krai the figure was 200,000 hectares.[38] Many of these perished in the snow. "In order to conceal losses of grain, the remains of the harvest were set alight in many regions. A reddish glow hangs day and night over the Kazakh Steppe. The combines are followed by torch-bearers who light the straw. Sometimes the unharvested sheaves burn too."[39]

There were major losses during threshing. On the sovkhozes of Karaganda Oblast about 20 per cent of the grain remained in the straw afterwards. After threshing, the grain is usually stored in the open prior to transport to the grain-reception points. Much grain is lost during the transport itself. *Kazakhstanskaya pravda* of October 11 wrote: "Look at the roads in Akmolinsk Oblast. They are completely covered with grain." The article also supplied the reasons for such losses — poor roads, losses during the actual unloading of the grain onto the elevators and as a result of fast driving. A driver does not want to wait for hours in a queue at the grain-reception point. Yet, according to agronomist A. S. Shevchenko, who visited the virgin lands on Khrushchev's instructions in the autumn of 1960, "new elevators, reception points, and roads have been built. The grain is better stored than two to three years ago."[40] Unfortunately, not enough has been done. The reception points have a very limited capacity and unloading takes far too long. The grain from the combines ought to be cleaned prior to delivery. However, the present separators can only deal with a moisture content of up to 17 per cent; the grain often has a moisture content of 25 per cent to 28 per cent and even more. Hence the reception points often refuse to accept grain in too damp a state. Further, a shortage of railway trucks means that the grain cannot be shipped off in time.[41]

In spite of the enormous losses of grain during harvesting, transport, and storage, the virgin lands are becoming ever more important as the main suppliers of grain to the state. In other regions the state has to take into consideration the needs of the local population. L. Korniets, Chairman of the State Committee for Grain Products, has written: "The share of the virgin lands in the country's grain stocks is extremely important: two thirds of the grain delivered to the state comes from the virgin lands of Kazakhstan, Siberia, and the Urals and Volga regions."[42] *Pravda* of June 14, 1960, noted that the virgin lands of Kazakhstan provide annually 13,000,000 metric tons of grain. Of course, this figure applies only to years with a good harvest and is far removed from

[38] *Selskaya zhizn*, September 9 and 21; October 19, 1960; *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, October 8, 1960; *Izvestia*, October 14, 1960.
[39] *Selskaya zhizn*, October 9, 1960.
[40] *Ibid.*, October 17—19, 1960.
[41] *Ibid.*, October 12; November 19 and 29, 1960.
[42] *Ibid.*, August 25, 1960.

Khrushchev's promise of over 30,000,000 metric tons of grain per year from the region.[43] The shortage of grain has led to the sown areas being extended each year. It has been proposed that about 4,000,000 more hectares be ploughed up in Kazakhstan. Some 1,500,000 hectares of this total were scheduled for 1960.[44] In Kustainai Oblast the authorities have their eyes on the Turgai Steppe which is at present used for sheep-breeding. In the summer of 1960 more than 300,000 hectares of virgin lands were ploughed up here.[45] For the seventh year in succession the virgin lands were sown with the same crops. Weeds are tending to grow, a result of the failure to observe crop rotation. During the harvesting itself there is a perennial shortage of manpower on the virgin lands. The urban population has to be mobilised for work on the fields, manpower and specialists transferred from other regions.

The authorities are at present most interested in extending the areas sown with corn. In 1958, 19,700,000 hectares were sown with this crop and in 1959, some 22,400,000. The initial reports for 1960 were exaggerated. On September 11, it was announced that 30,000,000 hectares had been sown. On October 25, the total was 28,000,000; on October 28, it was reported that 24,300,000 hectares or 92 per cent of the total sown area had been harvested. The total was thus 26,400,000 hectares.[46] Harvesting of silage corn began in August; harvesting of corn to be used as grain at the beginning of September in the Crimea, Southern Ukraine, and Northern Caucasus. By September 15, 17,200,000 hectares had been cleared; by October 15, about 24,300,000. By the latter date 1,300,000 hectares still remained to be cleared in the Ukraine and 500,000 in the RSFSR.[47] There were no further reports, so part of the crop must have perished.

There were the usual complaints from the authorities about the lack of attention paid to corn. The harvest was not as large as expected, although the silage corn crop exceeded the 1959 yield. According to *Selskoe khozyaistvo* of January 23, 1960, in 1959, 150,000,000 tons of silage were stored, including 114,000,000 tons of corn. In 1960, the figure was 175,700,000 tons, mainly corn. Owing to a shortage of silos, much of the silage is stored on the ground. After the 1955 visit of Soviet experts to the United States, the USSR adopted the American method of storing silage on the ground. By 1960, the American method was being widely used,[48] although this fact was not acknowledged in the Soviet press. The Soviets have also achieved successes with the sowing of hybrid seeds as a means of increasing the yield. Again the 1955 visit to the

---

[43] *Pravda*, February 15, 1960.

[44] *Ibid.*, June 14, 1960.

[45] *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, March 2, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, November 16, 1960.

[46] *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu* (The National Economy of the USSR in 1958), Moscow, 1959, p. 403; *Pravda*, January 1, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, July 24, September 11 and 15; October 25 and 28, 1960.

[47] *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, August 13; September 14; October 28, 1960.

[48] *Bulletin*, Munich, No. 12, 1957, pp. 25—29; *Selskaya zhizn*, October 25; November 12, 1960.

United States produced the necessary results.[49] The Central Committee overruled Lysenko's objections and ordered the sowing of hybrid seeds within three years. *Selskaya zhizn* of December 18, 1960 reported that "sowing with hybrid seeds accounted for more than 9,000,000 hectares (in 1960)."

In 1958, industrial crops accounted for 6.3 per cent of the total sown area in the USSR. The sugar beet crop total was 1.3 per cent. Some 2,500,000 hectares were sown with this crop in 1958. In 1960, 1,500,000 hectares were sown with sugar beets in the Ukraine and 1,351,000 in the RSFSR. There were a further 180,000 hectares in the other republics — mainly Moldavia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Lithuania, and Belorussia.[50] Harvesting of the sugar beet crop began in the second half of August in the southern regions. By October 13, about 2,000,000 hectares or 66 per cent had been cleared. According to figures published on December 12, 57,000,000 tons of sugar beet were harvested.[51] The 1960 harvesting campaign repeated the mistakes of earlier years. The main one was the delay with the harvest. *Selskaya zhizn* reported on October 28, in an article entitled "The Year is Coming to an End," that 385,000 hectares of sugar beet had yet to be cleared. The same newspaper wrote on October 18 that in 1959 part of the Orel Oblast harvest had perished under the snow. Second, there was too great a lag between the cutting and clearing of the beets. On November 2, the complaint was made that "about one third of the cut crop is still lying on the fields of the Ukraine, about one quarter in Moldavia, about one half in Lithuania. Thousands of tons of sugar beets have not been moved from the fields in the sugar beet oblasts of the RSFSR — the Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, and Lipetsk." The third problem was that of losses during transport in open trucks along poor roads.

The 1959 cotton crop had been a bumper one. About 4,700,000 metric tons had been gathered in. The plan for 1960 was accordingly fixed at 480,000 tons more[52]. Unfortunately last year the weather was unfavourable. In February it was warm; in March cold, with rain and snow. In April there was rain during the sowing. In places fields had to be resown.[53] Sowing began on April 5—6 in the Central Asian republics; on April 7 in Azerbaidzhan; and on April 8 in Kirghizia. By May 1, 2,000,000 hectares had been sown. On June 3 it was reported that the plan for sowing had been overfulfilled.[54] The picking began at the end of August.[55] Much greater use was made of machinery during the 1960 harvest in comparison with earlier years. By November 20, 420,000 tons had been picked by machine in Uzbekistan. The overall plan for Uzbekistan,

[49] A. Arkhimovich, *Rastenievodstvo SSSR* (Plant Cultivation in the USSR), Munich, 1960, p. 177; *Selskaya zhizn*, December 18, 1960.

[50] *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu, op. cit.*, pp. 387, 391; *Pravda*, June 12, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, October 13; November 6, 1960.

[51] *Selskaya zhizn*, August 18; October 13; December 12, 1960.

[52] *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, January 12, 14, 19, 22, 24, and 25, 1960.

[53] *Ibid.*, April 14 and 15, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, September 16, 1960.

[54] *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, April 5—8, 1960; *Pravda*, May 5; June 3, 1960.

[55] *Selskaya zhizn*, August 26 and 28, 31; September 3, 1960.

3,170,000 tons, was not fulfilled. Other republics did not fulfill their plans either. The Tadzhik SSR gathered about 460,000 tons by December 17 instead of the planned 480,000; by December 11 the Kara-Kalpak ASSR had harvested 205,000 tons instead of a planned 250,000.[56] The partial success with the use of machinery was lost in the sea of complaints in the Soviet press.[57] A lead article in *Selskaya zhizn* complained: "In numerous regions of Tashkent Oblast... the repair of the harvesting machinery dragged out, everywhere repairs were of poor quality." The same newspaper published on October 4 a report from Turkmenistan entitled: "Where are the Harvesting Machines?" The cotton had in many places to be gathered in by hand. "How much raw cotton is lost because the harvesting drags on until the winter." The newspaper reported on October 19 from Tashkent: "To date more than 1,200 machines have not been used." Even those in operation were not very efficient. The fields have to be carefully prepared from the spring onwards if machinery is used. Otherwise productivity per machine will be low and much cotton left unpicked.[58]

In 1959, the fibre flax crop had been less than the 1958 yield. By August 24, 1960, three quarters of the total sown area throughout the country had been cleared. Further work was complicated by the weather in the north-west and northern oblasts of the European part of the USSR.[59] The 1960 crop was thus rather disappointing. The year did not produce a good sunflower crop either. By November 3, when work came to a stop there were about 200,000 hectares still to be cleared in Voronezh Oblast and the same amount in the Ukraine.[60] In 1960, the government turned its attention to millet and buckwheat. Prior to the Revolution these crops had occupied a regular if somewhat modest place in the harvest. The sown areas increased sharply in 1955 and 1956.[61] In recent years the government's efforts to abolish the kolkhozniks' private plots had led to a reduction in these crops. In 1913, there were 2,200,000 hectares sown with buckwheat; in 1955, 2,800,000; and in 1958 only 1,700,000. The figures for millet were 3,500,000; 7,700,000; and 3,700,000 respectively.[62] At the beginning of 1960, the press began to publish articles on these crops under the general headings, "Restore Earlier Fame to the Bashkir Buckwheat"; "Let There be Buckwheat Porridge on Our Table"; "Open up the Way for Buckwheat and Millet."[63] The sown areas were accordingly extended.[64]

---

[56] *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, January 19 and 22; February 25, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, December 11 and 17, 1960.
[57] *Selskaya zhizn*, November 20, 1960.
[58] *Ibid.*, September 29; October 4 and 19; November 20, 1960.
[59] *Ibid.*, August 14; September 14 and 17, 1960.
[60] *Ibid.*, November 3, 1960.
[61] *Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu*, *op. cit.*, p. 387.
[62] *Ibid.*; *Rastenievodstvo SSSR* (Plant Cultivation in the USSR), Vol. I, Part 2, 1933, pp. 251, 300; *Posevnye ploshchadi SSSR* (The Sown Areas of the USSR), Moscow, 1938, p. 11.
[63] *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, January 10, 26, 27, and 30; February 14; March 3 and 18, 1960.
[64] *Pravda*, June 12, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, August 18; September 10, 14, and 22, 1960.

The next crop deemed worthy of special attention in 1960 was the soya bean. In earlier years this crop had been cultivated mainly in the Ukraine, Moldavia and the Northern Caucasus. Then it was decided to concentrate it in the Far East. In 1960 it was suggested that Amur Oblast specialise in this crop. Accordingly, out of a total of 384,000 hectares sown with soya beans, two thirds were located in Amur Oblast.[65] Supplies of potatoes and fresh vegetables are still a major problem. The rural population has been able to grow them on the private plots. Urban dwellers too have small plots outside the cities. Specialised vegetable-growing sovkhozes have been created near the major cities. Often supplies break down and the private kolkhoz market has to step in and save the situation. In 1960 more vegetables were grown than in 1959. Unfortunately, storage facilities still leave much to be desired and many vegetables perish.[66]

The supply of fodder was again a major problem in 1960. On March 30, *Selskaya zhizn* reported cases of murrain among sheep caused by lack of fodder in Orenburg Oblast. Large numbers of cattle perished in Kazakhstan in the winter of 1959—60. A lead article in *Selskaya zhizn* of December 9, 1960, admitted that "a large amount of fodder was stored, but in the winter livestock perished from lack of fodder in many regions." Matters were no better in the Ukraine. During the 1960 harvest Kazakhstan delivered by October 10 only 16 per cent of its plan for fodder. Figures for the individual oblasts were even less — 4.8 per cent for Akmolinsk Oblast; 6.4 per cent for Kokchetav; 2.5 per cent for Aktyubinsk; and 0.6 per cent for West Kazakhstan.[67] When fodder is in short supply, silage is used. Here too there were difficulties. By October 10, only 62 per cent of the silage deliveries for the USSR had been met. The figure for Kazakhstan was 65 per cent. By August 31, more than 58,000,000 hectares of meadow and grassland had been cut. By July 10, some 732,000 tons of hay, less than the 1959 figure, had been delivered. Deliveries had not even begun from Komi ASSR, Buryat ASSR and Irkutsk Oblast. *Selskaya zhizn* reported on October 16 that "in some oblasts of the Ukraine, Siberia, the central regions, and the Volga, the cattle does not have enough hay in comparison with 1959." Even deliveries of straw were lagging. *Selskaya zhizn* complained on October 16 that large areas had not yet been cleared. Very bad examples mentioned were the Stalingrad and Orenburg oblasts and Kazakhstan.

Thus, even making allowances for the unfavourable meteorological conditions, we can state that the 1960 harvest was a major disappointment. The government has invested billions of roubles in agriculture, particularly in the virgin lands, but the expected results have not yet been produced.

---

[65] A. Arkhimovich, *op. cit.*, p. 80; *Selskoe khozyaistvo*, January 30; February 5 and 10, 1960; *Selskaya zhizn*, October 7; December 2, 1960.

[66] *Izvestia*, October 9, 1960.

[67] *Kazakhstanskaya pravda*, October 23, 1960.

Literature and Science

Soviet Views on the Metaphysics of Relativity

G. OLGIN

"Space and Time have no independent existence, they are objective forms of existence of matter."
Friedrich Engels, *Anti-Dühring*

At the end of my article on "Physics and Dialectical Materialism," in the May 1960 *Bulletin* of the Institute for the Study of the USSR, the last of a series of three dealing with post-Stalin efforts to reconstruct dialectical materialism in accordance with Lenin's precept calling for the co-ordination of Communist philosophy with modern science, particularly physics, on the basis of a rationalised Hegelian system, I raised the question: "Can the fabric of Marxist materialism stand the resultant strain?"[1] No definite answer on this point can as yet be given, but it is becoming evident that in one all-important sector of physics the rapid advance of ideas propounded by some Soviet scientists has outrun the willingness or capacity of the ideologists to accommodate them. A mantle of silence has fallen over the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine of an absolute space-time relationship and the reality of the four-dimensional Minkowski world which only a year ago was acclaimed as a significant contribution to the "creative development of Marxism-Leninism" as well as to the advance of science. The same mantle of silence has fallen over the whole complex of questions regarding the nature of space and time and of their relation to matter in the light of relativity, the new cornerstone of the Soviet philosophy of physics and a highly important item in the four-year program of work of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, in connection with the campaign of ideological reconstruction.[2] Early in 1959 the organ of the Institute of Philosophy, *Voprosy filosofii*, carried a summary of the thesis of the doctrine presented by A. D. Aleksandrov at an All-Union conference in 1958 on "Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Natural Science."[3] The next issue included verbatim reports of the opening address of the chairman of the conference, President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR A. N. Nesmeyanov, the closing address by the philosopher P. N. Fedoseev and the report of the Organising Committee, accompanied by a meagre account of the discussion

---

[1] C. Olgin, "Physics and Dialectical Materialism," *Bulletin*, Munich, No. 5, 1960, pp. 3—20
[2] C. Olgin, "Lenin's Philosophical Legacy," *Bulletin, Munich, No. 1, 1960*, pp. 3—15.
[3] A. D. Aleksandrov, "The Philosophical Content and Significance of the Theory of Relativity," *Voprosy filosofii*, Moscow, No. 1, 1959, pp. 67-84.

which followed the presentation of the thesis.[4] This account included laudatory remarks addressed to the authors. Since then there has been complete silence on the subject. There has been no official statement to justify the assumption that the discussion settled the issue regarding the philosophic treatment of relativity — the cause of hot debates over some ten years. Nor has any reason been given for the subsequent disappearance of the name of Aleksandrov from the list of members of the editorial board to which he, together with the chief critic of the doctrine, the philosopher I. V. Kuznetsov, had been appointed after the stormy events of 1954 when the scientists grouped around the absentees V. A. Fok and G. F. Aleksandrov inflicted a signal defeat on the official ideologists.[5]

It may be argued that there was nothing out of the ordinary either in the temporary silence of *Voprosy filosofii* following the publication of the thesis or in the return of Professor G. F. Aleksandrov to purely scientific activity. Fok's colleague may well have been appointed to the editorial board specifically to ensure full co-operation between him and Kuznetsov and it is a fact that the final version of the doctrine as expressed in the thesis represents, superficially at least, a synthesis of the views on the meaning of relativity of the two chief opposing factions, the "kinematist" followers of Fok and Aleksandrov, i.e., the majority of the scientists assembled at the 1954 conference, and the "anti-kinematics," the accredited theoreticians backed by a few physicists, with Kuznetsov as their spokesman. What is more, V. I. Svidersky, philosophical mouthpiece in 1956 of Fok and Aleksandrov, remained on the editorial board. The doctrine itself, it is true, did not find mention in the relevant chapter of the authoritative post-Stalin book *Osnovy marksistkoi filosofii* (Foundations of Marxist Philosophy), but for this again there was a perfectly natural explanation: in the first place, the book was published prior to the presentation of the thesis, i.e., before the doctrine had received the Academy's official approval; secondly, even in its milder form in the thesis, the doctrine still demanded the revision of one or two basic posits of Engels' *Naturwissenschaft* philosophy, which at university textbook level could not be done in a hurry; and, thirdly, a certain amount of hedging on these posits, in contrast to the categorical assertions in Stalin's version of dialectical materialism, was already observable.

At the time when my article, "Physics and Dialectical Materialism," was being completed, there was therefore still no solid reason to think that those ultimately responsible for the ideological well-being of the Communist world had decided to ostracise the doctrine. On the contrary, there were grounds to

---

[4] "The All-Union Conference on Philosophical Questions of Contemporary Natural Science," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 2 1959, pp. 59—128.

[5] *Filisofskie voprosy sovremennoi fiziki*, Kiev, 1956. The entire issue is devoted to a verbatim report of the 1954 Conference on the Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Physics.

suppose that it would one day be incorporated in an amended version of official Soviet dialectical materialism once the problem had been thoroughly worked over by the dialecticians, a development which would undoubtedly give Soviet philosophy of physics a much needed stimulus and possibly place it ahead of its Western rivals.

Nor did the Kozyrev affair in the late autumn of 1959, which involved the suppression of publicity regarding a revolutionary theory of the nature of time, at first sight give grounds for reversal of this judgement.[6] The Kozyrev theory of time as a flow of physical action, the product of years of observations and deductions by a serious though not first-rank Soviet astronomer, had only a faint connection with the central theme of the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine. It had never figured in the programme of the effort of the Institute of Philosophy to co-ordinate natural sciences with dialectical materialism. It had moreover been commented upon sceptically by Western as well as Soviet scientists. Even if it had been condemned out of hand by ideologists, which had not been the case, this could hardly be regarded as a sign of a revival of Stalinist ideological repression or linked with official reticence over the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine. The theory first reached the Soviet public via a special edition of some 500 copies, which apparently were immediately bought up.[7]

No further editions have been published. But a four-page article in *Tekhnika molodezhi*, with a much larger circulation, acquainted the public at large with the elements of the theory. The article purported to present the results of an interview with Kozyrev, though the faulty logic and arguments of dubious scientific validity cast doubt on this point. Be that as it may, the very influential and definitely "Party" organ, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, followed up with a laudatory and less technical rendering of Kozyrev's hypothesis. Shortly afterwards a broadcast by the English service of Radio Moscow spread throughout the world the glad tidings of a sensational theory of time, of Soviet origin. Finally, on the pages of the most important high-brow literary periodical, *Literaturnaya gazeta*, Margarita Shaginyan burst into lyrics to tell her readers of "time burning in the stars" and of the unending life promised to our universe by the Kozyrev theory, which the ageing Party poetess described as the product of an imaginative and truly dialectical materialist approach to the problems of the physical universe. The fireworks of publicity and enthusiasm was short-lived. Within a few weeks of Shaginyan's outburst, *Pravda* poured cold water on the obvious interest of the Soviet public in the question of time and the Kozyrev article in *Tekhnika molodezhy* carried a special note to this effect. Over the signatures of three eminent physicists, all full members of the Academy

---

[6] See M. Kitaev, "Kozyrev's Controversial Theory of the Nature of Time," *Bulletin*, Munich No. 3, 1960, pp. 39—47.

[7] N. A. Kozyrev, *Prichinnaya ili nesimmetrichnaya mekhanika* (Causal or Asymmetrical Mechanics), Pulkovo, 1958.

of Sciences, the Party's mouthpiece warned the publicists against "sensationalising" a hypothesis before it had undergone the test of thorough scientific investigation, mentioning alongside the Kozyrev theory, with an obvious lack of tact, two or three completely ridiculous claims by would-be "innovators" (the Stalinist term for Soviet authors of unheard-of scientific or technical discoveries) to have overcome the law of entropy and conservation of energy. With this the Kozyrev theory disappeared from the pages of the Soviet press.

It has been suggested that the *Pravda* article was not based purely on a desire to combat sensationalism but that the Kozyrev theory was suppressed because it conflicted with the Marxist conception of the nature of physical reality, though how this fact could have escaped the notice of the ideological mentor of Soviet youth, *Komsomolskaya pravda*, or why Shaginyan should choose to elevate the author of an anti-Marxist theory to the status of a true progressive dialectical materialist is not clear.[8] Although Kozyrev's theory questioned Engels' subordination of space and time to matter, other points in Engels' *Naturwissenschaft* philosophy had been increasingly often questioned since the "creative development of Marxism-Leninism" was undertaken, without evoking more than occasional protests from second-rank ideologists. Fok and Aleksandrov, and their dialectic materialist interpreter Svidersky,[9] had in fact as much as openly declared that Engels' concepts of the nature of physical reality had been formulated before relativity had been heard of and were due for an overhaul, but they had not been attacked by ideologists, nor for that matter had Kozyrev. The obvious conclusion at the time was that *Pravda* in condemning the sensationalism around Kozyrev had acted in the interest of the Academy of Sciences and that the process of "historicising" the materialist posits of the classics (a euphemism often used to avoid accusations of revisionism) to make room for the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine and for the Kozyrev theory if it proved scientifically sound, would be carried on, though for the time being behind the scenes.

Six months after the publication of the *Pravda* article, when to all appearances the commotion around the Kozyrev theory had been forgotten, *Kommunist* came forward with a direct and this time mainly ideological condemnation of its author, whom it found guilty of questioning Engels' definition of space and time as forms of existence of matter on the basis of an hypothesis which still awaited scientific verification![10] Is this a warning to the "historicisers" of the classics and a sign that the reconstruction of the physics of dialectical materialism, the Achilles' heel of Stalinist philosophy in relation to natural sciences, is coming to an untimely, or timely, end? This would be

---

[8] M. Kitaev, *op. cit.*

[9] V. I. Svidersky, *Filosofskoe znachenie prostranstva vremmennykh predstavlennii v sovremennoi fiziki* (The Philosophical Meaning of Space-Time Concepts in Contemporary Physics), Leningrad, 1956.

[10] A. Bovin, "Science and World Outlook," *Kommunist*, Moscow, No. 5, 1960, pp. 105-06.

jumping to conclusions. If we hear no more of "time burning in the stars" or of time as an "inexhaustible source of energy" or of Kozyrev himself as a "true dialectical materialist," this in itself will prove nothing. It would be a different matter if the ideologists attacked the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine, which, unlike the Kozyrev theory, has always been treated with great respect by the scientists, even though its universal applicability has been questioned. Such an attack would be clear proof that the "reconstructors" of dialectical materialism have run into a snag and that Soviet scientists only recently co-operating in the task of reconstruction are at odds with Soviet philosophy on a cardinal point. But should we remain satisfied if we find it possible to establish such an attack has taken place? By no means.

The Facts Behind the Facts

It is always pleasant to demonstrate that Soviet scientists and Soviet philosophers are not pulling together, that the gap between science and dialectical materialism still persists. This has been for years the hobby of most of our experts on Soviet affairs. I know of no positive results of such activities and of one negative one — the encouragement of complacency on the part of our own philosophers to the movement of Communist philosophical thought as a whole, a complacency which in the writer's view is not justified. To use such an approach in the case of the Kozyrev affair and the continued reticence around or even eventual ostracism of the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine would be to continue a line of thought which has already led to many misconceptions regarding the relations between science and ideology in the USSR. We have been told and retold that Communist ideological repression would strangle the advance of Soviet science and have been astounded to see that specific enquiry on most vital sectors has been vigorously pushed forward. We have been assured at the same time that the real Soviet scientists only concern themselves with the pursuit of their scientific activities or at most that they formulate their theories in line with the moderate positivism favoured in the West and have been surprised (at least those of us who have followed the debates around the campaign of ideological reconstruction) at the sharpness of the philosophical arguments between leading Soviet scientists. It is high time we reviewed our notions on these points. It is right and proper to point out the outrageously shabby treatment of Kozyrev by his colleagues in *Pravda* and the sudden reticence around the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine but to cite these facts as new examples of ideological repression would be to miss the essential point — namely that daring theories of purely Soviet origin, more revolutionary by Marxist standards than any current in the West, have recently been developed in the USSR, that they have been acclaimed as true contributions to the development of Marxism-Leninism and have been given wide publicity before being suppressed or at least whisked away from the public eye, with the

accredited theoreticians keeping discreetly out of the direct line of fire. What is the explanation of this paradox?

The only way to get at the answer is to try to reconstruct the history of the two theories and this is not easy. Taking the Kozyrev theory first as the least complex, we find in the journal *Tekhnika molodezhi* the following brief information. Kozyrev, we are told, was struck by the fact that the assymmetry of time found no place in the physicists' equations related to action of any kind, particularly of electro-magnetic effects and gravitation. In other words the equations were reversible, whereas, as every schoolboy knows, time is a one way street. Dissatisfied with this paradox. Kozyrev worked out his own formulas in which the assymmetry of time was taken care of; he then proceeded to check his hypothesis of time as a flow of physical action by actual observation of the unilateral flattening of the planet's poles. In all this there was no mention of any philosophic considerations which may have moved the scientist (on this point *Tekhnika molodezhi* is more discreet than Shaginyan) or of any previous theories dealing with time as a physical and physically active entity. On this last point at any rate a little detective work puts us in a position to supplement the information provided by *Tekhnika molodezhi.*

Some seven or eight years before the publication of Kozyrev's theory none other than the physicist D. D. Ivanenko, who has recently been advocating the creation of a "unified physical picture of the world," advanced a theory bearing on this subject, which was then philosophically analysed from the point of view of dialectical materialism by Uemov. Starting with the facts of the general theory of relativity, i.e., that space and time are "deformed" wherever ponderable matter is present and applying the principle that there can be no action without a reaction, Ivanenko postulated that matter and gravitational fields not only interact but also that these fields can be transformed into substance and vice versa. This, according to A. I. Uemov, Ivanenko did without specifically rejecting Einstein's theory which identifies gravitational fields with deformation of space-time. Uemov objects that if Ivanenko persists in his theory of interconvertibility, he has two courses open to him. He must either stick to Engels' definition of space and time as "forms of existence of matter" and therefore, in themselves, immaterial, and, rejecting Einstein's formulation of the "general theory," regard gravitation as separate "material" entity. Or he must accept Einstein's formulation and reject Engels. One cannot but agree with Uemov's arguments and it is obvious that Ivanenko was and probably still is on dangerous ground; but so was Uemov. For, while rejecting Ivanenko's "inter-convertability," he is unable to get away from the over-riding principle of action and reaction, and admits the possibility of "interaction" between space-time and matter, thus being forced to draw the very risky parallel of logic, i.e., "form," acting on our thought processes, i.e., "content."

How thin the ideological ice is on which both the physicist and the philosopher skated in the heyday of Stalin's supreme power is shown by the further

criticism directed by Uemov against Ivanenko's "quantum field theory," postulating a "basic, fundamental, universal field, with particles considered as this field in an excited state." Driven to its logical conclusion this, according to Uemov, would mean that space and time are not forms of existence of matter but that on the contrary matter is a form of existence of the space-time continuum.[11] To the writer's knowledge this dangerous polemic has had no overt sequel, which is understandable. But there is little reason to doubt that the question has continued to be discussed behind closed doors. In any case, Uemov had already said enough to throw doubt on the complete originality of the Kozyrev theory as well as on the philosophical innocence of its author and of those who publicised it.

Practically the same considerations seem applicable to the evolution of the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine. Again the official story, as recounted in *Voprosy filosofii* and in Svidersky's rendering of Fok's doctrine,[12] is as simple as it is unsatisfactory. Fok and Aleksandrov, we are told, are Soviet scientists and therefore conscious or "elemental" dialectical materialists. They had disagreed with Einstein's positivism and had looked for a substantive cause behind the phenomenon of the constancy of the speed of light which had led them to reject Einstein's relativistic methodology. As scientists pure and simple they had also found that Einstein's "geometrisation" of gravitational effects led to wrong answers in calculating the bending of light rays in strong gravitational fields such as those around the sun.[13] They therefore, on both counts, had rejected Einstein's hypothesis of the identity of gravitational and inertial effects. So far so good, but even if we accept this version of Fok's disagreement with Einstein, it in no way explains how and why Fok and his Leningrad University colleague Aleksandrov, after helping materialism by "substantialising" and "objectivising" gravitational fields and, incidentally, re-establishing the objective superiority of the Copernican over the Ptolemaic system, proceeded to erect behind the façade of materialism (to use the words of Kuznetsov's attack on Fok and Aleksandrov at the 1954 conference on the integration of relativity)[14] their doctrine of absolute space-time relationship, virtually independent of matter and in any case superior to it. To this Fok and Aleksandrov, or rather their followers at the conference, answered uncompromisingly: Only the strictest "kinematic" interpretation of the changes in mass, dimensions, rhythm of processes, etc. expressed in the Lorentzian transformation of the special theory of relativity, particularly the strictest insistence on the complete reversibility of these changes when the position of observer and observed are reversed, are

---

[11] A. I. Uemov, "Can the Space-Time Continuum Interact with Matter?," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 3, 1954, pp. 176—77.

[12] Svidersky, *op. cit.*

[13] *Ibid.*

[14] I. V. Kuznetsov, "The Basic Questions of the Theory of Relativity," *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoi fitziki*, Kiev, 1956, pp. 155—92.

acceptable to science, i.e., these changes, unlike those caused by mechanical electro-magnetic or gravitational forces in which masses, charges, fields and distances play a role, depend purely on relative uniform, rectilinear movement between two objects or closed "inertial" system and on nothing else.[15]

Once the fact is accepted that these changes, though completely relative, are very real, the theory of a concrete, absolute space-time relationship follows automatically and this in turn leads logically via the "absolute interval" to the acceptance of the reality of the four-dimensional world. The premise itself is, however, based on a series of abstractions and the final deduction, while fitting faultlessly into the mathematics of the "special" theory, must now, and presumably for a long time to come, be taken on trust. The majority of our own physicists, at any rate, have managed to jog along without committing themselves so unreservedly on the physical meaning of the Lorentzian transformations, let alone on the question of the reality of the Minkowski world — a hypothesis which our scientists as a whole, with very few exceptions, still classify with metaphysics and thus unworthy of their attention. We have been so used to hearing of prominent Soviet scientists upholding daring Soviet hypotheses in sociology, economics, biology and genetics, founded on ideological rather than "purely scientific" considerations and advanced, under the cover of Party approval, against well-founded scientific concepts of Western origin, that a reversal of the picture in the case of physics seems out of the question.

Yet developments in this direction in the last ten years indicate the possibility of just such a reversal. A sober analysis of the available material on the genesis and official treatment of Ivanenko's theory of interconvertibility of gravitational field and matter, of Kozyrev's theory of the physical flow of time, and particularly of the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine of the physical reality of the Minkowski world, all of them revolutionary by orthodox Marxist standards, discloses a strong metaphysical content opposed to Western positivism, but all of them are equally opposed to the orthodox Marxist concepts of the nature of space-time and their relation to "matter." Nor have the accredited theoreticians been remiss in using for their purposes Western science or scepticism as well as the scepticism of rival groups of Soviet scientists, many of whom, like Peter Kapitsa and I. E. Tamm, the critics of Kozyrev, and Fok's chief critic, M. F. Shirokov,[16] based their arguments on theories of Western origin! As a result the Party Central Committee's mouthpiece *Kommunist* finds itself in the happy position of reprimanding "all those who advance grandiose hypotheses conflicting with Engels' definition of space and time as 'objective forms of existence of matter' before all the relevant facts are verified" and of stating that "there is only one science and not two — a socialist and a capitalist."[17] Only Kozyrev,

---

[15] "Answers to Questions," *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoi fiziki*, Kiev, 1956, pp. 193-201.
[16] *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 2, 1959, p. 80.
[17] Bovin, *op. cit.*

it is true, is named, but the criticism can be equally well directed against Ivanenko and, if need be, against Fok and Aleksandrov.

What conclusion can be drawn from the above facts? One jumps to the eye: the clear division between scientists and ideologists and the dominating position of the latter, which we were told conditioned the treatment of scientific theory under Stalin, has disappeared. The second is that influential groups of Soviet scientists, whose ideas find favour with the Soviet intelligentsia at large, including Party circles, are searching for a way out of the narrow materialism of Stalin's dialectical materialism, though most certainly not via Western positivism, existentialism or any other Western school of philosophy. To sum up, we can no longer say about academic disputes in the USSR, here are the "true" scientists, sharing Western views and therefore our secret allies, and there are the ideologists, backed by a few time-serving "renegade" scientists, dogmatic, obscurantist, set against Western ideas and for this reason persecuting the "true" scientists and at the same time strangulating science itself.

Who are the "true" scientists among the Soviet physicists and mathematicians and astronomers? The Ivanenkos, the Kozyrevs, Academican Fok and his colleague Aleksandrov who advance bold hypotheses which frighten the Soviet ideologists and find no sympathetic echo in the West? Or the Kapitsas, the Tamms, the Shirokovs who, using "strictly scientific" arguments acceptable in the West, severely criticise their unorthodox colleagues, and knowingly or unknowingly line up with the ideologists? Even to put such questions, let alone answer them, seems in the light of the evidence absurd. The present writer submits that we should abandon the chimeric idea still prevalent in the West that Soviet philosophy as a whole and Soviet science as a whole are engaged in an uncompromising struggle and address ourselves to the real problem: namely to elucidate what effect the propagation among scientists and intellectuals of new ideas of domestic origin, which can no longer be stopped, though the ideas may be for the time being withheld from the run-of-the-mill intelligentsia, will have on the future development of Soviet philosophy as a whole. That such a development is on its way, there is not the slightest doubt. The following notes on the evolution of the philosophy of relativity in the USSR, which for lack of space could not be included in the already mentioned article on "Physics and Dialectical Materialism" are not an attempt to solve the problem but only to show that it exists.

The Problem of Relativity in Dialectical Materialism

It must first of all be emphasized that Western popular views on the treatment of space-time-matter questions in general and of relativity in the USSR in particular have up to now been oversimplified to a degree. One of the leading

British experts on Soviet affairs, for example, not long ago noted with satisfaction the "rehabilitation" of Einstein on the strength of an article in *Kommunist* published some three or four years after Einstein had been proclaimed a "great reformer of science" and his chief detractors at the Institute of Philosophy thrown out of their positions of leadership.[18] Our best-informed expert on Soviet ideological matters, G. Wetter, at least notes this purge but contents himself, as regards the Fok-Aleksandrov interpretation of relativity, with saying that it opposes Einstein's positivism and is likely to remain in the lead,[19] without mentioning the fact that the doctrine and its authors were subjected to ideological attacks, if anything more virulent than those directed against Einstein himself. Our experts, even now, appear to be under the impression that the Soviet philosophers were forced to admit defeat before the advance of Western ideas regarding relativity, after vainly trying to reject it lock, stock and barrel, with the Soviet scientists sitting on the philosophical sidelines so long as the purely scientific content of Einstein's theories was not touched. The truth of the matter is that Soviet physicists, for possibly 20 years, have been quite active in working out for themselves the philosophic implications of relativity and that they have been doing their best to carry these implications to their logical conclusions with a vigour unknown in the West. That this process split the physicists into several well-defined groups and that some of them came into violent conflict with the ideologists and conformist scientists is therefore perfectly understandable.

It is of course true that the original impetus for this scientific-philosophic development came originally from the West, but it should be noted that Lenin's personal recommendation that Einstein's theories be philosophically worked over by dialecticians was made in 1922,[20] i.e., at a time when relativity, for the vast majority of our intelligentsia, scientists and, alas, even philosophers, was not more than a theory which could be accepted, if proved correct, while leaving our fundamental notions of the world untouched. Lenin's fatal illness delayed the assimilation of relativity by dialectical materialism by some thirty years; without his backing Einstein's theories fell into ideological disfavour and were attacked so crudely that not only the theory but the facts themselves were questioned in the early thirties by dialecticians and time-serving physicists. The result of this rude onslaught was only to encourage conscious or unconscious operationalism which developed and flourished in the thirties under the patronage of the late Professor L. I. Mandelshtamm, an interpretation of relativity which went much further in practice, if not in theory, than Einstein's own rather mild positivism and to all appearances dominated the academic scene for some twenty years.

---

[18] Edward Crankshaw, "Einstein Rehabilitated (and Freud?)," *Observer*, London, December 21, 1958.

[19] G. Wetter, *Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft in der Sowjetunion*, Hamburg, 1958, pp. 27—55.

[20] C. Olgin, "Soviet Dialectical Materialism in Transition," *Bulletin*, No. 6, 1959, pp. 11-19.

We are indebted to I. V. Kuznetsov, chief attacker of all "heresies" at the 1954 conference, for an interesting glimpse of the academic freedom enjoyed by scientists and pedagogues of note during most of Stalin's reign when Mandelshtamm was in a position of prominence. Mandelshtamm maintained, said Kuznetsov, that to talk of the physical meaning of the Lorentzian transformation was not the scientist's business. The *measure* of yard stick, moving with respect to a system of reference we *chose* to call stationary, decreased with an increase of speed. A moving clock *showed* a different time from a stationary one even though they had been synchronised but a moment ago. The scientist observed these facts and drew certain conclusions which he expressed in mathematical formulas. These in turn enabled him to conduct further experiments and so on *ad finitum*. Meanwhile he could use these formulas to predict future events and issue instructions to other scientific workers and engineers; to enquire into "substances" and "essences" was the business of philosophers; it was not, on the other hand, the philosophers' business to tell the scientists which direction their investigations should take or query the scientific validity of their hypotheses. At this point the late professor ran afoul of Marxism, which insisted and still insists that science and dialectical materialism should go hand in hand with philosophy in the lead.[21] Such views, however, had to be tolerated, for prior to the war no serious attempt had been made to produce an interpretation of relativity compatible with Stalin's (i.e. Engels') definition of matter-space-time and of their relation to each other (the subject as such being excluded from official discussion) except by Fok. And he, as it now seems, having started on the orthodox track by "substantialising" gravity and rejecting the main thesis of the general theory, voluntarily or involuntarily took a sharp turn towards ideas which in the eyes of the orthodox stand for "objective idealism" in his treatment of relativity as a whole.

So long as strict orthodoxy prevailed there was little the ideologists could do to remedy the situation even if they had been technically equipped to do so, and it is obvious that with very few such exceptions as Svidersky, Uemov, and G. I. Naan, the Soviet philosophers of the Stalin era were deeply ignorant of the basic facts and theories of modern physics. Detachment of pre-war Soviet philosophy from science as such was an incontrovertible fact and nowhere was this detachment more obvious than in the philosophy of physics, dominated as it was by relativity, for which no place could apparently be found in dialectical materialism. When the first organized attack on "Einsteinianism" was launched in the late forties, on orders of Zhdanov or of Stalin himself, as part of the general offensive against "worship of Western ideas," "positivism," "idealism," etc., it was still of so low a scientific calibre as to guarantee its failure. The only interest in this preliminary skirmish lies in the fact that the scientists and the better advised philosophers hit back at Einstein's attackers, chief of whom was

---

[21] I. V. Kuznetsov, *op. cit.*

the notorious A. A. Maksimov, Stalin's or Zhdanov's henchman at the Institute of Philosophy and head of its Natural Science Department, with arguments derived from the works of the "Classics of Marxism." The ill-conceived attack did however produce one important result: a discussion of Professor Mandelshtamm's posthumously published fifth volume of his collected works, which was conducted with little interference from ideologists and brought a spate of contributions to *Voprosy filosofii* from a number of scientists, mathematicians and philosophers offering a variety of interpretations of Einstein's ideas, including a discreet version of the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine. All of them criticised Einstein's philosophy but defended the scientific value of his ideas and condemned severely the ignorance of those who had attacked them.[22]

Concurrently, in 1952, the Academy of Sciences of the USSR published *Philosophical Questions of Contemporary Physics,* the first (and last) serious attempt to place Stalin's dialectical materialism on something like a scientific basis by providing a new official interpretation of relativity replacing Maksimov's crudities and by an up-to-date treatment of quantum mechanics. The importance attributed on all sides to the deeper implications of relativity is shown by the fact that his voluminous Stalinist production, published in 1952, devoted almost a third of its 570 pages to the subject in M. M. Karpov's "Critique of Einstein's Philosophic Views," R. Ya. Shteinman's "For a Materialistic Interpretation of High Velocity," I. V. Kuznetsov's „Soviet Physics and Dialectical Materialism," and N. N. Markov's article on Lobachevsky. Whether we agree with the four authors or not, it is only fair to note that these late defenders of Stalinist orthodoxy applied themselves conscientiously to the task of providing as much scientific evidence as they could, no longer relying on dogmatic assertions supported only by references to the "classics" or to Stalin, though references to both of course abound and Stalin is still lauded as a scientific genius.

Karpov, for example, soberly and correctly states that Einstein's views on the nature of the world and of our relations to phenomena were shaped by the works of Hume, of Schopenhauer and particularly of Mach. To prove Einstein's "Machist" or positivist viewpoint he quotes Einstein himself, "as against psychology, the subject of physics is solely the study of our immediate perceptions and the investigation of connections between them," and, "economy of thought was the real reason why the theory of relativity replaced all earlier concepts." He also sums up his criticism of Einstein's relativism (though he still calls it positivism) with the help of Einstein himself in the following quotation drawn from the 1948 edition of *Evolution of Physics:* "For every man there exists a subjective time, with the help of watches our conception of time is

---

[22] A. A. Semenov, "Summary of the Discussion of the Philosophic Views of Academican L. I. Mandelshtamm," *Voprosy filosofii,* No. 3, 1953, pp. 199-206.

objectivised."[23] All this is perfectly fair, and uncritical champions of Einstein should note that many leading Western scientists are nowadays distancing themselves from philosophic positivism and relativism; also that Einstein himself, in the last editions of this work, in general completely avoided philosophising and limited himself substantially to bare facts and to the construction of idealised experiments.[24]

The Stalinist "Materialist" Interpretation of Relativity

To agree with Karpov's criticism of the philosophic implications inherent in Einstein's formulation of the theory of relativity is not difficult if one is, in principle, against both positivism and philosophical relativism. To find alternative interpretations to the known facts and proven mathematical formulas, while keeping to the rules prescribed by science, is no easy matter, as one knows who has tried to follow the attempts of Western scientists and philosophers in this direction, including that of the late Whitehead. Maksimov and his like had ridden roughshod over these rules. Wetter in the compendium mentioned elsewhere equates Shteinman's "materialist" theory with Maksimov's crude attacks, but this is doing the author of the theory an injustice. Maksimov had virtually ignored or at least by-passed relativity; Shteinman, on the other hand, tries to "objectivise" it as do most Soviet scientists of the post-war era. Einstein had removed the last prop of pre-relativistic physics, the concept of privileged inertial systems, privileged not because their use made calculations easier or simpler but because of some inherent features of the physical world, for which, as earlier for "ether," he could find no scientifically valid proof and, this in turn leading him to the denial of the objective physical superiority of the Copernican over the Ptolemaic system.

The lost prop had to be replaced and a foundation established in consonance with the known facts of relativity. Some physicists, like Blokhintsev, considered that they had done their duty to dialectical materialism by simply postulating that such systems existed without going into the reasons which had led Einstein to his rejection of the bogey of inertia. Others, like Ya. P. Terletsky and Fok, went further and based their theories upon the acceptance of a Euclidian, or rather pseudo-Euclidian, structure of space-time, of a four-dimensional reality and a fixed space-time relationship. To the strictly orthodox this way was barred by Zhdanov's condemnation of Minkowski's four-dimensional world as rank mysticism and even more so by the obligation of keeping to Engels' definition of matter, space and time. The Marxist category of matter had been extended to cover fields — electro-magnetic, nuclear or gravitational. It could be stretched

---

[23] M. M. Karpov, "Criticism of Einstein's Philosophy," *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoi fiziki* (Philosophical Questions of Contemporary Physics), Kiev, 1952, pp. 217, 218, 224.
[24] Einstein and Infeld, *Die Evolution der Physik*, Hamburg, 1958.

no further for beyond them stood the "forms of existence" of matter, i.e., space and time, themselves immaterial and therefore physically inactive. The objective existence of privileged inertial systems had to be established and the "mechanism" of relativistic effects explained within these limits. In effect this meant a return to Lorentz without the prop of the "ether" theory. It was a venture doomed in advance to failure. Accordingly Shteinman failed but, in the writer's opinion, honourably, for he at least rejects the subterfuge of "physical space" which they moved at high speeds.[25] In doing so he laid himself open to the way or that like jelly by relative motion, a crude idea culled from one of Einstein's very early works which he later did his best to forget.

Shteinman's enforced search for the "mechanism" of relativistic effects led him to postulate that they were due to the interaction between the particle's own field and the "zero field" of the system to which they belonged and through which they moved at high speeds.[25] In doing so he laid himself open to the accusation by the " kinematists" that he was forgetting that such changes would be cumulative, and would depend on distance traversed and time taken over the observation period, which is not the case with the purely relativistic effects examined by the "special theory." This is no doubt a weighty argument, for the validity of the "special" theory has been empirically confirmed, but the "kinematists" in turn forgot that these "effects" are abstractions from a mass of observational data in which factors excluded in the "special" theory, such as acceleration, field interaction, etc., undoubtedly play a role. Furthermore it may be advanced in Shteinman's defence that, short of accepting unreservedly the physical reality of the Minkowski world (regarded in the West with scepticism), the "mechanism" of purely relativistic changes in mass and energy is still as inexplicable, except in mathematical formulas, as it was when Einstein abandoned the attempt.

On several points at least, such as denial of the complete reversibility of relativistic effects and insistence on the absolute character of changes in the processes taking place in objects or groups of objects travelling with really high speeds with reference to our planet (e.g., the physiological process of space-ship travellers), many Western interpreters of Einstein's ideas, in their non-technical works, show closer agreement with the author of the "materialistic theory of high velocities" than with the pundit followers of Fok and Aleksandrov.[26] From this point of view alone, Shteinman's article is worth studying, for, apart from ideological verbiage, the author, having openly refuted the "kinematist" interpretation, follows his refutation with a logic and attention to detail which help to bring out the many contradictions and blank spaces in the practical interpretation of relativity which are more often than not passed over in silence. What is more there are definite indications that some ideas contained in the

---

[25] P. Ya. Shteinman, "For a Materialist Theory of Rapid Movements," *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoi fiziki* (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Physics), Kiev, 1952.

[26] George Gamov, *One, Two, Three, Infinity*, New York, 1958.

thesis, whether original or not, are also found in the interpretations of opponents and critics, such as the idea of an ascending scale of "privileged inertial systems of reference," the mainstay of the school of thought of D. I. Blockhintsev[27] or the idea of a "zero field" (the resultant field of any system — atomic, molecular, or stellar) which found its way into the final version of the Fok-Aleksandrov thesis. An added interest of Shteinman's article is his introduction of the concept of movement of particles as the continuous reconstitution or generation of a pattern of connections between the field of the particle and the surrounding fields; from which it follows that inertial systems of reference are systems in which this pattern remains substantially unchanged when the particle is at rest or in uniform motion at speeds well below that of the speed of light with reference to the "nucleus" of the system.[28]

Shteinman's criticism of Einstein, both for his philosophical positivism and for his "geometrisation" of relativity, which occupies a good part of the article, is well-worded and astute. At the close, however, he is forced into a tactical mistake. Shteinman concludes with a final reproach to the creator of the theory of relativity for having accepted the empirical fact of the constancy of the speed of light, which he had made the basis of all his concepts without ever trying to get at the substantive reason behind this constancy. "Einstein with his second postulate [independence of the speed of propagation of all electromagnetic effects irrespective of the speed of source of emission] excludes the possibility of the existence of ether, but what is left, once there is no ether to fill the empty space? If the field is not the condition of motion of a medium, what is it?"[29] Shteinman's charge that Einstein deliberately avoids the issue is a calumny, for in a later edition of *The Evolution of Physics*,[30] which should have been available in the USSR, Einstein specifically states that the issue worries him but that he has no solution to offer. Neither has Shteinman, in spite of his erudition and his desire to please the authorities in this regard. A return to ether? But he himself condemns Lorentz for trying to maintain the ether hypothesis. He puts the question but does not answer it. As to the reason for the constancy of the speed of light, left untouched by Einstein, this will, according to Shteinman, remain unknown so long as our knowledge of the connection between field and particle remains rudimentary. The way to truth lies in the investigation of concrete facts, of the microcosmos, not in the building up of general theories with the help of idealised experimentation in macrophysics.

This may sound down-to-earth advice; but Shteinman's reproaches to Einstein open the way for Fok and Aleksandrov to postulate overtly a fixed and absolute space-time relationship as a dominating physical factor behind all

---

[27] D. I. Blokhintsev, "For a Leninist Teaching of Motion," *Voprosy filosofii, No. 1, 1952*, pp. 181—83.
[28] Shteinman, *op. cit.*
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 281.
[30] Einstein and Infeld, *op. cit.*

physical phenomena, something which they apparently had not yet done in 1952 and which is not dependent for its existence on any "matter." It was against this doctrine, equated with "objective idealism," that Kuznetsov's attack on the heretical scientists of the 1954 conference (fully reported in my article on "Physics of Dialectical Materialism" in the May 1960 Institute *Bulletin*) was chiefly directed, though Einstein, positivism and Mandelshtamm were also castigated. In his article in *Filosofskie problemy sovremennogo estestvoznaniya* neither the doctrine nor the authors find mention, "physical idealism" being still identified with positivism and no hint being made of the more dangerous heresy of "objective idealism." This omission reduces the interest of the ideological arguments of Kuznetsov, whose article is based completely on Shteinman's "Materialist Theory of High Velocity." One point, however, is worth noting: Shteinman, the physicist, in spite of all conformism, shied away from condemning Einstein's negation of objective or rather absolute simultaneity. Kuznetsov, the materialist dialectician, in the wake of Maksimov, still head of the Institute of Philosophy, insists on this point in which, from the positions of Marxist orthodoxy, he is perfectly logical. If there is nothing except matter in the universe, if matter extends only in three dimensions, then once the facts of relativity have been accepted, absolute, objective simultaneity must exist, even though we are unable to give it a scientific definition. It must be taken on trust. For otherwise how can the unity of a three-dimensional world be conceived?[31] Critics of Soviet philosophy, incidentally, should note that this notion, ridiculed by the anti-Stalinist Soviet scientists at the 1954 conference as "a form of religion" is probably firmly rooted in the minds of a very high percentage of our own intelligentsia and even in that of such philosophers of note as the late A. N. Whitehead.

Two Metaphysics

The Mandelshtamm Discussion. The "materialist theory of high velocity" was, as I have said, developed specifically as an attack upon the positivism of the Mandelshtamm school and Einstein's own relativism. The "Mandelshtamm discussion" in 1952—53 showed that a number of leading Soviet scientists, whether under pressure or by persuasion, wished to distance themselves from both, even though they were unwilling to accept Shteinman's solution. To do so without offending some tenets of dialectical materialism was, however, a practical impossibility. A detailed analysis of this phase in the development of the philosophy of relativity in the USSR would be out of place here, particularly since the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine in some ways represents a synthesis of the views expressed at the discussion. Fortunately *Voprosy filosofii* in late

[31] I. V. Kuznetsov, "Soviet Physics and Dialectical Materialism," *Filosofskie voprosy sovremmennoi fiziki* (Philosophical Questions of Contemporary Physics), Kiev, 1952.

1952, i.e., just before the discussion came to a close for all practical purposes, carried an article by I. P. Bazarov,[32] a specialist in relativity but also apparently in dialectical materialism, containing a well-balanced critical review of the scientists' contributions, including the various alternative interpretations of relativity proposed. A summary of Bazarov's article follows.

Maksimov (still head of the Natural Science Section of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR) had supplemented his ill-judged attacks on Einstein by long-winded contributions in *Voprosy filosofii* in which he leant heavily on *Das Kapital* to prove the objectivity of three-dimensional bodies and movements. Bazarov, *Das Kapital* notwithstanding, coolly pointed out that Maksimov's arguments could be led back to Newtonian absolute space and time which the Founding Fathers (or at least Engels) had denied. (In passing it may be noted that Bazarov was a loyal enough Marxist to fail to mention that Engels was merely repeating Leibnitz's verdict of Newtonian abstract absolutisation of space and time as another example of the worship of some English idol or other.) Stern, an East German philosophising publicist who unguardedly joined the fray, was dismissed as ignorant of true Leninism for having claimed that absolute motion must exist, on the grounds that otherwise an approach to absolute knowledge of matter in motion, the essence of the Marxist world, would be impossible, for how can one approach that which does not exist? Bazarov corrected him: Stern, he said, was looking for the Absolute in the wrong way. We must get at it by building up our concepts on the basis of knowledge of the relative motions of the totality of all bodies in the universe. Blokhintsev, one of the leading authorities in quantum mechanics, who without being a time server in philosophical matters (he is in fact known to have propounded extremely unorthodox views), had succeeded in maintaining a position akin to that of 18th century court physicists regardless of political changes, had come forward as stated with his (or Shteinmann's) theory of an ascending series of "privileged inertial systems of reference," the earth for atomic and subatomic movements, the sun for planetary movements, etc. He had guarded himself (or so he thought) against ideological attacks by saying that the "most inertial" system would not be found today or tomorrow but that we are moving towards its discovery. Like Stern he had referred to Lenin's definition of the Relative as an ever-closer approximation to the Absolute and like Stern had failed to satisfy the pundit Bazarov.[33] Blokhintsev, said Bazarov, seemed to regard the Absolute as co-existing with the Relative, whereas in fact the Absolute can exist only via the Relative.[34]

Terletsky, mathematician, distinguished designer of accelerators, chairman of the "Mandelshtamm discussion," and an apparently unconscious pace-maker

---

[32] I. P. Bazarov, "For a Dialectical Materialistic Understanding and Development of the Theory of Relativity," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 6, 1952, pp. 175-85.

[33] D. I. Blokhintsev, *op. cit.*

[34] I. P. Bazarov, *op. cit.*, pp. 179–81.

to Fok and Aleksandrov, had attempted to produce a non-relativistic interpretation of the "special" theory, consonant with his concept of dialectical materialism. He had advanced the view that the Lorentzian transformations, in the shape they assumed in the "special" theory, could be derived without any help from clocks, signalling systems or observers, in fact without any reference to electromagnetic effects as such. It was enough to assume: (a) the invariability of the form of mechanical laws when going from one inertial system to another; (b) the steady increase of inertial mass with relative speed; and (c) the basic isotropy and homogeneity of space-time. Plus the empirically established constant for the speed of propagation of action and reaction (the speed of light). Once these transformations are obtained by this means, the whole of the "special" theory of relativity, including kinematics, dynamics and wave-field theories can be regarded as a physical theory of space and time and detached from philosophical relativism.[35]

There is no doubt, in the light of the evidence, that Bazarov who, in 1952, seems to have been a moderate follower of Mandelshtamm, was swinging over to Terletsky's views. But the four-dimensional geometry of Minkowski which stands behind Terletsky's thesis, damned as it was by Zhdanov in 1947, was still unacceptable in 1953. In any case Terletsky, according to Bazarov, had gone astray in following too closely in the footsteps of Jeans and Eddington by postulating the relativity of all trajectories as being due to the freedom of the observer to choose his frame of reference, so long as it was an inertial one, and in considering that these trajectories were the reflection in our consciousness of absolute motion. Bazarov was also kind enough to give a reason for Terletsky's aberration: "It is a peculiarity of the special theory that ignores (better, excludes in its basic formulation) the mass of bodies; extended unlawfully to the limiting case of $m=0$, it leads to the conception of systems of reference as imaginary networks."[36]

The comparative impartiality of Bazarov is shown in his treatment of Shteinman's materialist theory of high velocities. He gave its author his due for his effort to get at the "mechanism" of relativistic changes, but reproached Shteinman, as the kinematists did a little later at the 1954 conference, for having failed to note that the reduction of these changes to the effect of action and reaction of fields would make them cumulative—something which is disproved by experiment. A further reproach was that Shteinman, in his exposition of Lorentz's theories, had failed to point out that they were specifically devised in order to explain why experiment had failed to track down the mysterious ether.[37] Bazarov had a word to say, too, about Kuznetsov, who as late as 1948

---

[35] Ya. P. Terletzky, "Basis of the Special Theory of Relativity," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 1, 1953, p. 207.
[36] I. P. Bazarov, *op. cit.*, pp. 181—82.
[37] *Ibid.*, pp. 183—85.

had apparently uttered laudatory remarks addressed to Einstein, before correcting his ideological error by attacking Einstein. This, said Bazarov, was tantamount to treating Marxism-Leninism as a piece of India-rubber, stretching it this way and that as circumstances require. What was Bazarov's own recipe? "Study space-time relationship and relativity as a whole in the quality of bodies."[38] This sounds "materialistic" enough, but is it? To the writer, at any rate, it seems to relativise material objects and thus lead to the recognition of the four-dimensional reality which Bazarov officially condemned.

The picture which emerges from Bazarov's article and the report on the Mandelshtamm discussion is that of a growing disarray amongst the ideologists, some of whom, like Bazarov, were guardedly preparing to abandon the positions of uncompromising orthodoxy and were hoping that the scientists would help them to find a way out of a crassly materialist impasse. In this connection it is interesting to note that Bazarov, though he condemned Terletsky for his predilection for Minkowski, made no mention of Fok and Aleksandrov. Was this the reticence of a disciple or was the second, and really revolutionary, stage of Fok's interpretation of relativity as absolute space-time relationship and its corollaries only developed after 1953, rapidly and somewhat conspiratorially, as part of the general ideological offensive against the Stalinists?

Fok's own contribution to the Mandelshtamm discussion in *Voprosy filosofii* carried the significant title, "Against Ignorant Critics of Contemporary Physics," and was so obviously directed against the Stalinists at the head of the Institute of Philosophy that A. A. Maksimov had a reply printed in the same issue. The philosophers, in Fok's view, were confusing the "objective" (existing independently of consciousness) and the "absolute" (existing independently of outside circumstances). To reflect reality, both concepts must be included in the theory of relativity, which would be better named the theory of space-time. Fok kept clear of the Minkowsky world, but its recognition was at least halfway implied in his thesis that the quasi-Lorentzian transformations of the "special" theory are not necessarily connected with Einstein's version of relativity, which is based on an analysis of simultaneity. The same results, according to Fok, could be arrived at by analysing the changes in mass and momentum on the assumption of a certain relationship between these changes and the relative uniform speed of bodies and on the further assumption of a limiting speed of action-reaction.[39] This thesis brought Fok very close to Terletsky's version and separated him rather sharply from the halfway conformist school of Blokhintsev.

Fok's colleague Aleksandrov, meanwhile, went straight for the philosophical-logical aspect of relativity in an article, "Regarding Certain Views

---

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 182—83.

[39] V. A. Vok, "Against Ignorant Critics of Contemporary Physics," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 1, 1953, pp. 168—73.

on the Theory of Relativity," in which he came forward to fight the ideologists with their own weapons as a full-fledged dialectician:

> The common fault of interpreters of relativity is confusion between the terms relative and non-objective: a materialist understanding of relativity is only possible if we correctly understand the dialectics of the categories of quality-relation, specific-general, concrete-abstract, of matter as content and of space-time as form, etc.[40]

It is commonly supposed that Soviet scientists, when they introduce dialectics, do so tongue in cheek. An unbiased reader of Aleksandrov's article, I feel sure, would not agree. The dialectic is, so to speak, built into his conception of relativity from the very beginning, a feature which distinguished his contribution from all the others. Another interesting feature of his article was his criticism of Terletsky and Eddington: "Certainly," says Aleksandrov, "energy is the projection of the impulse-energy vector on to the time axis, but does this explain the essence of energy, of its objectivity and relativity?"[41] The cardinal fault of both, according to Aleksandrov, was that they regarded the system of reference as something imposed arbitrarily by the observer rather than as an abstraction from an actual co-ordination of bodies.[42]

Conclusion

The Metaphysics of Fok and Aleksandrov. By 1953, when the "Mandelshtamm discussion" was nearing its end, though it was not officially declared closed until 1955, there were thus no less than four distinct schools of opinion on the correct approach to the problem of relativity and in particular to that of the "special" theory: (1) the official "materialistic theory of high velocities," (2) Blokhintsev's "ascending series of privileged inertial systems," (3) Terletsky's "four-dimensional reality plus projection theory," and (4) "conservative Einsteinianism," i.e., the uncritical acceptance of all of Einstein's formulas without any attempt to give them a philosophical interpretation. The last of these was, understandably, not presented at the discussion but proved its vitality by appearing from time to time in scientific pronouncements by such conservative scientists as Shirokov in journals such as *Priroda* and seems gradually to have become regarded by anti-revisionist ideologists as one of the lesser evils when it became evident that the "materialistic" interpretation had to be discarded.

---

[40] A. D. Aleksandrov, "Regarding Certain Views of the Theory of Relativity," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 1, 1953, pp. 225—26.
[41] *Ibid.*, p. 230.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

Fok and Aleksandrov, whose interpretation was to win the day five years later, had not yet come out into the open, but were limiting themselves substantially in their public pronouncements to destructive criticism of all and sundry, a fact which provoked Kuznetsov at the 1954 conference to ask their adherents: "Why doesn't Academician Fok write his own interpretation of relativity," a queston which elicited an immediate reply from an unnamed person in the audience, "V. A. Fok is writing!"[43] The main elements in the evolution of the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine from the apparently harmless "kinematic" interpretation of the "special" theory, through the theory of "absolute space-time relationship" contained in Svidersky's 1956 work, to Aleksandrov's thesis on relativity at the 1958 All-Union Conference have been roughly outlined in my article on "Physics and Dialectical Materialism." In order to obtain even an approximate idea of its philosophic implications, certain additional items will have to be examined.

Fok appeared for a second time, and this time more positively, on the arena of *Voprosy filosofii*, late in 1955, i.e., a year after the 1954 conference at which, it will be recalled, his followers had repulsed Kuznetsov's attack of "idealist" tendencies in Soviet physics. Only a few months remained before the Twentieth Party Congress when Stalin's dialectical materialism, particularly in its relation to natural sciences, was proclaimed dogmatic and retrograde—a timing of events which strengthens the hypothesis that the doctrine, quite apart from its intrinsic merits, was pushed forward by influences within the Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Philosophy as part of the general offensive against the Stalinists. The essence of Fok's brief and very lucid article, "Concepts of Homogeneity, Co-variance and Relativity in the Theory of Space and Time,"[44] is his separation of the mathematical structure of Einstein's theories which, with one or two reservations, he accepts while expressing his great admiration for their creator, from their physical (one might almost say metaphysical) content, which he rejects. This content, the main theme of the "general" theory, is insistence on the equivalence of all systems of reference in respect to the basic laws of the physical world, which led Einstein to equate acceleration effects with those of gravitation, to deny the objective existence of preferential inertial systems and, in principle at any rate, to regard Ptolemaic and Copernican systems as equals. This approach to the facts of relativity is, according to Fok, based on an unwarranted assumption. Accordingly, Fok completely separated the "special" from the "general" theory. The former, though an abstraction, had for Fok a deeper, more general significance than that granted it by its creator, since it expresses the basic homogeneity of the space-time continuum and the basic Euclidian structure of space, in both of which Fok believed (together, it might be noted, with the late A. N. Whitehead).

---

[43] *Filosofskie voprosy sovremennoi fiziki*, Kiev, 1956, p. 199.
[44] *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 4, 1955, pp. 130—35.

The "general" theory, on the other hand, being in Fok's view a theory of gravitation pure and simple unjustifiably superimposed on the "special," according to him expresses the non-homogeneity of space-time in the vicinity of ponderable matter. In its purely mathematical form, he said, it is a powerful instrument, legitimately constructed around the scientists' equally legitimate adherence to the principle of "co-variance" of laws pertaining to general physical processes, but it certainly does not prove the physical equivalence of all systems of reference, nor the principle of general physical relativity, which in Fok's view could only exist if space-time were universally homogeneous. By postulating that it is not, he continued, the "general" theory disproves universal relativity, and the name given the theory confuses the issue. The validity of the "special" theory is empirically proved, according to Fok, not merely for very small space regions but also for portions at least of the cosmic world by the fact which lies at the base of radio-location that the propagation of wave fronts of electromagnetic disturbances "at infinity" takes place in accordance with equations directly derived from the Lorentz transformation, which is the mathematical expression of the maximum possible homogeneity in a four-dimensional continuum. In this connection, Fok puts in an important philosophical aside which enables him to overcome the objection of unjustified extrapolation of empirical observations. Infinity of "space" as a whole must, according to Fok, be equated with infinity of the universe as a whole. The first must be accepted as referring to distances at which the gravitational effects of the totality of bodies composing the system under consideration are disappearingly small (varying from a micron in the case of the sub-atomic world to one light year in the case of the solar system, etc.). As to infinity of the universe as a whole, this according to Fok, is not a question which can be discussed in the context because of gnoseological reasons, a point of view, incidentally, shared by Wetter.[45]

The condemnation of Einstein's philosophical relativism is of course implied in the main argument, but in dealing directly with the philosophical background of Einstein's theories, Fok contents himself with saying that Einstein was probably influenced by Machism. His overt attack on the supremacy of the "general" theory and his thesis of the existence of preferential systems of reference received support in the same issue of *Voprosy filosofii* and came from an unexpected quarter. None other than Leopold Infeld, Einstein's lifelong collaborator and co-author of the philosophically heavily loaded (in its early edition at any rate) *The Evolution of Physics* stepped in to confirm, though indirectly, Fok's verdict. The mathematical structure of Einstein's theories is obviously such that preferential systems are excluded, but the mathematical structure of a theory must not, according to Infeld as well as Fok, be confused with its physical content. This content, according to Infeld, had been miscon-

---

[45] *Ibid.*, pp. 131—32; Wetter, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

strued by popularisers of Einstein's theories; the theory as such did not deny the objective superiority of some systems over others, i.e., the objective superiority of the Copernican over the Ptolemaic system; on the contrary it proved it.[46] Infeld's arguments sound somewhat unconvincing if it is recalled that Einstein had openly proclaimed his intention to use his general theory to banish the "bogey" of inertia from physics as such, but cynics who might think that Infeld's retreat from philosophic relativism was due only to change of residence (Einstein's collaborator had moved to Poland) may be doing him injustice, for in 1955 Fok's evaluation of the "general" theory had not officially been accepted and in fact does not seem to have been accepted even now.

Admiration for the person of the late Albert Einstein and the predominance of positivism and relativism in Western philosophy has resulted in unquestioning acceptance of his "general" theory as the crowning achievement of a man who was undoubtedly the greatest twentieth century theoretical physicist as well as one of the greatest contributions ever made to the philosophy of science. In consequence, and equally unquestioningly, the judgement of positivist critics of Marxism has been accepted, who declared that attacks in the USSR on Einstein's theories were shocking, irrational and only to be explained by the inherent obscurantism and reactionary character of dialectical materialism. It is true of course that Einstein's theories, and particularly some of the corollaries such as the finiteness of the world in space, are incompatible with the main tenets of Engels' *Naturwissenschaft* philosophy as interpreted in Stalin's dialectical materialism and that the initial attacks on Einstein by ignorant Stalinist ideologists and time-serving scientists were unsupported by any scientific or even to some degree logically tenable arguments. Some deistically inclined anti-Marxists, not satisfied with this added proof of the "poverty of Marxism" went further and, claiming that finiteness in time of our universe and with it the existence of a divine creation were uncontrovertibly proved by the "general" theory (which is far from being the case), continue even now to affirm that Soviet scientists reject or are made to reject Einstein's ideas because they undermine atheism and with it dialectical materialism as a whole. In the heat of the argument it seems to have been completely forgotten that Whitehead, who was neither a practicing atheist nor a fellow-traveller, rejected Einstein's formulation of "general" relativity because it postulated the "monstrosity of a natural geometry which was not homologous" and incidentally formulated a tentative interpretation of "special" relativity reminiscent of the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine.

Fok himself, by all accounts a man contemptuous of public opinion, has deemed it unnecessary to publicise the philosophic considerations which in the late thirties led him to part with Einstein or at least with his general theory.

---

[46] Leopold Infeld, "From Copernicus to Einstein," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 4, 1955, pp. 128—29.

His colleague A. D. Aleksandrov, who seems to realise that public opinion counts, has, however, filled the gap, in precise terms and without a trace of reference to atheism or Engels, while disposing at the same time of the official version of Fok's disagreement with Einstein, i.e., the alleged mathematical inaccuracies of the general theory. Einstein, said Aleksandrov, had elevated relativity into a principle, made it the central theme of all his theories and incorporated it in the logic of these theories.[47] One may argue that Aleksandrov was deliberately overplaying Einstein's devotion to philosophical relativism (related to but by no means identical with modern positivism) for the sake of effect, but there is no doubt that a philosophically-minded reader of many of Einstein's works would come to the conclusion that their author, consciously or unconsciously, superimposed this philosophy or world outlook upon the findings of empiricists working in the field of optical and electromagnetic phenomena and upon all the theories, particularly those of Lorentz, built around or upon the ruins of the Newtonian world. Such a philosophically-minded reader would, according to his own inclination, welcome this relativism or fight it. Fok seems to have fought it.

The picture which emerges from all the accounts of the "battle of relativity" which has been in progress in the USSR for the last twenty years and which may flare up again, shows two groups. One is that of the conformist ideologists clumsily hitting out at relativism and positivism, hardly distinguishing between the two. The other consists of a section of the scientists, particularly Fok and Aleksandrov, who, while regarding mild positivism as a legitimate point of view for a scientist disinterested in philosophy, have busied themselves with the task of producing a solution opposed to relativism and overt "Machism" and, in the process, have come near to destroying the foundation in physics of the "materialism" of the classics, including those of Lenin's own *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, upon which all Soviet versions of dialectical materialism have up to now been based. The fact that in so doing they were merely following Lenin's later injunction to construct a philosophy of science on the basis of a rationalised Hegelian system and that they were helped in this task by several prominent Soviet philosophers adds to the novelty of the situation and to the embarrassment of the conformist ideologists. The latter, helped no doubt by anti-revisionist influences, have temporarily at least managed to stave off the worst. In the last version of the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine, i.e., in Aleksandrov's 1958 thesis, interaction and interconnectedness of events are always qualified by the adjective "material" and a "material background of radiation" has been introduced as a "universal carrier" of all signals somehow reminiscent of Shteinman's "zero field."

These concessions presumably make the doctrine respectable by post-Stalin orthodox standards but in the writer's opinion only superficially so.

---

[47] A. D. Aleksandrov, "The Philosophical Content and Significance of the Theory of Relativity," *Voprosy filosofii, No. 1, 1959, pp. 67—84.*

the chief effect being a distinct weakening of the doctrine's essential logic. Aleksandrov's statement that this "background of radiation" has no connection with the discredited ether, or with Shteinman's zero field of isolated systems, that it is the "moving medium itself," and that to talk of movement with respect to it is nonsensical, already sounds unconvincing. What kind of "radiation" is it which carries all other forms of radiation but itself requires no carrier and which is indifferent to relative uniform motion but reacts to any other? And how, in the absence of an absolute three-dimensional frame of reference, can "uniform" relative motion be defined, except as motion to which the "radiation background" is indifferent — a circular argument similar to that which drove Einstein to abandon the concept of inertial systems and to formulate the "general" theory.

But there seems, to the present writer, an even graver objection to the "radiation background" sub-thesis. For if, as postulated, this radiation emanates from matter, thus differentiating it from Einstein's space-time continuum, then surely the "background" must be inherently more intense in the vicinity of stars and planets than away from them making nonsense of the main argument to the effect that the background is homogeneous unless distorted by a superimposed gravitation. It is indeed odd that this point was not taken up by his two critics, A. A. Tyapkin and M. F. Shirokov, the only reasonable explanation being that everyone was aware that the "radiation background" was merely a stage prop in the "materialistic" stage-setting which Aleksandrov could and would discard at the slightest provocation. In the précis at any rate, Aleksandrov, having postulated the necessity of "substantialism" in Minkowski's world by recognizing that such a background exists, dropped the subject after a few perfunctory phrases, making it quite obvious that it was totally unrelated to the real philosophical and scientific content of the doctrine.

The real content of the publicised version can, in the writer's opinion, be summarised in the following three points: (1) the right of the scientists not only to abstract from scientific equations and formulas, but also to maintain that these abstractions (in this case absolute space-time relationship and cause-effect detached from all material factors) represent a closer approximation to absolute truth and are therefore more real than the material data upon which they are based — a thesis which seems to have come from Hegel's *Science of Logic* via Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks* and one which, incidentally, finds a strange echo in Whitehead's philosophy of science; (2) the thesis of "objective-relativity" of all qualities of objects and phenomena in the three-dimensional space of our senses, opposed both to the Stalinists' absolutisation of these qualities propounded by the vast majority and to the subjectivised relativity of Einstein's interpreters, including Terletsky — a concept which may be made more understandable by visualising the thesis that "purely relativistic effects" were responsible for the destruction of Hiroshima; and (3) the corollary thesis that "bodies" have absolute motion, dimensions, qualities and real existence in

the indifferentiated four-dimensional continuum, the relative movement, qualities and dimensions in our differentiated space-and-time being their objective projections. Together with the virtual identification of cause-effect as a four-dimensional space-time relationship, this brings the doctrine very close to postulating the reality of Minkowski's world with all its philosophical concomitants.

The first point, concealed behind the innocent façade of the "kinematic" interpretation of the "special" theory, was the real object of Kuznetsov's 1954 abortive attack. The attack has not been renewed to date, or extended to cover the last point. But neither have the ideologists attempted, in public, to grapple with the problem of four-dimensional reality; they have instead pretended that it is not implicit in the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine. The present writer was at first inclined not to blame the authors of the doctrine for having failed to press this point home, assuming that they were scientists first and last and could therefore be excused for leaving the job to the philosophers. A closer examination of Fok's and Aleksandrov's argumentation in *Voprosy filosofii* and of the whole "battle of relativity" shows, as stated, that philosophic considerations played a decisive role in the formulation of the thesis. In this light the reticence of the proponents of the doctrine as well as that of their opponents regarding the cardinal philosophic conclusions begins to look like a silent conspiracy to keep the spectre of the Minkowski world out of the discussions for as long as possible. So far, in fact, only Svidersky among the whole regiment of Soviet philosophers had dealt specifically and positively with the doctrine itself, in his already-mentioned work, *The Philosophical Meaning of Contemporary Space-Time Concepts.*

But this was written over four years ago and says, except in its historical section, considerably less than is contained in Aleksandrov's thesis; nor has the latest of Svidersky's contributions to the philosophical treatment of space and time from the positions of dialectical materialism added anything to clarify the issue. If one may judge from the recent review of his work, Svidersky seems, in fact to have taken a step backward.

The coyness of the ideologists is fully understandable, for the doctrine, under its thin camouflage of conformism, is essentially incompatible with the materialism of the classics. Yet it cannot be subjected to a frontal attack so long as Lenin's "philosophical legacy" is praised sky-high, unless it can be proved to be scientifically above suspicion, and even then this position of the ideologists would not be particularly enviable. The doctrine therefore officially still stands as one of the cornerstones of Soviet philosophy of physics, while the philosophic or metaphysical problems which it has thrown up have been left hanging in the air.

What are Aleksandrov's "bodies" which have an absolute existence in a four-dimensional continuum from which they project themselves variously or

are variously projected into differentiated space and time (again one is reminded of Whitehead with his "objects" which "ingress" themselves into space and time)? And what has Aleksandrov to offer in place of Eddington's perception plane or the undefined "hypersphere" of Terletsky upon which projection takes place? Are his "bodies" a materialist version of Kant's "thing in themselves," stretching out in time as well as space, of which we perceive only facets, sections in time, but the totality of which as complete entities can only be grasped by abstract reason? Is Marxist "matter" the sum total of these "bodies" linked to each other by the „radiation background" into a four-dimensional world, with space and time mere functions of the relative movement by means of which this "matter" reveals itself to our senses? Or is "matter" only the materialised and vitalized section which space and time, or their "absolute relationship," or time alone, as "active principles," fashion out of an inert four-dimensional matrix, as Kuznetsov suggested at the 1954 conference while trying to pin upon Fok and Aleksandrov an accusation of hyelo-morphism and "physical idealism?" Aleksandrov, as a leading mathematical physics and accomplished dialectical materialist, should answer these questions, for they properly belong to the philosophy of science; what is more, there is every indication that he would have included the answers in the thesis, or at least posed the questions, had his hands been completely free.

The Philosopher's Task. For philosophers proper this, however, would only be the starting point for an enquiry into the inner philosophical meaning of the doctrine, expressed not in terms of mathematical formulas and geometrical constructs but in terms of human existence, of human thoughts and, since we are among Marxists, of human action. Does the future exist, not merely in the pattern of the present, but really, physically if not "materially" exist, as possibilities or probabilities, hidden somewhere in the depth of the four-dimensional continuum, waiting to be converted into momentary realities in the world of our senses by Kozyrev's time as a flow of action or by some other agency? And does the past we have known persist in one form or another, outside human memories and "material" records of the present? Do we as active but strictly temporal agents shape our "four-dimensional" lives out of these physically existing possibilities into something immaterial but still physical and enduring forever in a "real" though "immaterial" past? Or are we, as J. W. Dunne thought, four-dimensional beings, able with a bit of training to move this way and that along the time axis of the continuum, constructing lives which are "out of this world", but unable to change the woof of the continuum itself?[48] Is that which is absolute for us merely relative from a higher viewpoint?

The writer is under no illusion that these questions can, or will, be answered in a hurry. They are, however, to his mind, implied in the treatises of Eddington and Jeans and even more so in the treatment of relativity in the works of

---

[48] J. W. Dunne, *Serial Universe*, London, 1934.

Whitehead and in the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine. Most positivists of all colours will undoubtedly dismiss them out of hand as pseudo-questions since they are not, by positivist definitions, subject to scientific verification. The least anti-metaphysist of them, Mr. Philip Frank, might go so far as to answer "we shall never know," making sure however, that we have not mistaken this for "we do not know." According to that fount of factual information for the English-speaking intelligentsia, *Chamber's Encyclopedia*, such philosophical delvings into the meaning of relativity as the attempts of Samuel Alexander and A. N. Whitehead to construct a world outlook on the basis of relativist concepts of space-time matter should be postponed "until Einstein's theories have been more closely and quietly incorporated into the general world outlook of intelligent persons."[49] But the philosophical spectre of Minkowski's world refuses to be exorcised so easily. In addition to Dunne, Whitehead and Aleksander, we have lately had contributions on the subject in the posthumously published work of du Chardin in connection with evolution and in that of Professor Karl Heim from the positions of transcendent relativism.[50]

This recurrent Western interest on the part of "idealists" would not of course in itself be considered in the USSR as a recommendation to promote the study of the *existential* side of relativity. But neither can positivistic arguments be used against it. The writer at any rate is firm in his belief that this side of the question will sooner or later crop up in private discussions in the USSR and, unless forcibly suppressed, at philosophical seminars, once the basic ideas of relativity, detached from positivist interpretations, are disseminated among scientists, students and members of the Soviet intelligentsia. For all of them seem to be hungry for something entirely new to take them out of the ideological *cul de sac* of Engels' *Naturwissenschaft* philosophy, into which they are once more being forced by the anti-revisionists after the brief respite of the post-Stalin thaw.

It also strikes the author that the real task facing the post-Stalin ideologists is not the warding off of jejune attempts to "dematerialize matter" and other "anti-materialist" sophistries, which can be dealt with by rewriting a couple of paragraphs in Soviet philosophical dictionaries, but the interpretation in the light of modern physics of the Hegelian categories of being, non-being, becoming, etc., all contained in the simple word *existence*.

For the nineteenth century materialist, whether "vulgar" or "dialectical," there was no such problem. With the Newtonian clock striking the cosmic seconds, conscious existence was for both the "scientific" recognition, which Engels portentiously elevated to the dignity of a *Widerspiegelung* theory, first, of the brute facts of the daily life around us, and then of the atoms, the elements, the earth, the sun, the planets, the stars in their courses, all floating in the infinity of a three-dimensional ocean of ether, all held together by

[49] Relativity," *Chamber's Encyclopedia*, London 1950.
[50] Karl Heim, *The Transformation of the Scientific View*, New York, 1953, pp. 86—95.

instantaneously acting forces and all changing endlessly in time. Only the momentary present was "materially" real and this composed the totality of the universe. Outside this moment there was literally nothing. The past and future were contained in the pattern of the now and had no other meaning; the real moreover in the now was not only "material," it was atomic and therefore palpable or at least perceptible via our senses. This was the view of Democritus and Lucrecius Carr whom Marx and Engels so much admired. The creators of dialectical materialism animated or rather re-animated this atomic world with internal, "dialectical," objective, contradictions and let it be governed by dialectical laws whose origin was left unexplained. Further they could not and did not go, nor did Lenin go much further in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, even though he did his best to widen the framework of dialectical materialist physics by various devices including the concepts of the advance of scientific knowledge as an infinite approach to absolute truth via the relative. By the turn of the century the "atomistic" view of the physical world was no longer compatible with the findings of physics and the problem of existence became acute for any clear-thinking materialist. There is no doubt that this bothered Lenin. It is in fact a reasonable supposition that, had it not been for the necessity of fighting revolutionary defeatism and revisionism, he would as early as 1908—09 have approached the basic problem of philosophy in a very different spirit, as he did later in his *Philosophical Notebooks*, regardless of what Engels had said or not said about it.[51]

For Stalin, either the problem did not exist or he deliberately suppressed it. In the shelter of the *Short Course* version of dialectical materialism as outlined in his *Short Course of the History of the Communist Party of Bolsheviks*, surrounded by a thicket of "objective contradictions" and dialectical verbiage which could be relied upon to smother any uncomfortable question, the dialecticians felt safe. They are no longer safe now. They must come out into the open and address themselves seriously to the philosophic solution of such problems as that of the relativity of Times with a capital "T," unless of course they are prepared to follow the advice of *Chamber's Encyylopedia* and wait for the facts and theories to be digested by "intelligent persons" in the ordinary commerce of life. To do so, however, would be tantamount to a retreat from a major tenet of Soviet Marxism, namely, that dialectical materialism must lead social evolution in all its forms, including the advance of science, and not follow it — a surrender, in fact, to positivism. They could of course fall back upon the last ditch defence of orthodoxy by proclaiming that all true scientists are "natural" dialectical materialists; but they would soon find, in fact, they should know already, that the philosophy of Soviet scientists, if it is not positivistic, is of a brand which has little or nothing to do with the materialism of Engels, or of Lenin in his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* period.

---

[51] C. Olgin, "Physics and Dialectical Materialism," *Bulletin*, Munich, No. 5, 1960, pp. 4-6.

For establishing this truth we do not have to go to Western critics of Soviet philosophy. The journal *Voprosy filosofii*, anti-revisionism notwithstanding, has, since the Twentieth Party Congress, printed enough articles by Soviet and satellite scientists of note to show that most of them have little respect for Engels' *Naturwissenschaft* philosophy which Lenin did his best to defend in *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and even less for those who are clutching at this philosophy as a drowning man would clutch at a straw.

This new philosophy has been called "objective idealism" by Stalinist ideologists. The scientists, backed by a few ideologists, assert that it is dialectical materialism rebuilt on the foundations of "militant materialism." To the writer it seems that it could be best described as a twentieth century version of the atheistic Hegelianism which pushed its roots deep into the thoughts of the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligentsia and aristocracy without any help from either the Founding Fathers of Marxism or Lenin.

It is a philosophy singularly appropriate to a modern technocracy and as such possibly a greater menace to the Party than was positivism.

Postscript

At the moment when the writer of this article was preparing, with a sigh of relief, to hand over his copy to the editor, this Institute came into possession of the book *Filosofskii problemy sovremennogo estesvoznaniya*,[52] the verbatim report (published with a delay of some 18 months) of the 1958 conference of Soviet and Communist bloc scientists and philosophers at which, it will be recalled, the Fok-Aleksandrov thesis was first officially presented. A fairly detailed review of the main papers and criticisms, including some material on Aleksandrov's thesis, excluded from the issues of *Voprosy filosofii* dealing with this question, upon which the present article was based, was published in the January issue of the Institute's *Bulletin*. Here it will be pertinent to note that the conference, and particularly the discussion of Aleksandrov's thesis and Fok's own paper on Quantum Mechanics gave occasion to an open clash between the anti-revisionists, led by the Stalinist dialectician Mitin (purged in 1955-1956 from the editorial board of *Voprosy filosofii* but recently re-instated as chief editor) and the progressives among philosophers as well as scientists. The split among the ideologists is quite clear — a split not on a minor point concerning this or that isolated pronouncement of the Founding Fathers or Lenin but on the very meaning to be attached to Marxist definition of Matter and Materialism.

---

[52] *Filosofskie problemy sovremennogo estesvozaniya*, (Philosophical Problems of Contemporary Natural Science), Moscow, 1959.

Thus, Ovchinnikov, prominent Moscow dialectician and recognized post-Stalin authority on the philosophical (or shall we say Dialectical Materialist) aspect of physics, attacked Aleksandrov for the latent "idealism" inherent in the Fok-Aleksandrov doctrine,[53] while his fellow dialectician, Omelianovsky, of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, defending Fok against charges of Positivism, accused the anti-revisionists of completely misunderstanding the meaning of Lenin's (and by definition Marx's) "Materialism."[54] It is further interesting to note that Ovchinnikov's attack was, though indirectly, seconded by quite a few scientists present, including the official critic of the thesis, M. F. Shirokov, prominent theoretical physicist of the Moscow University.

The most surprising feature of Shirokov's attack, which was at least as vicious as Ovchinnikov's was the fact that he did not draw his arguments from the arsenal of Engels' pronouncements on the nature of the universe or even from Lenin's works. Shirokov in fact roundly declared that Aleksandrov, with insufficient experimental data in hand, had, unjustifiably, tried to discredit Einstein's views on the physical meaning of Special Relativity and on the overriding validity of the General Theory, views which, according to Shirokov, were shared by himself as well as by the great majority of Soviet scientists.[55] Since it is quite certain that Shirokov's criticism of the thesis must have been vetted by the organizers of the conference, one can only conclude that the powers that be were driven to accept mild positivism or even philosophical relativism as an undesirable but indispensable ally in order to fight off the greater menace to orthodox materialism which the doctrine of absolute space-time relationship carries within itself — a precursor in fact of the manner in which the Kozyrev theory of time was attacked by the orthodox a year later under the cover of purely scientific criticism.

The author is pleased to note that one of his predictions at least has been conclusively substantiated. As a decided enemy of Stalin's materialism and an amateur lover of the philosophy of science he is also pleased to note that, anti-revisionism notwithstanding, such dialecticians as Omelianovsky are taking sides with Fok and Aleksandrov. He is even more pleased, however, to have read in a recent issue of the Leningrad magazine *Neva* a long and well-informed article by one of the leading popularisers of Soviet science, Vladimir Smirnov, vindicating Kozyrev against those who have attempted to suppress every idea or theory tainted with "temporalisation" of the material world.[56] The fact that the article speaks with enthusiasm of Tsiolkovsky, of the eternal youth

---

[53] M. E. Ovchinnikov in *Filosofskie problemy sovremennogo estesvoznaniya*, Moscow, 1959.
[54] M. E. Omilyanovsky in *Filosofskie problemy sovremennogo estesvoznaniya*, Moscow, 1959.
[55] M. F. Shirokov in *Filosofskie problemy sovremennogo estesvoznaniya*, Moscow, 1959.
[56] Vladimir Smirnov, "The Theory of Professor Kozyrev: A Scientific Controversy," *Neva*, Leningrad, No. 7, 1960.

of the universe, of Soviet science as an "unfettered Prometheus learning to control and transform the world," is a further confirmation of the author's main thesis, that "intelligent persons" in the USSR are hungry for something new, for something even slightly mad, to use Blokhintsev's words. Some scientists and ideologists are all for feeding them this divine madness, some are not. Which side will the Party — or rather, those who rule it — take? Will they encourage or at any rate condone the glorification of science and technology detached from utilitarianism, the philosophic moving spring — the essence of Lenin's philosophical legacy, atheistic Hegelianism — elevating them to a position previously occupied by religion? Or will they, following the advice of anti-revisionists and Stalinists like Mitin, revert to the flat, down-to-earth (nowadays in the literal sense) materialism of Stalin's so-called philosophy and quietly re-inter Lenin's philosophical legacy?

If they adopt the first course, they run the risk not only of rearing the most unmaterialistic (in the Western sense) mysticism, but also of making the Party, or at any rate, the "apparatus" into mere executors of the will of technocrats and of giving the Academy of Sciences of the USSR with its Institute of Philosophy the status of an established church. If they adopt the second course, they will undoubtedly re-create, or rather perpetuate, the ideological void, with all its disastrous concomitants enumerated and openly denounced at the Twentieth Party Congress.

Which of these two courses presents the greater threat to the free world? It has always been assumed that in Stalin's USSR we had faced the worst, but we may yet have an unpleasant surprise. Meanwhile, it is a consolation to know that the theoreticians at the back of the Khrushchev administration are afraid to take the plunge and are trying to sit on two stools — an uncomfortable position to adopt at the best of times.

Soviet Views on the 1960 World Historical Congress

PANAS FEDENKO

One of the most important recurrent events in the field of historical studies is the International Congress of Historical Sciences held once each five years. These congresses are of particular interest to students of the Soviet Union as they provide a reflection of the Soviet attitude to scientific research and in particular of the invariable Soviet attempt to make political use of international meetings of this kind. This attempt is reflected in the papers and discussions at the 1960 Congress, held August 21—28, 1960, in Stockholm, and need not be reviewed here. A further reflection is to be found in reports and comments on the Congress in the Soviet press. The Congress was duly reported in the press of various countries, but, for some unknown reason, was for a long time passed over in silence by the Soviet press, including the main Moscow newspapers, *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. It was not until November and December 1960 that articles about it appeared in leading Soviet journals. The theoretical and political organ of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, *Kommunist*, November 1960, No. 17, contained an article by A. Berezkin and K. Kuznetsova about the Congress, entitled "History and the Contemporary Conflict of Ideologies" and written in the polemical propaganda style characteristic of this journal.

The *Journal of History* of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, published in Kiev, November—December 1960, No. 6, contained a brief paragraph on the Congress, giving the names of some of the Congress participants from the USSR and the titles of papers presented by Soviet scholars, and asserted that "the Congress demonstrated the further strengthening of the positions of Marxism in the field of history in comparison with the previous Congress in Rome in 1955."

Finally, in its December 1960 issue, the monthly journal of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, *Voprosy istorii*, carried an important article on the Stockholm Congress. This article was "based on information provided by members of the Soviet delegation to the Stockholm Congress of Historical Sciences and on materials for discussion of the results of its work at a meeting of the Department of Historical Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR." The article must accordingly be regarded as the official report of the Soviet delegation presented for discussion by the Department of Historical Sciences of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and edited in accordance with Party directives. Evidence that the Soviet delegation had been given definite political directives by USSR government organs is provided in an article published in

Voprosy istorii, August 1960, on the eve of the Stockholm Congress, which states: "Historical science was and remains the arena of a sharp ideological struggle: it was and remains a class, Party science." Further on the same article declares that "the struggle against bourgeois ideology is the primary task of our historians." It is true that the article contains the statement that the Party nature of Soviet historical science "does not signify a nihilistic attitude to all bourgeois historiography," and that it is useful "to support an international link with honest bourgeois historians." However, the general rule for historical science in the USSR still holds, that it must be of a "class" and "Party" character.

The *Voprosy istorii* article of December 1960 reported on the general tone of the Congress as follows:

> At the Congress, which became the arena of a sharp ideological struggle, two diametrically opposed ideas came into conflict: on the one side were scholars conducting their research on the basis of the theoretical and methodological principles of Marxism-Leninism and on the other side representatives of idealistic trends. The struggle between these two trends permeated all the activities of the Congress. It is significant that the representatives of Marxist-Leninist historiography, supported by the successes of progressive science, occupied an active, aggressive position. This was an indication that historiography with Marxism-Leninism as a methodological basis is now becoming the main trend in world historical science.

In their efforts to carry out the mission given them by the Communist leadership, the historians from the USSR and other countries of the Soviet bloc lost no opportunity to advance their "class" and "Party" views. It should perhaps be noted at this point that the attempts of the Soviet historians to exploit the historical meetings for political purposes did not meet with an open opposition as might have been expected from scholars from other areas, who for the most part simply ignored their aggressive outbursts. It should also be noted that at the Stockholm Congress and in the Commissions preceding it, exceptionally great political fanaticism was displayed by the delegates from East Germany. In their speeches they invariably emphasised the superiority of the type of methodology which in the countries of the Soviet bloc is termed "Marxism-Leninism" and spoke of the bankruptcy" of "bourgeois science." Since the speeches of the Communist historians from East Germany were mainly directed against historians in West Germany, the West German historians were forced to defend themselves, and the resulting discussions became on several occasions quite heated. Political overtones also made themselves heard in discussions between emigre historians from Soviet-bloc countries and proponents of Communist Party "science," both in the Congress proper and during meetings of commissions held at the same time.

It was perhaps too much to expect that those who reported on the Congress would provide an objective account of its activities. The point from which they

viewed it appears in a statement in the December 1960 *Voprosy istorii*, to the effect that: "Life and practice show convincingly that the Marxist-Leninist method, which is the only correct method of historical research, engenders the creative thought of the historical researcher, enriches it and reveals to the scholar vast possibilities of genuinely scientific research leading to broad and bold conclusions which advance science." Historians who do not acknowledge Party science, the article continues, are under a definite handicap: "The ideological conviction of the Marxist historians is radically opposed to the methodological helplessness of the representatives of bourgeois historical science with its scepticism and pessimism, which permeated the reports of the bourgeois scholars." The account of the Congress concluded as follows: "As a whole, the Stockholm International Congress of Historians demonstrated the huge successes of our Communist ideology with clarity and persuasiveness. It constituted further evidence of the growth and successful development of Marxist-Leninist historical science both in the Soviet Union and beyond its boundaries."

These quotations from the leading organ of historical science in the USSR again indicate the nature of the task assigned to the Soviet historians attending the Stockholm Congress and of the achievements which they had to be able to report on their return to the USSR. They account for the "tremendous activity of the Marxist historians, especially of the scholars from the countries of the socialist camp," described in the account of the Concress given in the same article. And in fact these scholars had worked as a unified group under their political leaders and had frequently disrupted proceedings in order to prevent the audience from listening to lecturers who disagreed with the theses of Party science.

To return to the Congress itself, the historians from the Soviet bloc exhibited their intolerance even at the meeting of the International Commission on Slavic Studies held in Uppsala, August 17—20, just before the main meetings. For example, during a lecture by Johann Weidlein from West Germany on the expulsion of Germans from Hungary after the Second World War, the historians from the Soviet bloc shouted "Fascist!," stamped their feet, banged on the tables with their fists and stopped Weidlein from completing his lecture. Weidlein's objection that he had not been a member of the Fascist movement was drowned in the noise made by the delegates from the Soviet bloc, several of whom left the hall in protest. The article on the Stockholm Congress published in the December 1960 *Voprosy istorii* reports that Weidlein "propagated revanchist ideas. The speech of the last Hitlerite spawn so upset those present in the hall that, on the demand of the majority of participants in the meeting, he had to cease speaking and the text of his lecture was excluded from the programme."

The authors of the article accuse delegates from other areas of using the type of tactics of which the Soviet bloc historians were themselves guilty:

> However, the work of the commission on the history of Slavdom would have been immeasurably more fruitful if it had not been for attempts on the part of

certain Western historians hostile to the Soviet Union to turn the committee from a forum of co-operation in international research into a place for loud anti-Soviet speeches by offering the platform of the commission to persons having nothing in common with research, mainly various traitors who have betrayed the Soviet people and Motherland and have been taken into the service of certain Western research institutions."

It should be noted that the article on the Congress on occasion failed to name the scholars with whom the Soviet historians engaged in arguments. For example, in speaking of a paper read at one of the commission meetings by a Ukrainian historian from the United States on "Kievan Rus and the Formation of the Three East Slavonic Nations," there was no mention of the name of the lecturer and no summary of his paper, but the episode was dismissed with the remark that "this lecture, constituting crude propaganda for Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism, was evidence of the author's complete ignorance of research methods."

One of the interesting papers which should have been reported on at length but was apparently referred to only by inference was that by Erwin Hölzle from West Germany on "The Problem of War in the Russian Revolution of 1917", delivered on August 18 in Uppsala. During the discussion attention was called to documents found in the archives of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs and removed to London after the Second World War, which confirmed the long-existing suspicion that large-scale financial aid was given to Lenin's party by German government circles during the First World War in the belief that a Bolshevik government would conclude a separate peace with the Central Powers. The considerable sums put at the disposal of the Bolshevik Party "through various channels" were intended for propaganda directed towards an immediate cessation of the war.[1] The Soviet bloc historians participating in the meeting of the International Commission on Slavic Studies raised no objection to Hölzle's paper itself, but interrupted a lecture by Professor George Katkov of Oxford University, England, who at a section meeting on August 24 also referred to the fact that Bolshevik Party leaders had received funds from German agents during the First World War. In the face of Soviet bloc protests, the chairman of the meeting refused to permit Katkov to continue. Professor I. I. Mints, a member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, speaking on behalf of the Soviet delegation, called Katkov's statement a filthy fabrication and finished with the Spanish Civil War slogan: "They shall not pass!"

One of the complaints of the article was directed at the composition of the International Commission on Slavic Studies, regarding which it stated that only five members of the Commission, four from the USSR and one from Czechoslovakia, were genuine representatives of the Slavonic peoples. It also accused the leaders of the Commission of "lack of scientific method." "The near future," it said,

---

[1] See *International Affairs*, London, April 1956.

"should show to what extent the persons directing the work of the Commission are actually striving to create in it a genuine scientific atmosphere and to make it an international centre co-ordinating the study of the history of Slavdom." This dissatisfaction was probably aroused by the fact that a number of non-Communist historians and émigrés from Soviet bloc countries participated in the Commission conference. The article also asserted, without giving details, that "some other reports read at the Commission conference do not possess and cannot possess any scientific value in so far as their authors have nothing in common with science." In the same vein, an article by A. Berezkin and I. Kuznetsova in *Kommunist*, No. 17, 1960, citing the views of the eminent Polish émigré historian, Oscar Halecki, on periodization in history merely refers to him as "a certain Halecki."

At the Stockholm Congress the program was conducted in five sections. In each section the Soviet historians made some attempt to conduct an "ideological offensive." One such attempt which led to prolonged comment in the reports on the Congress published in the Soviet press was the paper by Academician E. M. Zhukov on periodization in world history, in which he defended as indisputable the well-known Marxist thesis of the development of mankind from a primitive classless society through slave-owning and feudal periods to capitalism and socialism. He defined the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 as the border between "capitalism" and "socialism" and maintained that the role of a dictatorial party is an essential element in the building of socialism. He asserted that after the seizure of power by the Bolshevik Party in Russia in November 1917, "the masses became sovereign rulers of their own destiny." (It appears to have escaped his attention that in the USSR and other countries of the Soviet bloc, the masses are limited to carrying out the orders of the ruling party.) According to Zhukov, the duty of "the people — the main creator of history," under a totalitarian regime is uncomplainingly to fulfil the plans of the ruling party which calls itself the vanguard of the proletariat, and to express enthusiasm for the decisions of the Party leadership. Historians from non-Soviet countries pointed to the self-contradiction in the Communist view of the course of historical development involved in the assumption that the dialectical process must come to an end with Communism. Surely, they remarked, the social system created by the Communists in various countries of Europe and Asia must in accordance with the dialectic also change rather than remain the final structure of world history. (In private conversation, one of the Soviet bloc historians asked with a sigh: "But how much longer must one wait?" This question was asked by a man who, in open discussion at the Congress, had vehemently defended the standpoint of Party science forced upon the historians in the countries of the Soviet bloc.)

In connection with Zhukov's paper, attention should be drawn to the dissatisfaction expressed by the December 1960 article regarding the independent points of view expressed by the historians from Yugoslavia. For example, Pro-

fessor Branislav Djurdjev from Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, who took part in the discussion on Zhukov's paper, expressed the opinion that it is impossible to draw a sharp line between capitalism and socialism since the elements of socialism are already taking shape within capitalist society itself. Although this idea is encountered in the work of Marx, e.g., in his *Critique of Political Economy* and in writings by Engels, both of whom regarded capitalist development as a prerequisite for transition to socialism, the *Voprosy istorii* article on the Congress accused Djurdjev of revisionism.

At the Congress itself the Soviet bloc historians who participated in the discussion of Zhukov's paper zealously defended the standpoint of Marxism-Leninism and frequently deviated from the academic tone customary at conferences of this kind. In the discussion on Zhukov's paper, a historian from East Germany asked a West German critic of the paper why he had changed the views which he had held under Hitler's regime. The chairman of the meeting commented that the Communist historians from East Germany should recall their own behaviour in 1939—41 when Stalin and Hitler had been allies and these historians had not attacked the Nazi dictatorship in Germany.

The authors of the article on the Congress describe its activities in only two colours — black and white. All the Communist or pro-Communist participants are described in favourable tones, while any disagreement with Party science is categorically condemned as an example of "reactionary method in historical science." For example, Professor Erich Rothacker from West Germany asserted in his paper on the influence of philosophy on history that scholars engaged in historical research depend on definite types of thinking in their choice of material and its evaluation. Among other things he pointed to the Messianism noticeable in the teaching of Marx and his followers, who ascribe to the proletariat as a class a special role in world history as liberators. He observed that for Marx the process of world history was similar to that depicted in the Bible except that it was directed towards the establishment of a Kingdom of God not in heaven but on earth.

In the world outlook of Marx, the proletariat, he added, plays the role of a chosen people whose victory is bound to bring universal well-being. Rothacker's description, which is by no means novel, is characterized in the article about the Congress as "a malicious statement by Rothacker about Karl Marx."

The theory of historical development supported by the Soviet adherents of Party science is obligatory for researchers examining any historical processes and events and they are not allowed to deviate from it. In a paper on "The Problem of Generalisation in History," delivered at the Congress, Professor Louis Gottschalk of the University of Chicago placed a high evaluation on the work of the eminent German sociologist Max Weber as a guide to the interpretation of historical processes. Since Weber was not a supporter of historical materialism, the article on the Congress comments that "the views of the Neo-

Kantian M. Weber serve the cause of the subjective idealist reactionary method in historical science." In the same way, Soviet historians criticised other papers by Western scholars, including that of Professor Dragomir Stojcevic of Yugoslavia, who questioned the Communist view on the role, development and disappearance of slavery in the ancient world. Stojcevic asserted that the slave rebellions in the ancient world did not lead to the elimination of slavery, even during the temporary victory of a slave movement: when the victorious slaves had become free they re-introduced the slave-owning system and became the masters themselves. Without citing the arguments given in the papers on the history of slavery, the article refers to those who disagreed with the standpoint of Party science as "representatives of bourgeois historiography" and reports that the scholars of the USSR and the countries of People's Democracy "outlined the Marxist-Leninist theory of the history of slave-owning society and noted the decisive role of the class struggle in the development of this society and in the transition from slavery to the status of *coloni*." The propaganda term "bourgeois historiography" is repeated endlessly. The authors commend Professor Michael Roberts of the Queens University, Belfast, Ireland, who analysed the motives behind Oliver Cromwell's Baltic policy, because "he rejected the assertion of bourgeois scholars that in his policy Cromwell was guided by personal and religious motives."

In the lectures and discussions at the Congress the historians from the countries of the Soviet bloc, in accordance with current Soviet policy, defended the expansionist activities of the Moscow state in past centuries. Characteristic papers were those by Professor Wladyslaw Czaplinski of Poland and Professor B. F. Porshnev of the University of Moscow. In his paper Czaplinski described the friendly relations between the Moscow state and Poland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in regard to the Andrusovo peace treaty between these states in 1667 commented that "this served as a basis for temporary cooperation between Warsaw and Moscow." As is known, this treaty was based on a division of the Ukrainian Cossack Republic between Poland and the Moscow state. The article on the Congress maintained that the "bourgeois historians" made use of Czaplinski's paper "for attacks on Russian policy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" and added that the "Marxist historians" who spoke during the discussion of the paper "rejected the tendentious formulation of the question made by some speakers and showed that their views could be explained by their political antipathies."

An entirely different yardstick is applied by the authors of the article in evaluating the history of British imperialism. In connection with the paper by Professor Nicholas Mansergh of Cambridge University, who dealt with British policy in the twentieth century, when many peoples of the British Empire were granted independence, the article stated that "in present conditions of the collapse of the colonial system of imperialism the bourgeois historians are

presenting . . . arguments for imperialist propaganda." From the standpoint of Party science, even if the British relinquish their colonies, they nevertheless remain imperialists.

There are a number of curious inconsistencies in connection with Porshnev's paper on "The Political Relations of Western and Eastern Europe in the Epoch of the Thirty Years' War." This paper reflected trends characteristic of Soviet Party science in the Stalin and the post-Stalin periods. Porshnev tried to inflate the significance of the role of the Moscow state in European affairs during the Thirty Years' War. Others argued that the Moscow state weakened by civil war and invasions during the Time of Troubles at the beginning of the seventeenth century, could not play a large role in European affairs. However, the article takes offence at such criticisms of Porshnev's paper and even attacks some of the participants in the discussion for having spoken of the backwardness of the Moscow state in comparison with the countries of Western Europe at that time. It accuses Porshnev's critics of attempting "by every means to depreciate the cultural level of Russian society during the period under examination."

Another paper which was commented upon in the Soviet report of the Congress was one read in the section on current history by the Belgian historian Henri Haag on the policy of the German Social Democratic Party during the First World War in which he declared that this policy was conditioned by the existence of strong patriotism on the part of the great majority of the German workers. At the Congress itself the historians from the Soviet bloc had attacked his views, the article on the Congress denies that the German workers were patriotic during the First World War and accuses Haag of having falsified the facts.

The subject of the paper by the Soviet historian Dr. N. I. Shatagin was closely allied to that of Haag. In his survey of the policy of the Russian Bolsheviks during the First World War, Shatagin asserted that Lenin was opposed to war and had always struggled for peace. Shatagin accused the Social Democrats, whom he called socialist chauvinists, of having betrayed the interests of the proletariat because the Social Democrats of different countries had not accepted Lenin's slogan: "Transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war." He argued that Lenin's slogan "All power to the soviets," was also proof of Lenin's peaceful intentions, as it shows that he was striving for a "peaceful development of the revolution."

In commenting on Shatagin's assertion that Lenin was a supporter of international peace, one of the participants in the discussion cited a letter from Lenin to Maxim Gorky in 1912 in which Lenin expressed the hope that Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire would enter the Balkan war, but feared that "Francis (Emperor Francis Joseph) and Nikolashka (Emperor Nicholas II) will not give us this satisfaction."[2]

---

[2] See V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works), Moscow, 3rd ed., XII, p. 130.

Shatagin made no reply to this and other criticism. His paper itself was not published in the *Voprosy istorii* report on the Congress nor was there any comment on it except that it was possibly in regard to Shatagin that the article declared, immediately following a notice of his remarks: "In this section there were attempts by reactionary elements extremely hostile to the Soviet Union to use the platform of the Congress for slanderous attacks upon Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet government. As usual, use was made for this purpose of the dregs of the emigration discarded beyond the frontiers of the Soviet country by the peoples of the USSR and coming to the surface in the role of 'professors' from Munich and American universities."

The assertion of the authors of the article in *Voprosy istorii* that "as a rule the discussions at the Congress were of a business-like character" is not entirely in accordance with the facts. The discussions were scientific and business-like only when the Soviet bloc historians abstained from the political propaganda required of them by the Party.

Some historians from the USSR and the Soviet bloc read interesting papers giving new factual material and throwing light on various problems, but there is no doubt that the political propaganda and polemics which marked most of their statements lowered the scholarly level of the work of the Congress.

The article also claims that the Congress "demonstrated with great clarity and cogency the immense victories of our Communist ideology." While it is true that after the Second World War the Communist ideology spread to various countries of Europe and Asia, "Party science" and the Communist ideology were by no means highly victorious at the Stockholm Congress. If many scholars from the free countries abstained from criticism of the arguments presented by the Soviet bloc historians, it was because of their unwillingness to reply to political propaganda and in addition subject themselves to having their views called fascist, reactionary, and revanchist. Leaving aside the question as to whether it was right or wrong to abstain from discussion with the Soviet bloc historians, the statement in the article in *Voprosy istorii* that the Communist ideology "is now becoming the main trend in world historical science" does not accord with the facts. "Party science" predominates only where the Communist Parties are in power, and even the real accomplishments of historical research in the countries of the Soviet bloc lose much of their value on account of the influence of Party ideology imposed on researchers from above.

In closing, a few words should be said about the composition of the delegation from the USSR. The overwhelming majority of these scholars were Russians. The only Ukrainian historian among the 43 delegates from the USSR was Professor V. A. Holobutsky from Kiev, and there was only one Belorussian, I. S. Kravchenko, director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the Belorussian SSR. N. A. Mokhov, deputy director of the Moldavian branch of the Institute of History of the USSR, who is of Russian nationality,

was alone in representing Moldavian historical research. The sole participant from the Armenian SSR was B. N. Arakelian, while Georgian historical research was represented by G. A. Melikishvili and O. I. Gugueineshvili. His contribution consisted in accusing the Social Democratic government of the independent Georgian Republic of 1918—1921 of being an "oppressor of the Georgian people" and in commending as a "liberator" the Soviet Army which conquered Georgia in February 1921. From the three Baltic republics only one historian, Kh. A. Moora from Estonia, attended the Congress. Azerbaidzhan was represented by I. A. Gusseinov, Turkmenia by Ch. V. Batyrev and Kirghizia by B. D. Dzhamgurchinov.

The discrimination against the non-Russian peoples of the USSR which was evident in the composition of the Soviet delegation was still more obvious in the exhibition of historical literature which was held in Stockholm during the Congress. Of the satellites Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania displayed publications. *Mezhdunarodnaya kniga* (International Book) had a display of books published in the USSR, but none of these were in any of the languages of the many peoples of the Union other than Russian, except for the Ukrainian language monthly *Ukrainsky Istorichny zhurnal* (Ukrainian Historical Journal) published in Kiev.

The Tolstoy Jubilee in the USSR

I. N. BUSHMAN

According to figures published by the Soviet press on the occasion of the Tolstoy Jubilee Year, 1960, the total circulation of the works of L. N. Tolstoy in the Soviet Union amounts to 97,000,000 to 98,000,000 copies in Russian and 82 other languages of the peoples of the Soviet Union.[1] A comparison with corresponding figures published on the occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1957, which show a circulation of 77,400,000 indicates that during the three years prior to the Jubilee the circulation has increased by 20,000,000 copies. This is evidence of serious attempts on the part of Soviet publishing houses to prepare for the Jubilee. The crowning achievement of these efforts was the completion in 1958, after thirty years' work, of a complete edition in ninety volumes of the writings of Tolstoy. This edition had been planned in connection with the previous celebration — the centenary of his birth in 1928. This ninety-volume edition is the fullest edition of Tolstoy's works ever to be published. The twenty-volume edition of his works, the first volume of which was published in 1960, is also valuable and interesting. The exhaustive nature of the complete edition of Tolstoy's work made it hard to find fresh material for the Jubilee issues of Soviet periodicals. *Izvestia* of November 20, 1960, published letters from Tolstoy to various persons; on page 15 of *Ogonek*, No. 47, 1960, letters from Tolstoy to Edison were published.[2] The correspondence of Tolstoy with the Japanese writer Tokutoni Roka was included in the article by A. Shifman, "Lev Tolstoy and Tokutoni Roka."[3] These letters do not contribute any new material on Tolstoy's life.[4]

Soviet literary critics have shown great interest in the writings of Tolstoy. In the bibliography of literature about Tolstoy published during 1917-58, more than 6,000 books and articles entirely or partly dealing with his life and writings are listed.[5] Noting the "substantial achievements in the study of the biography and writings of Tolstoy," *Voprosy literatury* nevertheless complains of immense gaps in this field and places great hopes on the Jubilee Campaign: "The celebration of the Tolstoy Jubilee will be a review of the forces of scholarship of Soviet literary criticism. New research by scholars studying the writings of the great author will be published ... there is no doubt that the thorough

---

[1] See *Voprosy literatury*, Moscow, No. 11, 1960, p. 3 and *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, Moscow, November 19, 1960.

[2] *Yasnopolyansky sbornik* (Yasnaya Polyana Symposium), Tula, 1960, p. 162.

[3] *Voprosy literatury*, No. 11, 1960, pp. 60—73.

[4] See also *Voprosy literatury*, No. 11, 1960, pp. 74—93, and *Ogonek*, Moscow, No. 47, 1960, pp. 15—21.

[5] *Voprosy literatury*, No. 11, 1960, p. 13.

research on the artistic heritage of the writer will receive a fresh and mighty impetus."[6]

It is known that Tolstoy expressed a wish that there should be no ceremonial laying of wreaths on his grave. His basic attitude to jubilees is best reflected in his refusal of an invitation from P. Gnedich to participate in the celebration of the centenary of the birth of Pushkin. This attitude is confirmed by his comments in an unpublished letter to the editor of a newspaper on March 25, 1908, in which he recalled his refusal to accompany Turgenev to the unveiling of the Pushkin memorial in Moscow: "However high my estimation of the genius of Pushkin was (and is), I refused ... I could not do otherwise because at that time too, such celebrations appeared to me to be somewhat unnatural."[7]

A celebration meeting was held in the Bolshoi Theatre in Moscow on November 20, 1960. In the centre of the stage, which was decorated with flowers, a huge portrait of Tolstoy framed with laurel branches was erected. On the stage, together with members of the All-Union Committee for the Celebration of the Jubilee of L. N. Tolstoy and distinguished foreign guests headed by the artist Rockwell Kent, sat the author's grandsons, his secretary N. N. Gusev and his friend, the famous musician and teacher A. B. Goldenveizer. The Lenin Prize laureate L. M. Leonov, chairman of the All-Union Committee for the Celebration of the Jubilee of L. N. Tolstoy, delivered a speech in which he enthusiastically praised the genius of Tolstoy and carefully censured his outlook, linking comments on the impracticability of non-resistance to evil with remarks on the possibility of a new war. After the celebration meeting there was a literary and musical evening including the reading of extracts from the writings of Tolstoy, and the performance of scenes from his plays and various musical compositions of which he was particularly fond.

On the eve of the Jubilee a meeting was held at Yasnaya Polyana, the Tolstoy family estate, at which the Chairman of the Union of Writers of the RSFSR, L. Sobolev, made a speech followed by a silent procession to Tolstoy's grave on which wreaths were laid. A similar meeting was held outside the house where Tolstoy lived in Leningrad and a memorial plaque was placed upon it.

The Jubilee issues of Soviet newspapers contained portraits of Tolstoy. *Ogonek*, No. 47, 1960, contained a large number of reproductions of portraits of Tolstoy by famous artists and a number of reviews of performances of his plays and of films based on his works. During November 15-19, 1960, *Literaturnaya gazeta* published comments on the writings of Tolstoy by various eminent figures in art and politics in different parts of the world. The mint

---

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Sovetsky pisatel*, Moscow, 1958, p. 168.

issued a bronze medal for the Jubilee and a special series of postage stamps was also issued.

Besides the celebration meetings held in Moscow and in the big cities of the RSFSR, meetings also took place in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union. The newspapers in these republics contained stereotyped material on the occasion of Tolstoy's Jubilee: a big portrait of Tolstoy in the centre of the page, a general article about his life and writings (in many papers the same article) and possibly brief remarks about his visit to the district concerned such as Bashkiria, Georgia and Moldavia. A carpet with a portrait of Tolstoy was sent as a gift to the Union of Writers of the RSFSR from Ashkhabad and another portrait of him "skilfully made from sheepskin in different colours" was sent to Yasnaya Polyana from one of the Central Asian republics.

In surveying the Jubilee literature on the study and interpretation of Tolstoy, i.e., the books published during 1959-60 and the Jubilee issues of Soviet periodicals, it will be noted that the quality of the descriptions of the personality and life of Tolstoy is very uneven. It is known, for example, that Tolstoy's first attempt to abandon literature was connected with his enthusiasm for teaching: "I am not writing and I hope that I shall not, in spite of this fact be so busy that ... there will be no time to write to you. I will tell you what I am doing when these activities bear fruit," Tolstoy wrote to Druzhinin on December 20, 1859; a little later, in a letter to Chicherin, he wrote: "I am doing what is as natural to me as breathing."[8]

This latter statement of Tolstoy is absolutely sincere since his departure from literary activities during the period of his enthusiasm for teaching was not simply the whim of a writer of genius but the result of a conflict between two great talents each of which demanded the complete submission of the other. Tolstoy's talent as a teacher is evident from the brilliant practical results which he attained in school with his pupils in an extremely short time. Also the foundation of his genius as a teacher — his profound understanding of the psychology of children and young people — was manifested in his first literary works, *Childhood, Boyhood,* and *Youth.* If Tolstoy had not later become the author of *War and Peace* and *Anna Karenina,* it would have been possible to debate to this day whether the author of the autobiographical trilogy was a writer with great talent as a teacher or a teacher with great talent as a writer. Thus it is particularly important that Tolstoy's activities as a teacher should be taken into account in a survey of his literary work.

Nevertheless, the books of a general character about Tolstoy which were published by the central publishing houses before the Jubilee, i.e., during 1959-60, do not deal with Tolstoy's teaching activities. The only important Soviet journal to touch upon these activities was *Oktyabr,*[9] but only in so far

[8] N. N. Gusev, *Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoi. Materialy k biographii* (Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy. Material for a Biography), Moscow, 1957, p. 343.

[9] *Oktyabr,* No. 11, 1960, p. 196.

as they concerned his relations with the peasants. In the publications of *Uchpedgiz* (The State Publishing House of Educational and Pedagogic Literature) and the special journals and newspapers for teachers, Tolstoy's vocation as a teacher was pushed from the centre to the periphery. The only book entirely devoted to his teaching activities, published by *Uchpedgiz* in 1960,[10] dealt more with the historical, biographical and practical aspects of these activities than with his educational theories. The special periodical for teachers, *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, deals very superficially with Tolstoy's career as a teacher. In the issue of November 17, 1960, the director of the Yasnaya Polyana estate, A. Popovkin, described the lessons which Tolstoy gave and the walks he took with the peasant children. In the Jubilee issue of November 19, 1960, an article about Tolstoy as a teacher describes his activities as a member of the educational council of the Krapivinsky district, the method of instruction advocated by him, the practical teacher's seminars at the school at Yasnaya Polyana, his plans for the creation of two-year courses in teaching for the peasants, and teachers' congresses.

In the same issue of the *Uchitelskaya gazeta*, in an article entitled "The Meaning of Life, the Source of Happiness," V. Veikshan seeks a justification of the system of trade schools and polytechnical education in the ideas of Tolstoy. Nothing is said about the influence of Tolstoy's educational experiments on Soviet schools. *Sovetskaya pedagogika*[11] contains another article by V. Veikshan entitled "The Pedagogical Views of L. N. Tolstoy as Evaluated by Russian Educationalists in the Sixties and Seventies of the Nineteenth Century." Avoiding any independent evaluation of the views of Tolstoy, Veikshan confines himself to the observation that Tolstoy's ideas pleased neither the "progressive intelligentsia," which "criticised the political immaturity of his educational ideas" nor the "reactionaries" who "attacked his innovation." These assertions contradict the data cited by Gusev in his book *Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy. Material for a Biography.*[12] The statement that Tolstoy opposed the education of children on religious lines is also incorrect since, although he opposed the influence of the Church on schools, he was not against religious influence in principle. The article by V. A. Lebedev on "The Work of L. N. Tolstoy on an Alphabet and a Reading Book" is of interest.[13] Tolstoy's alphabet and reading books are frequently republished for Soviet children but without the religious stories. The only article which deals with the attempts to apply the educational ideas of Tolstoy in school is written by a Czech author[14] and concerns the experiments of Ferdinand Krkh and Frank Muzhik; it also

---

[10] V. L. Veikshan, *L N. Tolstoi — narodny uchitel* (L. N. Tolstoy — A People's Teacher), Moscow, 1960.
[11] *Sovetskaya pedagogika*, Moscow, No. 11, 1960, pp. 78—90.
[12] N. N. Gusev, *op. cit.*, pp. 505—566
[13] *Yasnopolyansky sbornik, op. cit.*,
[14] *Sovetskaya pedogogika*, No. 11, 1960, pp. 91—94.

contains references to the application of Tolstoy's educational ideas in a present-day school in Czechoslovakia.

The influence of Tolstoy's educational ideas on school reform plans in Tsarist Russia is not discussed at all. Emphasis is placed on the hostile attitude to the educational ideas of Tolstoy on the part of the government as a single monolithic whole while Gusev points out in his memoirs that the hostile attitude to Tolstoy's school and educational journal came exclusively from the Ministry of Internal Affairs while the attitude of the Ministry of Education to Yasnaya Polyana was quite favourable. A memorandum of the Ministry of Education on Tolstoy's school stated: "To regard the nature of children as the guiding principle in education ... to conduct school studies on the basis of experiment and observation, having established easy relations between pupils and teachers ... to free lessons from all coercion ... to make the school into a family ... what could be better, more desirable or more fruitful than this?"[15] The ministry considered Tolstoy's educational system to be impracticable only when the number of pupils was large, because Tolstoy selected the subjects for study in accordance with the taste of the pupils, rejected all forms of punishment and wished to reduce to a minimum all pressure and coercion. "Tolstoy based the education of peasant children on a free lively interest ... but did not develop the pupils and did not organize them on strict disciplinary lines" wrote N. N. Naumova.[16] This evaluation by a Soviet critic of Tolstoy's educational activities is considerably more severe than that of the Tsarist Ministry of Education.

In most cases Soviet researchers on Tolstoy's educational activities avoid independent evaluations and confine themselves to quotations from Chernyshevsky or Krupskaya. In the various articles the evaluation by Chernyshevsky of Tolstoy's educational theories is represented as both favourable and unfavourable. It is alleged that Tolstoy's criticism of Western European education after his visits to Germany, Switzerland and France with the aim of studying schools in Western Europe, went as far as a complete rejection of "bourgeois" teaching methods. The possible influence of the educational ideas of Tolstoy outside the boundaries of the "people's democracies," as for example on the American school system, is not discussed.

The position is still worse as far as Tolstoy's activities as a sociologist are concerned. The article by Veikshan about his educational activities deals superficially with his sociological teachings.[17] But as an independent research subject, these teachings have no place in the Jubilee programme. The journal *Kommunist* was indignant at the large amount of attention which Tolstoy's activities as a sociologist received at the international congress in commemoration

---

[15] N. N. Gusev, *op. cit.*.

[16] N. N. Naumova, *L. N. Tolstoi v shkole* (L. N. Tolstoy in School), Leningrad, 1959, pp. 55—57.

[17] *Sovetskaya pedagogika*, No. 11, 1960, pp. 78—90.

of Tolstoy held in Venice in June and July, 1960,[18], and the contents of the papers read at the congress were not brought to the attention of Soviet readers. Scattered references to Tolstoy's sociological teachings appear in articles dealing with his "ideology" as a whole, that is, his religious, philosophical and political convictions. An article by A. Shifman entitled "Lev Tolstoy — Critic of Bourgeois Science"[19] deals with these teachings with a little more detail but contains nothing new in comparison with Gusev's attempts to reduce the "social and political convictions" of Tolstoy to nine basic points arbitrarily chosen by Gusev himself from Tolstoy's articles on education.[20] Shifman uses Tolstoy's criticism of Malthusianism to conceal his critical attitude to Darwinism; he interprets Tolstoy's sceptical attitude towards science and civilization as scepticism only towards "bourgeois science" and "bourgeois civilization". Manipulating Tolstoy's concepts of "pseudo-science" and "genuine science," Shifman tries to prove that Tolstoy was correct in rejecting "bourgeois pseudo-science" and in believing in the victory of genuine science, but that he erred in his idealist concept of what constitutes genuine science; for Shifman genuine science is none other than scientific socialism leading to real progress and a genuine civilization. Shifman's conclusion is paradoxical: according to him Tolstoy was right in criticizing science from false idealist standpoints because the science which he criticized was "bourgeois."

In examining the philosophical views of Tolstoy, Soviet researchers usually note his "undervaluation" of the importance of Hegel, his initial enthusiasm for and his subsequent criticism of Schopenhauer's philosophy, and his disapproval of Nietzsche and "racialist" theories. The majority of Soviet authors avoid giving an independent evaluation of Tolstoy's philosophical views, shielding themselves behind some quotation from Lenin. Shifman's interpretation of Tolstoy's philosophy can be summarised as follows: an idealist world outlook with considerable elements of materialism, fatalism in the interpretation of the phenomena of social life, and relativism in questions of cognition.

A. Saburov mainly concerns himself with an analysis of Tolstoy's philosophy of history.[21] He emphasises that Tolstoy was the first person in Russia to advance the thesis of necessity in the historical process, that he understood fatalism as a temporarily necessary stage and believed in the possibility of comprehension of the laws of history. Saburov considers that a weak point in Tolstoy's philosophy of history is "a deliberate ignoring of the organisational principle in the historical process," since, according to Tolstoy, the "organiser" of one or another action cannot have any free will because the action is con-

---

[18] *Kommunist*, No. 16, 1960, pp. 96—97.

[19] *Tvorchestvo Tolstogo, sbornik statei* (The Work of Tolstoy. A symposium), Moscow, 1959, pp. 294—295.

[20] N. N. Gusev, *op. cit.*.

[21] A. A. Saburov, *Voina i mir L. N. Tolstogo, Problematika i poetika* (War and Peace by L. N. Tolstoy. Problems and Poetics), Moscow, 1959.

ditioned by events while the possessor of a free will is a small individual who cannot influence events.

Soviet researchers do not examine the religious convictions of Tolstoy in detail but simply refer to them as "the source of Tolstoy's philosophical errors." In examining various letters of Tolstoy on the scepticism of the peasants, Motyleva regards the religious aspect of Tolstoy's teachings not as a reflection of the ideology of the peasantry but as "insurmountable prejudices of his own class of gentry."[22] An interesting remark is that of S. Mashinsky to the effect that some of Tolstoy's views ceased to be reactionary after his death in the changed circumstances; for example, Tolstoy's concept of moral self-perfection which, in its religious sense was, according to Mashinsky, conservative, "deprived of its undercurrent of religious morality" in the Soviet era, has become "the expression of the noble strivings of Soviet man towards the perfection of his moral principles."[23]

When examining Tolstoy's political convictions, Soviet researchers try to stress the influence not only of Herzen's writings, which Tolstoy really valued, but also of Chernyshevsky's writings.[24] *Literaturnaya gazeta* emphasizes Tolstoy's enthusiasm for the ideas of Petrashevsky.[25]

Where there is no evidence in Tolstoy's writings of sympathies towards the democrats or the revolutionaries, the authors resort to indications of such sympathies in his life, as for example instances when he interceded on behalf of political prisoners.

The standard of those studies of Tolstoy which do not fall under the usual categories of „educationalist — sociologist — thinker — writer," is not high; they exploit Tolstoy's name for the narrow interests of some professional group,[26] or some political campaign. Many articles on Tolstoy's enthusiasm for Ukrainian literature which appeared in the Jubilee year 1960 are partly based on the coincidence of the Tolstoy Jubilee with the Festival of Ukrainian Art in Moscow. More often, however, they are full of current political propaganda such as the article by Shifman[27] which, in its description of the cultural links of Tolstoy with the Arab countries, tries not only to present him as "a fervent defender of the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America" but to justify Soviet interference in present developments in Africa. Tolstoy's pacifism is widely used for propaganda purposes but this does not prevent Soviet authors from denouncing this pacifism in other articles.

---

[22] *Oktyabr*, No. 11, 1960, p. 198.
[23] S. Mashinsky, *Zavety velikogo khudozhnika* (Legacy of the Great Artist), *Izvestia*, November 18, 1960.
[24] *Voprosy literatury*, No. 9, 1960, pp. 71—111.
[25] *Literaturnaya gazeta*, November 17, 1960.
[26] I. Linder, *Tolstoi i shakhmaty* (Tolstoy and Chess), Moscow, 1960.
[27] S. Mashinsky, *Zavety velikogo khudozhnika* (Legacy of the Great Artist), *Izvestia AN SSSR* (News of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), Moscow, XIX, No. 5, September-October 1960, pp. 389—398.

A biography of Tolstoy presents great difficulties for Soviet researchers. Motyleva writes bluntly that the question of a link between the life of Tolstoy and his writing is "not harmless in the ideological sense."[28] Soviet biographers of Tolstoy find it easiest to cope with the earliest period of his life. The lyrical biographical description by Savelev, "In the Fire of Sevastopol," can be read with interest and enjoyment.[29] Its modest aim is to remind the reader of some dates and only its conclusion is tainted with propaganda. However, the nearer the dates are to the turn of the century, the more the true picture of Tolstoy is distorted by the demands of propaganda. Meanwhile, the sage from Yasnaya Polyana interests the reader far more than the officer, teacher, or temporarily happy family man. The last ten years of Tolstoy's life are the most difficult for Soviet biographers: they can accept neither the husband and father who left his family, as described in the diaries of Sophia Andreevna, nor the majestic prophet and preacher of non-resistance, who emerges from Tolstoy's reminiscences. Meilakh protests against „icon-painting" of Tolstoy,[30] but his deeply ingrained idealised picture appears again and again not only on the pages of the new edition of Goldenveizer's reminiscences,[31] but in the reminiscences of his secretary, V. Bulgakov,[32] and the copyist of his papers, A. Less.[33]

A vivid human portrait of Tolstoy is given in a short fragment by a distant relative and great admirer, Ekaterina Yunge.[34] He is also well depicted in a simple story by V. Yan.[35] The notes of F. Perevoznikov[36] published as an illustration of Tolstoy's friendly relations with the revolutionary-minded proletarian youth produce an unfavourable impression on the impartial reader; the author, with obvious reluctance, describes the inner tragedy of the attempts of the advocate of non-resistance to find a common language with the revolutionary and shows how far removed were the ideas and writings of Tolstoy from the understanding of the revolutionary generation. All the material on Tolstoy published during the pre-Jubilee campaign contains nothing new in comparison with the account of his life and literary work compiled by Gusev, which was published in a second supplemented edition in 1958.

Among attempts to analyse the life of Tolstoy, the article by Motyleva consists only of a number of biographical details strung on the thread of her own opinions.[37] Much effort is wasted on an attempt to prove what has long

---

[28] *Oktyabr*, No. 11, 1960, p. 194.
[29] *Moskva*, Moscow, No. 11, 1960.
[30] B. Meilakh, *Ukhod i smert Lva Tolstogo* (The Departure and Death of Lev Tolstoy), *Novy mir*, Nos. 10 and 11, 1960.
[31] A. B. Goldenveizer, *Vblizi Tolstogo* (Near Tolstoy), 2nd ed., Moscow, 1959.
[32] *Ogonek*, Moscow, No. 47, 1960, pp. 14—15.
[33] *Moskva*, No. 11, 1960, pp. 206—207.
[34] E. Yunge, *Nezabyvaemoe* (The Unforgettable), *Ogonek*, No. 47, 1960.
[35] *Zvezda*, No. 10, 1960, pp. 208—210.
[36] *Moskva*, No. 11, 1960, pp. 200—205.
[37] *Oktyabr*, No. 11, 1960.

been known; for example, in the second half of the article, Motyleva concludes, on the basis of a number of facts, that during the course of his life Tolstoy had a wide circle of interests outside literature. A characteristic approach of Soviet literary critics to facts about Tolstoy's life can be found in Lomunov's preface to the new second edition of Goldenveizer's reminiscences. Lomunov reproaches Goldenveizer for the "disproportion and unevenness" of his material, because according to Lomunov he "indiscriminately" cites what is "important," that is, the statements of Tolstoy on politics and literature together with what is "unimportant," the family scenes in Yasnaya Polyana. However, in the very next paragraph Lomunov states that the "indiscriminate use" of material makes the portrait of the writer vivid and the book interesting. In the remainder of the preface he gives quotations and rehashes of extracts from the book intermingled with brief commentaries and slogans.

Usually, Tolstoy's family drama is not analysed in detail by Soviet biographers. Even the article by Meilakh, "The Departure and Death of Lev Tolstoy"[38] is not an exception to this rule, since, in referring to the misunderstanding between Tolstoy and his wife, he does not try to condemn either of them but mentions only the differences of outlook and character and emphasises that he does not consider Sofia Andreevna responsible for Tolstoy's leaving home. Meilakh is more interested in the aims than in the reasons for Tolstoy's departure from Yasnaya Polyana. He dismisses both the supposition that Tolstoy left home in order to die and the suggestion that Tolstoy intended to become reconciled to the Church in the Optina Pustyn (the famous monastery in central Russia); he also rejects the hypothesis that Tolstoy intended to lead the life of a wandering hermit estranged from the Church. Meilakh considers that Tolstoy left Yasnaya Polyana not to die but to start a new life, and that his departure from home was at the same time an act of transition from the ideas of non-resistance to those of revolution. It has evidently not occurred to Meilakh that Tolstoy's reputation would inevitably suffer if in his eighty-third year he had naively tried to start a new life. Thus his article, which begins with a protest against "icon-painting" of Tolstoy, ends with an attempt to paint a political poster.

In research on the purely literary aspect of Tolstoy's writings attention has been devoted mainly to individual works, a field in which nothing basically new can be expected. A book by L. Bilinkis[39] is entirely devoted to an analysis of separate works of Tolstoy; it examines the trilogy, the *Tales of Sevastopol*, *The Cossacks*, *War and Peace*, *Anna Karenina*, and *Resurrection*. The chapter dealing with the trilogy merits most attention not because of any new ideas but on account of its conscientious and knowledgeable treatment of the subject.[40]

---

[38] *Novy mir*, Nos. 10 and 11, 1960.

[39] L. Bilinkis, *Tvorchestvo Tolstogo* (The Work of Tolstoy), *Sovetsky pisatel*, Leningrad, 1959.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 5—60.

As a subject for discussion *War and Peace* occupies first place among Tolstoy's writings. The most detailed study is that in Saburov's book, which treats Tolstoy as the reformer of almost all the main genres of Russian prose and regards *War and Peace* as a new and unique type of novel which is a "departure from the European form."

The novel which occupies second place among those most discussed is *Resurrection* which receives the most detailed examination in a book by V. Zhdanov.[41] Zhdanov maintains that *Resurrection* was planned as the story of the moral self-perfection of the hero but turned out to be that of the moral self-perfection of the heroine. This opinion is also expressed in the chapters about *Resurrection* in the book by Bilinkis.[42] An interesting article by Gusev published in the journal of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR regards Tolstoy's unfinished novel *The Decembrists* not only as a starting-point for the writing of *War and Peace* but as a novel on an independent subject to which Tolstoy returned after he had written his epic. Bilinkis devotes two chapters of his book to *Anna Karenina*,[43] regarding Anna as the sole representative of "living life" against a background of spiritual disintegration, and Levin only as an example of a search for a contact with "living life."

Articles attempting an analysis of Tolstoy's literary work as a whole are usually connected in theme with some one work; this gives concrete expression to individual features but narrows the scope of the subject. An example of such an article is that by Yu. N. Trotsky[44] which deals with the influence of the Western European historical novel on *War and Peace* and vice versa. In spite of what appears to be a strictly limited subject, the article sets out to prove that Tolstoyan realism is based on Russian literature and that it is "engendered by the social advance at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties," which "forced Tolstoy to reflect on the role of the people in history." Great emphasis is put on Tolstoy's influence on Western European literature while as little as possible is said on the influence of Western literature on Tolstoy. However, the general trend in articles of the Jubilee period is to attribute still more importance to the influence of Tolstoy on the Satellite countries and the countries of the East and less to his influence on Western European literature.

A characteristic trend in articles on the subject "Tolstoy and Art" is to make him an almost infallible authority on all questions of aesthetics as though the authors wish to compensate by this for the complete rejection of his philosophical views; yet it is known that even in literature his tastes were very subjective and could hardly serve as a general criterion. This trend on the part of Soviet authors is evidently designed to secure the support of an acknowledged

---

[41] V. Zhdanov, *Tvorcheskaya istoriya romana L. N. Tolstogo "Voskresenie"* (The Composition of the Novel by L. N. Tolstoy, *Resurrection*), *Sovetsky pisatel*, Moscow, 1959.

[42] L. Bilikis, *op. cit.*, pp. 340—413.

[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 280—339.

[44] *Tvorchestvo Tolstogo, sbornik statei, op. cit.*, pp. 164—202.

authority to counter certain tendencies in Western European aesthetics and literature. The nearest attempt to a general analysis of Tolstoy's literary work is an article by Khrapchenko[45] which is largely about *War and Peace*. There is nothing new in the assertion that a characteristic feature of Tolstoy's writings is the "depiction of manifestations of reality from different positions and from different points of view... through the prism of the perception of individual heroes."

An article by Mikhailov[46] which deals with Tolstoy's influence on Soviet prose-writers sets out to show that all the Soviet writers of any importance have followed the literary traditions of Tolstoy. Only one writer is not mentioned — Boris Pasternak.

In a book on the methods of teaching Tolstoy's literary work in Soviet secondary schools, N. Naumova[47] writes of the necessity of creating "a system for the interpretation of Tolstoy's literary work" for school children. Soviet literary criticism is striving for the creation of a system not of learning but of interpreting the literary work of Tolstoy — and not only for the youth. This accounts for the naive interpretation of the attitude to Tolstoy in the West which is evaluated not as the simultaneous "co-existence" of a multitude of different views on Tolstoy but either as a "foreign" conception of Tolstoy elaborated by the remnants of the "White Guard emigration," or as the presence of two opposite trends — "reactionary" and "progressive."

The Soviet "system of interpretation" of Tolstoy is created primarily with the aid of a framework of quotations permeating the texture of articles on Tolstoy and by no means always thematically or logically connected with their contents. Quotations from Herzen or Chernyshevsky are often encountered but those from Lenin, to whom there is some reference in every article about Tolstoy, and Gorky predominate. Up to now the authors of newspaper articles have managed with quotations from what Soviet literary critics consider to be a classic article by Lenin, "Lev Tolstoy as a Mirror of the Russian Revolution." The authors of journalistic articles and individual publications hunt for quotations from other works of Lenin in order to demonstrate their own initiative. As a rule these quotations are placed either at the beginning or at the end of an article, providing a starting-point or a conclusion. It is, however, very difficult to squeeze the varied literary work of Tolstoy into the artificial framework of a one-sided interpretation.

---

[45] *Voprosy literatury*, Nos. 10 and 11, 1960

[46] Mikhailov, *O nekotorykh traditsiyakh Lva Tolstogo* (Some Traditions of Lev Tolstoy), *Znamya*, No. 11, 1960.

[47] N. Naumova, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

BOOK REVIEWS

Primemenie matematiki v ekonomicheskikh issledovaniyakh

(The Application of Mathematics in Economic Research)

Edited by Academician V. S. NEMCHINOV
Published by the Publishing House of Social and Economic Literature, Moscow, 1959, 486 pp.

This symposium results from a sharp change in the Soviet Union in recent years in the attitude to the use of mathematics in economic research. The preface "From the Publishing House" states:

> For a long time our economists have been dominated by the incorrect opinion that socialist production cannot use mathematics for the purpose of planning the national economy in view of the complexity and diversity of the work of devising and fulfilling a plan. These comrades have failed to take account of the fact that it is not sufficient to investigate the conformity to natural law of the socialist economy from the qualitative standpoint only and that in this case it is also of great importance to bring to light quantitative connections and relations . . . It is also a gross error in planning to apply bourgeois conceptions of "mathematical economics," which incorrectly interpret the internal conformity to natural law of the capitalist means of production and are of a purely apologetic character. But mathematics, as an "instrumental" science, can in our hands serve the purpose of the building of Communism excellently and efficiently . . .

As the preface proceeds to explain, a special laboratory has been established in the Siberian section of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR to study the problem of purging from mathematical methods of economic exploitation any elements of "bourgeois apologetics" and applying these methods in the building of Communism. Its programme of work also includes the compilation of monographs and symposiums on the subject, of which the present symposium is evidently the first in a series.

The symposium contains seven studies of widely varying scope and an extensive bibliography compiled by A. A. Korbut and covering 152 titles of specialized books in related fields of economics and mathematics, 33 of them Russian and the remainder foreign. The bibliography is accompanied by an explanatory article organizing the reference material according to subject.

Two articles in the symposium are by authors from the "people's democracies." The article by Oscar Lange, a leading Polish economist, entitled "Some Reflections on the Analysis of Total Expenditures and the Output of Production" (pp. 214-50) is a somewhat revised version of an article published in 1957

in *Sankhyaa, The Indian Journal of Statistics*, Vol. XVII, Part 4, February 1957. In the first part of his article, Professor Lange bases his analysis of expenditures and output in various branches of the economy on studies by V. Leontev, whose conclusions he somewhat modifies in order to bring them into line with the Marxist labour theory of value, for which purpose he adds to Leontev's total an additional item conforming to the Marxist conception of surplus value. If limited to two main sectors — the production of the means of production and the production of consumer goods — such an approach is entirely satisfactory, but applied to a large number of branch sectors it is less so. In the second part of the article, Professor Lange deals with problems of dynamics. Here he differs with Leontev as to the relation between the co-efficient of utilization of means of production and that of amount of investment, a relation which, according to Lange, can be expressed, by using the period of service of the basic means of production, the "period of turnover," by the following simple formula, amount of investment equals utilization of means of production times period of service.

The article ends with a study of the process of economic growth over long periods of time in relation to the distribution of current production between consumption and capital investment. This study is conducted by using various equations relating to a series of final production periods or "intervals." The author does not make use of the alternative method of continous analysis by derived functions and differential equations.

The article by the Hungarian B. Kreko, entitled "Lectures on Linear Programming" (pp. 400-36), is an extremely elementary and vague introduction to the theory of linear programming. The entire material, which is presented in eight separate lectures, is based on examples and analyses of individual cases and describes the principles of the simplex method, the distributive method and the graphic method. The graphic method, in spite of the advantage of great clarity, is applied to only the most simple problems.

Among the studies by Soviet authors the article by A. L. Lure entitled "Methods of Attaining the Minimum Mileage of Freight Traffic in the Devising of Transport Projects" (pp. 354-89) and that by M. A. Yakovlev entitled "The Problem of the Minimum of Transport Expenditures" (pp. 390-99) are narrowly specialized. The article by G. S. Rubinshtein entitled "Numerical Methods of Solving the Problems of Linear Programming" (pp. 437-60) is a brief reference study based mainly on theoretical studies by Professor L. V. Kantorovich.

The studies of the greatest general interest are two by Professor Kantorovich and one each by Professor V. V. Novozhilov and Academician V. S. Nemchinov. Those by the first two authors are important for their factual scientific content while the article by Nemchinov is mainly interesting as a reflection of the official views of the Soviet Communist Party on the subjects concerned.

The two articles by Kantorovich are "Mathematical Methods of Organising and Planning Production" (pp. 251-76) with a supplement (pp. 277-309) and

"The Further Development of Mathematical Methods and the Prospects of Their Application in Planning and Economics" (pp. 310-53). The first of these studies had appeared earlier in a compendium published in 1939 of lectures delivered by the author in May of that year to representatives of industrial research institutes. The study was apparently the first to deal with the problem of devising an optimum production plan, which it solved by the method subsequently known as linear programming. The impetus towards working out methods of solving this problem had been furnished by a request by the Fonergo Trust to the Institute of Mathematics of the Leningrad State University to recommend the most rational means of utilizing full equipment while maintaining the output of a given assortment of products, a typical problem for solution by linear programming. Professor Kantorovich provides a mathematical formulation of a general type of basic problem which he distinguishes from other types of basic problems by the presence of additional limitations, the economic treatment of which is based on the assumption that the resources available — free capital, man-power and sources of energy — are available in limited quantities only.

The solution worked out by the author and given in detail in the appendix is called that of "resolving multipliers" or "objectively conditioned estimates"; it approximates very closely to the method of shadow prices widely used in studies by the American school of linear programming. He notes the connection between the method of "objectively conditioned estimates" and the concept of the market process of price formation:

> A surplus of a certain type of production causes a decrease in its price, a shortage an increase in its price. We approach production factors in a similar manner. We gradually arrive at the best plan. In one sense this process resembles the process of the fluctuation of market prices when changes occur in the relation between demand and supply.

To some extent the method thus described by Professor Kantorovich has much in common with elements of contemporary economic theories of marginal value since the values which he applies for production or for production factors found in absolute surplus amount to zero. The fact that his views are so similar to certain elements of non-Marxist economic theory probably explains the sharp criticism to which they have recently been subjected in Soviet economic journals. Large parts of both the first article and the second, which was written specially for the symposium, are devoted to analysis of solutions of typical practical cases and to description of the fields of technical and economic activity in which the author believes his method can be most fruitfully applied. In his conclusion he points to limitations in the application of mathematical methods and warns against making a fetish of them.

The study by Professor Novozhilov entitled "The Measurement of Expenditures and Their Effects in a Socialist Economy" (pp. 42-213), which is the

longest in the symposium, occupying a third of the contents, goes far beyond the bounds of research on mathematical methods in economics; its main value lies in its analysis of aspects and problems of Soviet economics. The purely mathematical part of the study in fact, occupies a very small place. Professor Novozhilov presents a picture of the present status of calculations of the cost factor in Soviet planning and remarks that "the presence of a gulf between theory and practice leads to the fact that at the present time the measurement of expenditures is fraught with a high degree of relativity." In practice nearly all the basic data for the compilation of plans, especially for new construction, are merely tentative. He declares:

> Theoretically the economic result of live labour is measured by a single indicator — net production, that is, contribution to the national income. In practice there is no synthetic index of the results of live labour. Net production in plants is not even calculated. The applied indices of the products of live labour have considerable deficiencies. It is difficult to conceive a more flagrant error in economic calculations than loss of the distinction between income and expenditures, result and expense. Meanwhile the elements of this mistake are contained in the most widely applied means of calculating the products of live labour: calculation of overall production according to the factory method or as a quantity of manufactured output.

Novozhilov's conclusions, it may be noted, are fully in accord with Soviet practice, where the habit of basing calculations on "gross output" is one of the basic obstacles to rationalization and modernization of production. "Reliability of indices", he says, "is also an essential condition of democratization of production management. In its absence, expansion of the rights of an enterprise simultaneously expands the possibility of utilizing non-state profits in cases where such profits do not coincide with the welfare of the national economy." This statement reveals the nature of the struggle for the extension of the rights of enterprises, or more accurately of their managers, which has been in progress during recent years and has become particularly acute since the organization of the Councils of National Economy.

The author ends his scathing analysis of the present status and quality of planning with the glowing statement that "it is difficult even to imagine what prospects for the development of the creative activity of the workers and what prospects for the development of the economy and for democratic centralism in economic construction would be revealed if we could easily and accurately estimate what the community receives from each enterprise, workshop and worker. Inexhaustible sources of new wealth, more abundant than the richest natural resources, would come to light." In view of the fact that no economic miracle of this kind has taken place in the more than forty years of existence of the Soviet economic system, there is reason to doubt the possibility of its realization in future if the administration of industry only is reorganized without completely reorganizing the entire economic system.

The later parts of Novozhilov's study are devoted to research on and proposed solutions for three main problems whose solution, in his opinion, would in turn provide a solution for the problem of the correct measurement of expenditures and thereby the problem of the drafting of practical and effective plans. The first of the three problems is that of joint calculation of current expenditures and capital investment; the second that of a situation where the planner is asked to compare variants of different project decisions for new industrial construction; and the third that of the calculation of additional expenditures resulting from deficient materials and other indirect expenses.

The author's formula for joint calculation of current expenditures (cost price) and capital investment includes the concept of an interest rate very close to that applied by the contemporary American school of linear programming.

The second problem, that of comparing variants, amounts to a demand that variants be introduced into a simple production programme. The method of introduction proposed by Novozhilov is in a way the application of an economic "least common multiple" for the programmes of all the variants which are being compared. The most difficult problem is that of the calculation of supplementary expenditures connected with deficiencies of material and other indirect expenses which the author calls "expenses with a reverse connection" or "differential expenses." In a "capitalist" market economy this problem, as the author of the article agrees, is decided, although not ideally, in the process of creation of a competitive market price and establishment of an average norm of profit and interest. The continuation of this process is assured by the search for maximum profits. In a socialist economy this problem must be solved by estimates in every branch of production and according to each variant (hence the term "differential"), of the amount of increase in expenditures by the national economy on production of the product concerned and by selection of the variant with the lowest possible amount of increase. The next stage of the estimate is the checking of the amounts of requisite resources according to their types and of all the most economical variants which have been selected within the existing limits of these resources. Further definition must consist of systematic approaches to the best plan in accordance with data on the availability of resources.

As the author himself notes, even if the application of linear programming is taken into account, where it embraces the entire national economy, such a task "in itself constitutes a colossal task of computation impracticable without electronic computers. But it would very likely be even more complicated to organize the gathering of material to be fed into the computers." Work on such a scale would cause the product to lag behind practical demand and thus, even if it were mathematically an acceptable solution, its practical value would be negligible.

The article by Nemchinov entitled "The Utilization of Mathematical Methods in Economic Studies" (pp. 6-41) refers to the possibility of applying matrix calculation to problems of planning the supply of material and technical equipment for a given production programme. The plan for the supply of material is expressed by the product of the matrix of the co-efficients of specific expenditure in the sector of a work quota; the plan devised by the matrix of the co-efficients of the expenditure can be used for many variants of the work quota. In the remainder of his article Nemchinov concentrates on trying to prove Soviet priority in creating the method of balanced accounts which constitutes the basis of Leontev's theory of input-output analysis. For this purpose he uses the Soviet balance sheet of the national economy for 1923-24. He also makes great efforts to emphasize the priority of Kantorovich, who had published his study in 1939, that is, before the appearance in the USA of the first studies on linear programming. Nemchinov does not dwell on the reasons why the development of these methods and especially their application has stagnated for many years in the USSR while abroad they have been accepted and applied on a broad scale.

In his "Postscript" (pp. 474-82) Nemchinov makes critical comments on the studies of Lange, Kantorovich and Novozhilov and points out what he calls deviations from orthodox Marxist theory. In this respect both Nemchinov's article and his postscript are characteristic of the Soviet attitude to serious scientific research, as indeed is the symposium as a whole.

Contrary to the expectations aroused by the title, the symposium fails to cover a number of fields of the application of mathematics in economic research such as the mathematical theory of the balance sheet of the national economy, the application of the theory of self-regulating systems to the study of the dynamics of economic processes, and the application of methods of mathematical statistics to the discovery of trends of development. Nevertheless, the symposium constitutes a serious survey of the practical and theoretical problems arising in the USSR in the process of "socialist planning."

S. Kirsanov

Hayastani Komunistakan Partiyayi Patmoutian Ourvagdzer

(Outlines of the History of the Communist Party of Armenia)

Edited by H. K. MARGARIAN, A. N. MNATSKANIAN and K. H. BARSEGHIAN
Published by the State Publishing House, Erevan, 1958, 686 pp.

This first history of the Communist Party of Armenia did not appear until thirty-eight years after the establishment of Communist rule in the country. The various sections were written by different authors and collectively edited. Publication of the book was not an event peculiar to Armenia. Histories of the

Communist parties of the other Soviet republics have also appeared in recent years according to plan, also, as a rule, collectively written.

The book begins with a two-page foreword which is far more revealing than the body of the text, for it states bluntly that the Communist Party of Armenia is merely a militant detachment of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. As to the origin of the book itself, the foreword provides the following curious information:

> As early as 1923, the Second Congress of the Communist Party of Armenia, after hearing a report on the history of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, passed a resolution calling for the study and subsequent publication as a separate book of the history of the Communist Party of Armenia. This resolution, however, was not carried out for many long years. It was not till 1954 that, by decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, work was undertaken on a large scale toward the writing of the history of the Communist Party of Armenia, resulting in the publication of this book.

The fact that it took thirty-five years to carry out a resolution passed in 1923 is highly intriguing. Regarding the organization of the material, the foreword says:

> The *Outlines of the History of the Communist Party of Armenia* for the first time gives a scientific presentation of the history of the development of the social-democratic organizations of Armenia from the end of the nineteenth century, then the history of the Bolshevik organizations from the day of their foundation to 1920, and finally the history of the Communist Party of Armenia from 1920 to the end of 1957.

As to this pattern of organization, it is necessary to point out that the real history of the Communist Party of Armenia begins in 1920, that is to say, with the planning and carrying out of the occupation of Armenia by foreign armed forces and the establishment in the country of a despotic regime alien to the character and traditions of the Armenian people. The Communist Party in Armenia did not evolve out of the life of the Armenian people, nor was it the result of the interplay or reshuffling of native social and political forces, but it came into being only in consequence of a change in circumstances created by the approach and incursion of foreign forces.

The book, says the foreword, was prepared by the Institute of History of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia, which in turn is the Armenian branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The authors are members of the institute and all have degrees of Candidate or Doctor of Historical Sciences. The first chapter (pp. 7-104) was written by V. A. Avetisian, the second (pp. 1045-1054) by G. M. Mneyan, the third and fourth (pp. 155-267) by G. B. Gharibdjanian, the fifth and sixth (pp. 268-415) by A. M. Hakobian, and the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth and elenventh chapters, as well as the Conclusion,

(pp. 416-680) by A. N. Mnatskanian. Shortly after the appearance of the book, Mnatskanian was removed from his posts in disgrace. Almost the same fate befell another editor, Margarian, who was unexpectedly, and without explanation, removed from his post as Second Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia and appointed Minister of Culture, a position of secondary importance under Soviet conditions. Such purges are of frequent occurrence in the Soviet Union and are one of the chief barriers to serious creative effort, as well as one of the reasons why books often appear in new editions.

The book was obviously compiled by applying to facts and events in Armenia the principles and methods compulsory for all text-books of Party history published in the Soviet Union. However, as these facts and events alone did not provide sufficient material of the type required for compilation of a Party history, considerable space was devoted to generalizations and to description of parallel occurrences in Russia. If the book had been reduced to a quarter the size of the present volume it would probably have been more in accord with its title and with the declared objectives of the authors. It is frequently necessary to read through several paragraphs before encountering a fact of significance.

Another characteristic of the book is that the difference between the history of the people and that of the Party is not kept clear. As is usual in Soviet writings on history and sociology, the Communist movement is portrayed as the expression of the will of the progressive, conscientious and energetic elements of the people concerned, in an attempt to give the impression that the histories of the people and the Party are identical. It is therefore not surprising that the sections of the book which are supposed to record the history of the Party are in fact merely summaries of books on the various periods in the history of the people. The term "Communist Party" is frequently used in an effort to remind the reader that he is reading a book on the history of the Communist Party of Armenia and not one of the numerous books of a general nature he has so often come across, but the result is quite the opposite, because of disregard or inconsistent treatment of the main trends in the history of the people and of the nature and spirit of non-Communist movements. By placing Communism in the foreground, the authors distort the role of other forces in the people's history and give an incorrect picture of the factors which brought the Communist movement into Armenia, as well as presenting a false impression of its course and consequences.

In spite of the collective editing, the style and approach of the portions written by different authors are of uneven quality. The first chapter is the longest and, in spite of serious defects, the best. It covers the spread of Marxism and the rise of social-democratic movements in Armenia during the long period extending from 1880 to 1904 and accordingly deals with the sporadic appearance of Communist ideas and the first steps in organizational effort during the pre-Bolshevik era. The author therefore feels the need of

presenting a general picture of Armenian life at the time, together with reflections of the social, economic, political and revolutionary outlook of the time, including mention of the various existing movements. Since there is an unlimited amount of documentary material for the purpose, the author, even when preoccupied with a one-sided interpretation of a limited number of facts, simply has no occasion to indulge extensively in the general statements peculiar to Communist authors. But even in this chapter, there is a consistent effort to prove that the course of events in Armenia provided a logical preparation for the rise and extension of the Communist movement. Even when discussing the outlook and activities of the different Armenian organisations, the author emphasizes what he calls the unique value of the Communist movement to the Armenian people, even going so far as to ascribe to the anti-nationalist Communists certain achievements of the nationalist parties. For example, when analysing Armenian public life in the latter part of the last century he correctly states that "the leading intelligentsia of Armenia ascribed equal importance to the questions of the national and the social liberation of the people, devoting heroic efforts towards working out a correct theory and practice for the solution of both problems" (p. 35). "The internal strife among the Armenian populists (*narodniki*)," he continues, "coincided with the period when, on the one hand, due to the advance of capitalism, the old revolutionary *populism* had exhausted itself, and, on the other hand, Tsarism had intensified its policies of persecution and assimilation in the national peripheries of Russia. . . . The propaganda by the separate Armenian national movement during the eighties and the nineties enjoyed considerable success and attracted an appreciable section not only of the bourgeoisie but also of the democratic intelligentsia and of the democratic elements of the petty bourgeoisie" (pp. 40-41). But he follows this with an outspoken attack on the Armenians who were more interested in nationalism than in the general political movements of the time. "The abandonment by the basic part of the Armenian intelligentsia of questions of all-Russian political life," he says, "for those of a purely Armenian character retarded the development of Armenian revolutionary thought for a certain period in comparison with progressive Russian political thought" (p. 42). Anything of a specifically national character, he implies, was of no benefit to the Armenian people, while anything in any way connected with the general Marxist movement in the Empire was inevitably progressive and useful. The author views from the same angle the rise of Social Democratic cells which gave priority to the general Russian labour movement over the struggle for liberation from the Ottoman Empire.

In a similar manner, the author distorts the problem of the Armenian Church. He describes correctly the Tsarist decree of June 12, 1903, confiscating Armenian Church property, a decree aimed against the vital interests of the Armenian people, and emphasizes the resistance which it aroused among all classes and shades of opinion. But although he admits that "the Armenian

anti-Tsarist movement embraced the whole of the Armenian people," he seeks to ascribe a decisive and almost monopolistic role to the Social Democrats, who in fact played no vital part in this struggle. The active opposition of the Armenian people at large to the confiscation of Church property by the central government was led exclusively by the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (*Dashnaktsoutyun*), which for the first time directed a portion of its strength, mainly engaged in the fight against Ottoman rule, against the Tsarist regime; the Social Democrats merely acquiesced in this opposition, and that only because it happened to be anti-Tsarist.

The chapters devoted to the period 1904-20 contain very little about life and events in Armenia, but are filled with extracts from Lenin and other official sources; the main emphasis is on the development of the all-Russian labour movement and the activities of the Bolsheviks, while the history of the Armenian Social-Democrat organization is treated as merely the history of a local branch of the all-Russian Social-Democrat organization. A careful study of the many interesting developments within the Armenian Social-Democrat movement of the time would have led to instructive conclusions. But the authors have chosen the easier road of appraising events on the basis of statements by Lenin. It must, however, be pointed out that they could not have done otherwise, for a more critical approach would have involved the unforgivable sin of "revisionism." These chapters are more violent in their attacks upon the non-Communist, particularly the nationalist, organizations. This is understandable first, because these organizations enjoyed great popular support and second, because they had taken a definite stand as between national and anti-national movements and were hostile towards Armenian ideological groups which acted under directives from outside. These chapters continue the attempt to identify the interests of the Armenian people with those of the Russian proletariat. "*Pravda*," says one of the authors, "emphasized that the liberation of the Armenian people would only be possible in the event of the victory of the revolutionary struggle of the Russian proletariat" (p. 178). This argument, however, is contradicted by the citation of "Lenin's directives" for a general struggle against the forces of nationalism.

Naturally, special emphasis is devoted to the events of the revolutionary years 1917-20. Here again efforts are exerted to justify what are called the "Leninist actions" of the Russian Communist Party and its Armenian members, even if these were diametrically opposed to the interests of the Armenian people. Of course, more space is devoted to general events, including a chronological history of the principal occurrences, than to the views and separate concepts of Armenian Communists. These events are analyzed and interpreted exclusively from the traditional Bolshevik point of view, leading to frequent distortion of their significance. The authors devote much space to a wearisome recital of facts and figures about the press organs, Party leaders and Party meetings and their decisions.

The book describes the first steps in organizing a Communist Party in Armenia as follows:

> In September 1919, through the initiative and leadership of the Caucasian District Committee and with the participation of its representatives, the first consultative meeting of the Communist organizations of Armenia was held in Erevan, where an executive body of the Russian Communist Party for Armenia (Armenkom) was elected and the unity of Party organizations in Armenia was thus established . . . In January 1920 the first conference of Communist organizations in Armenia was illegally convened in Erevan, with the participation of representatives of 22 organizations with a total membership of 1,200 (p. 246-248).

Here it should be noted that the Communist Party of Armenia, created, according to the *Outlines*, in June, 1920, was brought into being by direct orders from the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party. It devoted itself to the pursual of the Russian Party's colonial policy, which it proceeded to apply to Armenia immediately after a First Congress of the Peoples of the East, convened in Baku in September 1920 at the initiative of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Accordingly, it appears that the question of creating a Communist Party of Armenia was raised after the Comintern had decided to Sovietize the country.

The number of Communists in Armenia, especially those capable of providing leadership, was so small that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party deemed it necessary to send in 182 Communists from Russia and about 300 from Azerbaidzhan.

The actual existence of the Communist Party of Armenia dates from 1921 and a history of the Party should therefore concentrate more completely on the Armenian Party from that date on than in the preceding period. But in discussing the events of the next few decades, this book pays more attention to general events in Armenia than to the history of the Party proper and ends by identifying the history of the Party completely with that of the people.

At first glance, the chapters devoted to the period 1921-57 give the impression of being mere collections of statistical data and recitals of boring details on Party congresses. It is true that some of these data, based on official sources, refer to Party life, showing the number of members, internal changes, growth or decline and the role and consequences of purges, but the number of tables is out of all proportion to the meagre attention devoted to critical periods in Party life, reflecting the clash between factions and opposing views and of significance in explaining the course of events. Such neglected periods are the years 1927-30, 1936-38, 1947-50, and the post-Stalin years 1953-56. But again it must be said in all fairness to the authors that an attempt to deal in detail with these matters would no doubt have been viewed with disfavour from above, with the unpleasant consequences that such disfavour entails under the Soviet system.

Only occasionally does the book deal with the critical periods in the history of the Communist Party of Armenia corresponding to phases in the history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Although the pages devoted to these periods treat events superficially, they constitute the most interesting parts of the book. For example, the pages devoted to the struggle against Trotskyism provide many revealing facts although they are interpreted from the point of view of the Party rather than that of independent scholarship. There is, for instance, the following comment on Rightist tendencies in connection with the campaign for collectivization of agriculture:

> In Armenia, Rightist tendencies are interwoven with nationalist tendencies and take the form of national deviationism. In order to veil the class struggle being waged in the villages and to defend the interests of the kulaks, the Rightists spread the view that there were no kulaks in Armenia, that all peasants were equally destitute and that therefore Soviet authorities should adopt the same attitude towards all of them (p. 372).

The actual description of events in Armenia in the course of agrarian collectivization, in fact provides evidence in favour of the people rather than the Communist Party. It was impossible to avoid mention of the peasant risings of 1930-31, though, of course, the reader will only find a Communist version.

The fourth section of the seventh chapter of the *Outlines* is of exceptional value, particularly pages 451-457, which summarize "a number of negative phenomena which appeared in the internal life of the Party" during the years 1936-37 by giving a brief account of police acts of persecution and oppression applied to Party and state officials, intelligentsia and the general public. For example:

> Such a situation was created within the leading organs of the Communist Party of Armenia that careerist elements resorted to acts of provocation and accused honest Communists of being "enemies of the people" and "nationalists." A number of careerists working in Party organs were inflicted with the mania of seeking enemies among Communists . . . Towards the beginning of 1937 new false documents were manufactured, according to which the NKVD had discovered a new anti-revolutionary nationalist group. Based on these false documents, Beria, Amatuni and their collaborators persecuted N. Stepanian, A. Yeghiazarian, A. Yessayan, D. Ter-Simonian, L. Arissian and others. The psychosis of seeking bourgeois nationalists spread to the field of culture. The great poet, old soldier of the Civil War and Old Bolshevik Yegishe Charents, Communist writers A. Bakunts, V. Alazan, and A. Vshtuni, Old Bolshevik artist H. Gulikyakhian and other writers, artists and scientists were thrown into prison (pp. 453-454).

The ninth chapter of the book, entitled "The Communist Party of Armenia During the Years of the Great Fatherland War of the Soviet Union (1941-45," contains a good deal of valuable factual information and often bears signs of genuine enthusiasm, perhaps because ideological barriers were weakened during the war. It is, however, true that the chapter does not present a complete history of the participation of the Armenian people in the war, but rather provides the Communist version of the war years.

The subsequent chapters are short and embrace brief periods. In these too, the most interesting parts are those which deal directly with Party life and refer to various crises. Of particular interest from this point of view are the chapters entitled "The Measures Taken by the Party to Strengthen Ideological Work" and "The Decision of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party Regarding the State of the Communist Party of Armenia, and the Struggle for its Implementation" (pp. 599-604).

The events within the Communist Party of Armenia during the post-Stalin period are given in pages 634-638, 650-651 and 653-655. Of considerable interest are a summary of the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, and a report of two resolutions by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1956, one condemning the activities of the District Party Committee of Erevan and another on "concrete questions" concerning the Communist Party of Armenia. With reference to these resolutions, the book comments as follows on a too liberal interpretation of Khrushchev's criticisms of Stalin:

> At the same time, the Central Committee pointed out the serious mistakes which were allowed to be committed by different Party organizations and a number of Party members in Armenia.
>
> These mistakes were particularly reflected in the meetings of the District Party *Active* of Erevan and in the Party organizations of the State University, the Polytechnic Institute and the Association of Writers. Individual Communists misunderstood the directives of the Party on criticism of the cult of J. V. Stalin. Under the guise of criticism of the cult of the individual, they made unfounded attacks upon the policy implemented by the Party and the Soviet government and upon the Soviet system, and began to deny the advantages of socialist democracy over each and every bourgeois democracy. Instead of correctly understanding the mistakes committed by J. V. Stalin towards the end of his life and the negative effects of the cult of the individual, they vulgarly identified these mistakes with the entire activity of the Party, boldly placed doubt on J. V. Stalin's entire career, and tried to revise the policy of the Party in the struggle for the building of socialism in our country . . . In its resolution, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party underlined these mistakes and pointed out that the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Armenia had delayed the investigation of the question of expressions of anti-Party opinions in different organizations, and that even after investigation it had not made an appropriate Party-political appraisal of these opinions and had not punished the slanderers and demagogues (pp. 653-654).

These reprimands by the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party are far more revealing than the lengthy assertions regarding the unity of Party ranks. While it is untrue that opposition tendencies were limited to "different Party organizations" and "a few members," and that members of the opposition were "slanderers and demagogues," it is a fact that the much-vaunted "ideological unity" within the ranks of the Communist Party of Armenia exists only on the surface and is maintained only by means of periodical repri-

mands and orders from the centre. And this in turn is additional proof of the fact that the Communist Party of Armenia owes its existence exclusively to force applied from outside and that its history is merely the history of the activities in Armenia of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Conclusion concentrates on generalizations. One is that "the historic experience of the Communist Party of Armenia shows that the only correct policy for saving the long-suffering Armenian people from the centuries-old yoke of national and social pressure was elaborated and implemented by the Communist Party" (p. 665), in contrast with all the other Armenian national organizations and in particular with the Armenian Revolutionary Federation. "The pro-Western orientation of the Dashnaktsoutun," says the book, "turned out to be an orientation which sacrificed the interests of the Armenian people to the bourgeois-imperialist states." Moreover, the author continues:

> The Communist Party of Armenia, guided by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, understood the interests of the Armenian people correctly, felt the pulse of the political life of the country and of its salvation at the opportune moment, implemented verified tactics and strategy, organized and led the armed struggle of the masses of workers and peasants for the victory of the ideals of the Great October Revolution in Armenia . . . The history of the Communist Party of Armenia shows that it was only the Communist Party that put an end to the dependent and colonial status of Armenia, liberated the people from the traps of the bourgeois diplomats and the yoke of exploiters, created an independent national state where the people are the masters of the land and where democracy is implemented to the widest possible extent . . . The history of the Communist Party of Armenia is the history of a stubborn and continuous struggle against petty-bourgeois influences, opportunist deviations, and anti-Party fractions which had penetrated into the Party" (pp. 679-680).

The authors of the *Outlines*, then, ascribe to the Communist Party of Armenia not only credit for having realised social aims, but also the mission of defending national interests and of creating a national state. But how can the Communist Party of Armenia pursue national aims, when in virtue of its very doctrine, as the standard-bearer of international Communism, it denies nations the right to individual independent existence? Even if it be supposed for a moment that the overwhelming majority of the members of the Communist Party of Armenia desire to realise national aspirations, how can they bring this about when they are totally within the grip of the Soviet Communist Party, are deprived of the right to manage their own affairs, including the right to appoint or dismiss their own leaders, and are completely dependent on orders from the Communist regime in Moscow.

After publication of the *Outlines*, radical criticism of it appeared in the Party press of Armenia and the Party Central Committee adopted resolutions in March and May 1959 calling for publication of a new edition within two or three years.

Norair Arissian

INSTITUTE NEWS AND NOTES

For the past few years the Institute has made available a few summer interneships for young scholars wishing to perform research and obtain language practice. Eight students, from the United States, France, and Germany, have enrolled for the summer of 1961. Their time will be divided between attendance at seminars conducted by Institute researchers, supervised individual research in the Institute library of 50,000 volumes of Soviet material, and Russian or other language practice in small discussion groups.

The 1961 annual Institute conference will be held in Munich on July 25 and 26, 1961, on the theme "Soviet Colonialism in Theory and Practice." The following papers will be presented: "The Basic Features of Soviet Colonialism — Colonialism of a New Type," by Prof. Panas Fedenko, Institute for the Study of the USSR; "The Colonial Policy of the Soviet Regime Toward the National Republics of the USSR," by Prof. A. Adamovich, New York; "Turkestan as an Example of Soviet Colonial Policy," by Dr. Baymirza Hayid, University of Cologne; "Soviet Colonial Policy in the Communist Countries," by Dr. Hans Bräker, University of Cologne; and "Soviet Policy Regarding the Underdeveloped Countries," by Mme Suzanne Labin, Paris, with supplementary papers on "Communist Infiltration in Mongolia," by Prof. W. B. Ballis, University of Michigan, and "Soviet Economic Expansion in the Underdeveloped Countries," by Prof. E. Glovinsky, Institute for the Study of the USSR. The main language of the conference will be Russian, with provision for translation. The conference proceedings will be published as the thirteenth in the series of Institute conference reports.

*

Recent Institute monographic studies include the following: Panas Fedenko, *The New "History of the Communist Party,"* a critique and analysis of the latest official version of Party history, in Russian; A. Z. Arkhimovich, *Plant Cultivation in the USSR,* a handbook on the subject, in Russian; Alexander Kischkowsky, *Die sowjetische Religionspolitik und die Russische Orthodoxe Kirche,* a second edition of the book; *Religion in the USSR,* a symposium on both Christian and other confessions in the Soviet Union; David Burg, *Youth Opposition Trends in the "Post-Thaw" Years,* a brief account of the views of young people as revealed in the literature of the period of relatively free expression following the death of Stalin; M. de Santerre, *Soviet Concentration Camps and Their Inmates,* a memoir and description by an intelligent observer.

The present periodical publications of the Institute include in addition to the English-language *Studies on the Soviet Union, New Series* and *Bulletin* a number of reviews in other languages: *Sowjetstudien* in German, *Problèmes Soviétiques* in French, *Dergi* in Turkish, *Majallah* in Arabic, and a new journal, *Estudios sobre la Unión Soviética,* in Spanish. The *Analysis of Current Developments in the Soviet Union,* a weekly commentary on developments on the Soviet scene, appears in English and Russian editions.

Two extended trips on behalf of the Institute have recently been made for the purpose of making an inquiry into the problems of greatest interest in the areas visited, in order to increase the value of Institute research and publication. Mr. Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, an Institute charter member, visited several countries of the Near East and Mr. Herman Achminov, a member of the Institute research staff, travelled to the major educational centres of India.

*

Among Institute studies nearing publication is a handbook on Siberia and the Soviet Far East. The *Biographic Directory of the Soviet Union* published in 1958 is being enlarged and completely revised and will appear early in 1962 as one of the well-known *Who's Who* series. The widely-used index, *Institute Publications*, the last edition of which provided a guide to more than one thousand Institute books, articles, and reports published in the years 1951—58, is being brought up to date to cover the years 1951—60.

Contributors to this Issue

GEORG STADTMÜLLER. Born in 1909 in Bürstadt, Hessen. 1935—38 department head in the Osteuropa-Institut, Breslau. 1938—45 Professor of the History and Culture of South-Eastern Europe at Leipzig University. Since 1950 Professor of Comparative Historical Research at Munich University. Since 1960 Director of the Osteuropa-Institut, Munich.

L. M. UYAZEBEK. Professor of Law. Born in 1904. Member of the Institute for the Study of the USSR and member of its Learned Council.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG. Born in 1922 in St. Augustin, Florida, United States. In 1953 was awarded the Ph. D. degree at Columbia University. Now Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin. Author of the books *Ukrainian Nationalism 1939-45* and *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite.*

I. S. KOROPECKYJ. Born in the West Ukraine. Has studied economics in European universities and is now a research student working for a Ph. D. degree at Columbia University. He is a free-lance contributor of articles on various aspects of the Soviet economy to Western periodicals.

VSEVOLOD S. HOLUBNYCHY. Born in Kharkov. Economist. B. S. and M. A. Is working for a Ph. D. at Columbia University. Member of the American Economics Association. Corresponding member of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

ALEXANDER Z. ARKHIMOVICH. Born in 1892. Graduated at the University of St. Vladimir, Kiev, in 1917 and the Agronomy Faculty of the Kiev Polytechnical Institute in 1922. A Doctor of Biological Sciences specializing in plant propagation and selection. Honorary member of the Institute for the Study of the USSR.

C. OLGIN. Born in Orel in 1904. Later emigrated to the West. B. Sc. of London University. Has made a study of totalitarian ideology.

PANAS V. FEDENKO. Born in 1893. Historian and teacher. Author of studies on the ancient and modern history of the Ukraine. Member of the Institute for the Study of the USSR and member of its Learned Council.

I. N. BUSHMAN. Born in 1921. Collaborator of the Institute for the Study of the USSR. Literary critic and literary historian.

SERGEJ E. KIRSANOV. Born in 1905. Graduated at the Kharkov Technological Institute in 1927. Electrical engineer specializing in power supply.

NORAIR ARISSIAN. Born in Armenia and graduated from the Erevan Institute of Education. Was a college teacher in Armenia until the outbreak of the Second World War.